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Subject: Re: memlockd
To:     russell@coker.com.au,
        "selinux-refpolicy@vger.kernel.org" 
        <selinux-refpolicy@vger.kernel.org>
References: <1920940.Lkz1Kncxd7@xev>
From:   Chris PeBenito <pebenito@ieee.org>
Message-ID: <109b4ae6-a8b4-7bc8-8a20-8edfc838ac2f@ieee.org>
Date:   Sun, 16 Feb 2020 10:30:13 -0500
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On 2/11/20 10:34 PM, Russell Coker wrote:
> The attach patch adds policy for memlockd, this is a daemon that locks
> important programs and config files into RAM so that if the system is paging
> heavily the sysadmin still has a good chance of being able to login to
> diagnose problems.

Please inline patch and add signed-off-by.

> --- /dev/null
> +++ refpolicy-2.20200209/policy/modules/services/memlockd.te
> @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
> +policy_module(memlockd, 1.0.0)
> +
> +########################################
> +#
> +# Declarations
> +#
> +
> +type memlockd_t;
> +type memlockd_exec_t;
> +init_daemon_domain(memlockd_t, memlockd_exec_t)
> +
> +########################################
> +#
> +# Local policy
> +#
> +
> +allow memlockd_t self:capability { setgid setuid ipc_lock };
> +allow memlockd_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
> +allow memlockd_t self:unix_dgram_socket { create connect };
> +
> +# cache /etc/shadow too
> +auth_read_shadow(memlockd_t)
> +auth_map_shadow(memlockd_t)
> +
> +sysnet_map_config(memlockd_t)
> +files_read_etc_files(memlockd_t)
> +
> +# for ldd
> +corecmd_exec_bin(memlockd_t)
> +corecmd_exec_shell(memlockd_t)
 > +
> +libs_exec_ld_so(memlockd_t)
> +
> +corecmd_search_bin(memlockd_t)
> +files_map_etc_files(memlockd_t)
> +# has to exec for ldd
> +corecmd_exec_all_executables(memlockd_t)

I would guess this is doing mmap_exec but not execute_no_trans.


> +corecmd_read_all_executables(memlockd_t)
> +
> +logging_send_syslog_msg(memlockd_t)
> +
> +miscfiles_read_localization(memlockd_t)
> +
> Index: refpolicy-2.20200209/policy/modules/system/sysnetwork.if
> ===================================================================
> --- refpolicy-2.20200209.orig/policy/modules/system/sysnetwork.if
> +++ refpolicy-2.20200209/policy/modules/system/sysnetwork.if
> @@ -366,6 +366,31 @@ interface(`sysnet_read_config',`
>  
>  #######################################
>  ## <summary>
> +##	map network config files.
> +## </summary>
> +## <desc>
> +##	<p>
> +##	Allow the specified domain to mmap the
> +##	general network configuration files.
> +##	</p>
> +## </desc>
> +## <param name="domain">
> +##	<summary>
> +##	Domain allowed access.
> +##	</summary>
> +## </param>
> +#
> +interface(`sysnet_map_config',`

Please change name to sysnet_mmap_read_config().

> +	gen_require(`
> +		type net_conf_t;
> +	')
> +
> +	files_search_etc($1)
> +	allow $1 net_conf_t:file { read_file_perms map };
> +')
> +

-- 
Chris PeBenito