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Subject: Re: [RFC] ssh: remove unconfined_shell_domtrans(sshd_t)
To:     Dominick Grift <dac.override@gmail.com>,
        selinux-refpolicy@vger.kernel.org
References: <20190831172713.140005-1-dac.override@gmail.com>
From:   Chris PeBenito <pebenito@ieee.org>
Message-ID: <21a95013-0147-63fa-77ab-471ef24b0eb8@ieee.org>
Date:   Sat, 31 Aug 2019 16:54:33 -0400
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On 8/31/19 1:27 PM, Dominick Grift wrote:
> This call allows sshd_t associated processes with run shell with an automatic domain transition to unconfined_t.
> I was unable to make sense of the commit that added this:
> 
> https://github.com/SELinuxProject/refpolicy/commit/708aab13932bb8830a2d37850cc0a5c72a5d4df4
> 
> Debian's motd dynamic pam module makes sshd run a shell, we want this shell to run with sshd_t instead of unconfined_t
> 
> This patch will make the ssh_sysadm_login boolean apply to unconfined ssh logins.
> To me this makes sense, as unconfined_t is targeted equivalent to the strict sysadm_t.
> The boolean could however be renamed to the more generic ssh_priv_login name.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Dominick Grift <dac.override@gmail.com>
> ---
>   policy/modules/services/ssh.te | 4 ----
>   1 file changed, 4 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/policy/modules/services/ssh.te b/policy/modules/services/ssh.te
> index 4e75b6e1..a99ad912 100644
> --- a/policy/modules/services/ssh.te
> +++ b/policy/modules/services/ssh.te
> @@ -328,10 +328,6 @@ optional_policy(`
>   	systemd_dbus_chat_logind(sshd_t)
>   ')
>   
> -optional_policy(`
> -	unconfined_shell_domtrans(sshd_t)
> -')
> -
>   optional_policy(`
>   	xserver_domtrans_xauth(sshd_t)
>   	xserver_link_xdm_keys(sshd_t)

I don't have any objections to this.

-- 
Chris PeBenito