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Subject: Re: [PATCH] more Chrome stuff
To:     Russell Coker <russell@coker.com.au>,
        selinux-refpolicy@vger.kernel.org
References: <YAf4o+bWqueNpBrT@xev>
From:   Chris PeBenito <pebenito@ieee.org>
Message-ID: <9026bc26-8f2c-92a1-6a51-5618f60b4f26@ieee.org>
Date:   Mon, 25 Jan 2021 09:38:54 -0500
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On 1/20/21 4:32 AM, Russell Coker wrote:
> Patches for some more Chrome stuff
> 
> Signed-off-by: Russell Coker <russell@coker.com.au>
> 
> Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/apps/chromium.te
> ===================================================================
> --- refpolicy-2.20210120.orig/policy/modules/apps/chromium.te
> +++ refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/apps/chromium.te
> @@ -90,7 +90,9 @@ xdg_cache_content(chromium_xdg_cache_t)
>   #
>   
>   # execmem for load in plugins
> -allow chromium_t self:process { execmem getsched getcap setcap setrlimit setsched sigkill signal };
> +allow chromium_t self:process { execmem getsched getcap setcap setrlimit setsched sigkill signal signull };
> +allow chromium_t self:dir { write add_name };
> +allow chromium_t self:file create;
>   allow chromium_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
>   allow chromium_t self:sem create_sem_perms;
>   allow chromium_t self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket client_stream_socket_perms;
> @@ -144,7 +146,12 @@ dyntrans_pattern(chromium_t, chromium_re
>   domtrans_pattern(chromium_t, chromium_sandbox_exec_t, chromium_sandbox_t)
>   domtrans_pattern(chromium_t, chromium_naclhelper_exec_t, chromium_naclhelper_t)
>   
> +# for self:file create
> +kernel_associate_proc(chromium_t)
> +
> +kernel_get_sysvipc_info(chromium_t)
>   kernel_list_proc(chromium_t)
> +kernel_read_crypto_sysctls(chromium_t)
>   kernel_read_fs_sysctls(chromium_t)
>   kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(chromium_t)
>   kernel_read_net_sysctls(chromium_t)
> @@ -156,6 +163,7 @@ corecmd_exec_shell(chromium_t)
>   corenet_tcp_connect_all_unreserved_ports(chromium_t)
>   corenet_tcp_connect_ftp_port(chromium_t)
>   corenet_tcp_connect_http_port(chromium_t)
> +corenet_tcp_connect_ipp_port(chromium_t)
>   corenet_udp_bind_generic_node(chromium_t)
>   corenet_udp_bind_all_unreserved_ports(chromium_t)
>   
> @@ -325,6 +333,9 @@ userdom_use_user_terminals(chromium_rend
>   
>   xdg_read_config_files(chromium_renderer_t)
>   
> +# should we have a tunable for this?
> +xdg_read_pictures(chromium_t)
> +
>   xserver_user_x_domain_template(chromium_renderer, chromium_renderer_t, chromium_tmpfs_t)
>   
>   tunable_policy(`chromium_read_system_info',`
> Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/kernel/kernel.if
> ===================================================================
> --- refpolicy-2.20210120.orig/policy/modules/kernel/kernel.if
> +++ refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/kernel/kernel.if
> @@ -2442,6 +2442,24 @@ interface(`kernel_rw_all_sysctls',`
>   
>   ########################################
>   ## <summary>
> +##	Associate a file to proc_t (/proc)
> +## </summary>
> +## <param name="domain">
> +##	<summary>
> +##	Domain allowed access.
> +##	</summary>
> +## </param>
> +## <rolecap/>
> +#
> +interface(`kernel_associate_proc',`
> +	gen_require(`
> +		type proc_t;
> +	')
> +	allow $1 proc_t:filesystem associate;
> +')
> +
> +########################################
> +## <summary>
>   ##	Send a kill signal to unlabeled processes.
>   ## </summary>
>   ## <param name="domain">

Merged.

-- 
Chris PeBenito