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Subject: Re: [PATCH] strict patches
From:   Daniel Burgener <dburgener@linux.microsoft.com>
To:     Russell Coker <russell@coker.com.au>,
        selinux-refpolicy@vger.kernel.org
References: <X/16iLdAwmYW/3cp@xev>
 <40e12eb0-782d-2a73-3cd9-a2e2cca2d916@linux.microsoft.com>
Message-ID: <9e38ca3b-cc76-2b52-dcd5-01c661cdcfcd@linux.microsoft.com>
Date:   Tue, 12 Jan 2021 09:18:42 -0500
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On 1/12/21 9:15 AM, Daniel Burgener wrote:
> On 1/12/21 5:31 AM, Russell Coker wrote:
>> Also remove the systemd_analyze_t domain which
>> does no good.
>
> I proposed this same change on github: 
> https://github.com/SELinuxProject/refpolicy/pull/321
>
> The consensus there was that having a separate domain for this access 
> would add value and the better direction would be to flesh out the 
> permissions it needs.? We have a bit of a starting point locally on 
> that.? I'm not sure what shape it's in with regard to upstreaming, but 
> I'll talk to the developer who worked on it.
>
> -Daniel

My mistake - looks like we ended up granting the needed permissions to 
the parent domain in our environment, so I don't have any 
systemd-analyze policy available for upstream.? I still might try 
developing some, but I don't expect that I'm likely to get to it soon.

-Daniel