From: "J. Bruce Fields" <[email protected]>
Thanks to James Ralston for helping debug a problem with the server's
handling of kerberos principal names, which could cause 4.1 mount
failures when using Active Directory.
Along the way I noticed another bug and some opportunities for minor
cleanup.
--b.
J. Bruce Fields (5):
svcrpc: move some initialization to common code
nfsd: helper for dup of possibly NULL string
nfsd: minor consolidation of mach_cred handling code
nfsd: fix unlikely NULL deref in mach_creds_match
nfsd4: fix gss-proxy 4.1 mounts for some AD principals
fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c | 55 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
include/linux/sunrpc/svcauth.h | 9 +++++-
net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_rpc_upcall.c | 3 ++
net/sunrpc/svcauth.c | 2 ++
net/sunrpc/svcauth_unix.c | 8 ------
5 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
--
2.5.0
From: "J. Bruce Fields" <[email protected]>
Technically the initialization in the NULL case isn't even needed as the
only caller already has target zeroed out, but it seems safer to keep
copy_cred generic.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <[email protected]>
---
fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c | 21 +++++++++++++++------
1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c
index 6b800b5b8fed..db53df069069 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c
@@ -1857,15 +1857,24 @@ static void copy_clid(struct nfs4_client *target, struct nfs4_client *source)
target->cl_clientid.cl_id = source->cl_clientid.cl_id;
}
-static int copy_cred(struct svc_cred *target, struct svc_cred *source)
+int strdup_if_nonnull(char **target, char *source)
{
- if (source->cr_principal) {
- target->cr_principal =
- kstrdup(source->cr_principal, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (target->cr_principal == NULL)
+ if (source) {
+ *target = kstrdup(source, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!*target)
return -ENOMEM;
} else
- target->cr_principal = NULL;
+ *target = NULL;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int copy_cred(struct svc_cred *target, struct svc_cred *source)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = strdup_if_nonnull(&target->cr_principal, source->cr_principal);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
target->cr_flavor = source->cr_flavor;
target->cr_uid = source->cr_uid;
target->cr_gid = source->cr_gid;
--
2.5.0
From: "J. Bruce Fields" <[email protected]>
Minor cleanup, no change in functionality.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <[email protected]>
---
fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c | 17 ++++++++++-------
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c
index db53df069069..5b1be1ab700b 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c
@@ -2374,10 +2374,17 @@ nfsd4_exchange_id(struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
if (exid->flags & ~EXCHGID4_FLAG_MASK_A)
return nfserr_inval;
+ new = create_client(exid->clname, rqstp, &verf);
+ if (new == NULL)
+ return nfserr_jukebox;
+
switch (exid->spa_how) {
case SP4_MACH_CRED:
- if (!svc_rqst_integrity_protected(rqstp))
- return nfserr_inval;
+ if (!svc_rqst_integrity_protected(rqstp)) {
+ status = nfserr_inval;
+ goto out_nolock;
+ }
+ new->cl_mach_cred = true;
case SP4_NONE:
break;
default: /* checked by xdr code */
@@ -2386,10 +2393,6 @@ nfsd4_exchange_id(struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
return nfserr_encr_alg_unsupp;
}
- new = create_client(exid->clname, rqstp, &verf);
- if (new == NULL)
- return nfserr_jukebox;
-
/* Cases below refer to rfc 5661 section 18.35.4: */
spin_lock(&nn->client_lock);
conf = find_confirmed_client_by_name(&exid->clname, nn);
@@ -2451,7 +2454,6 @@ out_new:
goto out;
}
new->cl_minorversion = cstate->minorversion;
- new->cl_mach_cred = (exid->spa_how == SP4_MACH_CRED);
gen_clid(new, nn);
add_to_unconfirmed(new);
@@ -2469,6 +2471,7 @@ out_copy:
out:
spin_unlock(&nn->client_lock);
+out_nolock:
if (new)
expire_client(new);
if (unconf)
--
2.5.0
From: "J. Bruce Fields" <[email protected]>
We really shouldn't allow a client to be created with cl_mach_cred set
unless it also has a principal name.
This also allows us to fail such cases immediately on EXCHANGE_ID as
opposed to waiting and incorrectly returning WRONG_CRED on the following
CREATE_SESSION.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <[email protected]>
---
fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c | 9 +++++++++
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c
index 5b1be1ab700b..36ad22a15d61 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c
@@ -2384,6 +2384,15 @@ nfsd4_exchange_id(struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
status = nfserr_inval;
goto out_nolock;
}
+ /*
+ * Sometimes userspace doesn't give us a principal.
+ * Which is a bug, really. Anyway, we can't enforce
+ * MACH_CRED in that case, better to give up now:
+ */
+ if (!new->cl_cred.cr_principal) {
+ status = nfserr_serverfault;
+ goto out_nolock;
+ }
new->cl_mach_cred = true;
case SP4_NONE:
break;
--
2.5.0
From: "J. Bruce Fields" <[email protected]>
The principal name on a gss cred is used to setup the NFSv4.0 callback,
which has to have a client principal name to authenticate to.
That code wants the name to be in the form servicetype@hostname.
rpc.svcgssd passes down such names (and passes down no principal name at
all in the case the principal isn't a service principal).
gss-proxy always passes down the principal name, and passes it down in
the form servicetype/hostname@REALM. So we've been munging the name
gss-proxy passes down into the format the NFSv4.0 callback code expects,
or throwing away the name if we can't.
Since the introduction of the MACH_CRED enforcement in NFSv4.1, we've
also been using the principal name to verify that certain operations are
done as the same principal as was used on the original EXCHANGE_ID call.
For that application, the original name passed down by gss-proxy is also
useful.
Lack of that name in some cases was causing some kerberized NFSv4.1
mount failures in an Active Directory environment.
This fix only works in the gss-proxy case. The fix for legacy
rpc.svcgssd would be more involved, and rpc.svcgssd already has other
problems in the AD case.
Reported-and-tested-by: James Ralston <[email protected]>
Cc: Simo Sorce <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <[email protected]>
---
fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c | 10 +++++++++-
include/linux/sunrpc/svcauth.h | 9 ++++++++-
net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_rpc_upcall.c | 3 +++
3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c
index 36ad22a15d61..0e685201f0db 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c
@@ -1875,6 +1875,10 @@ static int copy_cred(struct svc_cred *target, struct svc_cred *source)
ret = strdup_if_nonnull(&target->cr_principal, source->cr_principal);
if (ret)
return ret;
+ ret = strdup_if_nonnull(&target->cr_raw_principal,
+ source->cr_raw_principal);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
target->cr_flavor = source->cr_flavor;
target->cr_uid = source->cr_uid;
target->cr_gid = source->cr_gid;
@@ -1978,6 +1982,9 @@ static bool mach_creds_match(struct nfs4_client *cl, struct svc_rqst *rqstp)
return false;
if (!svc_rqst_integrity_protected(rqstp))
return false;
+ if (cl->cl_cred.cr_raw_principal)
+ return 0 == strcmp(cl->cl_cred.cr_raw_principal,
+ cr->cr_raw_principal);
if (!cr->cr_principal)
return false;
return 0 == strcmp(cl->cl_cred.cr_principal, cr->cr_principal);
@@ -2389,7 +2396,8 @@ nfsd4_exchange_id(struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
* Which is a bug, really. Anyway, we can't enforce
* MACH_CRED in that case, better to give up now:
*/
- if (!new->cl_cred.cr_principal) {
+ if (!new->cl_cred.cr_principal &&
+ !new->cl_cred.cr_raw_principal) {
status = nfserr_serverfault;
goto out_nolock;
}
diff --git a/include/linux/sunrpc/svcauth.h b/include/linux/sunrpc/svcauth.h
index 8d71d6577459..c00f53a4ccdd 100644
--- a/include/linux/sunrpc/svcauth.h
+++ b/include/linux/sunrpc/svcauth.h
@@ -23,13 +23,19 @@ struct svc_cred {
kgid_t cr_gid;
struct group_info *cr_group_info;
u32 cr_flavor; /* pseudoflavor */
- char *cr_principal; /* for gss */
+ /* name of form servicetype/hostname@REALM, passed down by
+ * gss-proxy: */
+ char *cr_raw_principal;
+ /* name of form servicetype@hostname, passed down by
+ * rpc.svcgssd, or computed from the above: */
+ char *cr_principal;
struct gss_api_mech *cr_gss_mech;
};
static inline void init_svc_cred(struct svc_cred *cred)
{
cred->cr_group_info = NULL;
+ cred->cr_raw_principal = NULL;
cred->cr_principal = NULL;
cred->cr_gss_mech = NULL;
}
@@ -38,6 +44,7 @@ static inline void free_svc_cred(struct svc_cred *cred)
{
if (cred->cr_group_info)
put_group_info(cred->cr_group_info);
+ kfree(cred->cr_raw_principal);
kfree(cred->cr_principal);
gss_mech_put(cred->cr_gss_mech);
init_svc_cred(cred);
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_rpc_upcall.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_rpc_upcall.c
index 59eeed43eda2..f0c6a8c78a56 100644
--- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_rpc_upcall.c
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_rpc_upcall.c
@@ -326,6 +326,9 @@ int gssp_accept_sec_context_upcall(struct net *net,
if (data->found_creds && client_name.data != NULL) {
char *c;
+ data->creds.cr_raw_principal = kstrndup(client_name.data,
+ client_name.len, GFP_KERNEL);
+
data->creds.cr_principal = kstrndup(client_name.data,
client_name.len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (data->creds.cr_principal) {
--
2.5.0
From: "J. Bruce Fields" <[email protected]>
Minor cleanup, no change in behavior.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <[email protected]>
---
net/sunrpc/svcauth.c | 2 ++
net/sunrpc/svcauth_unix.c | 8 --------
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/svcauth.c b/net/sunrpc/svcauth.c
index 79c0f3459b5c..69841db1f533 100644
--- a/net/sunrpc/svcauth.c
+++ b/net/sunrpc/svcauth.c
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ svc_authenticate(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *authp)
spin_unlock(&authtab_lock);
rqstp->rq_auth_slack = 0;
+ init_svc_cred(&rqstp->rq_cred);
rqstp->rq_authop = aops;
return aops->accept(rqstp, authp);
@@ -63,6 +64,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(svc_authenticate);
int svc_set_client(struct svc_rqst *rqstp)
{
+ rqstp->rq_client = NULL;
return rqstp->rq_authop->set_client(rqstp);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(svc_set_client);
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/svcauth_unix.c b/net/sunrpc/svcauth_unix.c
index 621ca7b4a155..dfacdc95b3f5 100644
--- a/net/sunrpc/svcauth_unix.c
+++ b/net/sunrpc/svcauth_unix.c
@@ -728,10 +728,6 @@ svcauth_null_accept(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *authp)
struct kvec *resv = &rqstp->rq_res.head[0];
struct svc_cred *cred = &rqstp->rq_cred;
- cred->cr_group_info = NULL;
- cred->cr_principal = NULL;
- rqstp->rq_client = NULL;
-
if (argv->iov_len < 3*4)
return SVC_GARBAGE;
@@ -794,10 +790,6 @@ svcauth_unix_accept(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *authp)
u32 slen, i;
int len = argv->iov_len;
- cred->cr_group_info = NULL;
- cred->cr_principal = NULL;
- rqstp->rq_client = NULL;
-
if ((len -= 3*4) < 0)
return SVC_GARBAGE;
--
2.5.0
On Tue, 2015-11-24 at 12:18 -0500, J. Bruce Fields wrote:
> From: "J. Bruce Fields" <[email protected]>
>
> The principal name on a gss cred is used to setup the NFSv4.0 callback,
> which has to have a client principal name to authenticate to.
>
> That code wants the name to be in the form servicetype@hostname.
> rpc.svcgssd passes down such names (and passes down no principal name at
> all in the case the principal isn't a service principal).
>
> gss-proxy always passes down the principal name, and passes it down in
> the form servicetype/hostname@REALM. So we've been munging the name
> gss-proxy passes down into the format the NFSv4.0 callback code expects,
> or throwing away the name if we can't.
>
> Since the introduction of the MACH_CRED enforcement in NFSv4.1, we've
> also been using the principal name to verify that certain operations are
> done as the same principal as was used on the original EXCHANGE_ID call.
>
> For that application, the original name passed down by gss-proxy is also
> useful.
>
> Lack of that name in some cases was causing some kerberized NFSv4.1
> mount failures in an Active Directory environment.
>
> This fix only works in the gss-proxy case. The fix for legacy
> rpc.svcgssd would be more involved, and rpc.svcgssd already has other
> problems in the AD case.
>
> Reported-and-tested-by: James Ralston <[email protected]>
> Cc: Simo Sorce <[email protected]>
LGTM, feel free to add ack by me.
> Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <[email protected]>
> ---
> fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c | 10 +++++++++-
> include/linux/sunrpc/svcauth.h | 9 ++++++++-
> net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_rpc_upcall.c | 3 +++
> 3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c
> index 36ad22a15d61..0e685201f0db 100644
> --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c
> +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c
> @@ -1875,6 +1875,10 @@ static int copy_cred(struct svc_cred *target, struct svc_cred *source)
> ret = strdup_if_nonnull(&target->cr_principal, source->cr_principal);
> if (ret)
> return ret;
> + ret = strdup_if_nonnull(&target->cr_raw_principal,
> + source->cr_raw_principal);
> + if (ret)
> + return ret;
> target->cr_flavor = source->cr_flavor;
> target->cr_uid = source->cr_uid;
> target->cr_gid = source->cr_gid;
> @@ -1978,6 +1982,9 @@ static bool mach_creds_match(struct nfs4_client *cl, struct svc_rqst *rqstp)
> return false;
> if (!svc_rqst_integrity_protected(rqstp))
> return false;
> + if (cl->cl_cred.cr_raw_principal)
> + return 0 == strcmp(cl->cl_cred.cr_raw_principal,
> + cr->cr_raw_principal);
> if (!cr->cr_principal)
> return false;
> return 0 == strcmp(cl->cl_cred.cr_principal, cr->cr_principal);
> @@ -2389,7 +2396,8 @@ nfsd4_exchange_id(struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
> * Which is a bug, really. Anyway, we can't enforce
> * MACH_CRED in that case, better to give up now:
> */
> - if (!new->cl_cred.cr_principal) {
> + if (!new->cl_cred.cr_principal &&
> + !new->cl_cred.cr_raw_principal) {
> status = nfserr_serverfault;
> goto out_nolock;
> }
> diff --git a/include/linux/sunrpc/svcauth.h b/include/linux/sunrpc/svcauth.h
> index 8d71d6577459..c00f53a4ccdd 100644
> --- a/include/linux/sunrpc/svcauth.h
> +++ b/include/linux/sunrpc/svcauth.h
> @@ -23,13 +23,19 @@ struct svc_cred {
> kgid_t cr_gid;
> struct group_info *cr_group_info;
> u32 cr_flavor; /* pseudoflavor */
> - char *cr_principal; /* for gss */
> + /* name of form servicetype/hostname@REALM, passed down by
> + * gss-proxy: */
> + char *cr_raw_principal;
> + /* name of form servicetype@hostname, passed down by
> + * rpc.svcgssd, or computed from the above: */
> + char *cr_principal;
> struct gss_api_mech *cr_gss_mech;
> };
>
> static inline void init_svc_cred(struct svc_cred *cred)
> {
> cred->cr_group_info = NULL;
> + cred->cr_raw_principal = NULL;
> cred->cr_principal = NULL;
> cred->cr_gss_mech = NULL;
> }
> @@ -38,6 +44,7 @@ static inline void free_svc_cred(struct svc_cred *cred)
> {
> if (cred->cr_group_info)
> put_group_info(cred->cr_group_info);
> + kfree(cred->cr_raw_principal);
> kfree(cred->cr_principal);
> gss_mech_put(cred->cr_gss_mech);
> init_svc_cred(cred);
> diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_rpc_upcall.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_rpc_upcall.c
> index 59eeed43eda2..f0c6a8c78a56 100644
> --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_rpc_upcall.c
> +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_rpc_upcall.c
> @@ -326,6 +326,9 @@ int gssp_accept_sec_context_upcall(struct net *net,
> if (data->found_creds && client_name.data != NULL) {
> char *c;
>
> + data->creds.cr_raw_principal = kstrndup(client_name.data,
> + client_name.len, GFP_KERNEL);
> +
> data->creds.cr_principal = kstrndup(client_name.data,
> client_name.len, GFP_KERNEL);
> if (data->creds.cr_principal) {
--
Simo Sorce * Red Hat, Inc * New York
On Tue, Nov 24, 2015 at 01:05:06PM -0500, Simo Sorce wrote:
> On Tue, 2015-11-24 at 12:18 -0500, J. Bruce Fields wrote:
> > From: "J. Bruce Fields" <[email protected]>
> >
> > The principal name on a gss cred is used to setup the NFSv4.0 callback,
> > which has to have a client principal name to authenticate to.
> >
> > That code wants the name to be in the form servicetype@hostname.
> > rpc.svcgssd passes down such names (and passes down no principal name at
> > all in the case the principal isn't a service principal).
> >
> > gss-proxy always passes down the principal name, and passes it down in
> > the form servicetype/hostname@REALM. So we've been munging the name
> > gss-proxy passes down into the format the NFSv4.0 callback code expects,
> > or throwing away the name if we can't.
> >
> > Since the introduction of the MACH_CRED enforcement in NFSv4.1, we've
> > also been using the principal name to verify that certain operations are
> > done as the same principal as was used on the original EXCHANGE_ID call.
> >
> > For that application, the original name passed down by gss-proxy is also
> > useful.
> >
> > Lack of that name in some cases was causing some kerberized NFSv4.1
> > mount failures in an Active Directory environment.
> >
> > This fix only works in the gss-proxy case. The fix for legacy
> > rpc.svcgssd would be more involved, and rpc.svcgssd already has other
> > problems in the AD case.
> >
> > Reported-and-tested-by: James Ralston <[email protected]>
> > Cc: Simo Sorce <[email protected]>
>
> LGTM, feel free to add ack by me.
Thanks!--b.
>
> > Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <[email protected]>
> > ---
> > fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c | 10 +++++++++-
> > include/linux/sunrpc/svcauth.h | 9 ++++++++-
> > net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_rpc_upcall.c | 3 +++
> > 3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c
> > index 36ad22a15d61..0e685201f0db 100644
> > --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c
> > +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c
> > @@ -1875,6 +1875,10 @@ static int copy_cred(struct svc_cred *target, struct svc_cred *source)
> > ret = strdup_if_nonnull(&target->cr_principal, source->cr_principal);
> > if (ret)
> > return ret;
> > + ret = strdup_if_nonnull(&target->cr_raw_principal,
> > + source->cr_raw_principal);
> > + if (ret)
> > + return ret;
> > target->cr_flavor = source->cr_flavor;
> > target->cr_uid = source->cr_uid;
> > target->cr_gid = source->cr_gid;
> > @@ -1978,6 +1982,9 @@ static bool mach_creds_match(struct nfs4_client *cl, struct svc_rqst *rqstp)
> > return false;
> > if (!svc_rqst_integrity_protected(rqstp))
> > return false;
> > + if (cl->cl_cred.cr_raw_principal)
> > + return 0 == strcmp(cl->cl_cred.cr_raw_principal,
> > + cr->cr_raw_principal);
> > if (!cr->cr_principal)
> > return false;
> > return 0 == strcmp(cl->cl_cred.cr_principal, cr->cr_principal);
> > @@ -2389,7 +2396,8 @@ nfsd4_exchange_id(struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
> > * Which is a bug, really. Anyway, we can't enforce
> > * MACH_CRED in that case, better to give up now:
> > */
> > - if (!new->cl_cred.cr_principal) {
> > + if (!new->cl_cred.cr_principal &&
> > + !new->cl_cred.cr_raw_principal) {
> > status = nfserr_serverfault;
> > goto out_nolock;
> > }
> > diff --git a/include/linux/sunrpc/svcauth.h b/include/linux/sunrpc/svcauth.h
> > index 8d71d6577459..c00f53a4ccdd 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/sunrpc/svcauth.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/sunrpc/svcauth.h
> > @@ -23,13 +23,19 @@ struct svc_cred {
> > kgid_t cr_gid;
> > struct group_info *cr_group_info;
> > u32 cr_flavor; /* pseudoflavor */
> > - char *cr_principal; /* for gss */
> > + /* name of form servicetype/hostname@REALM, passed down by
> > + * gss-proxy: */
> > + char *cr_raw_principal;
> > + /* name of form servicetype@hostname, passed down by
> > + * rpc.svcgssd, or computed from the above: */
> > + char *cr_principal;
> > struct gss_api_mech *cr_gss_mech;
> > };
> >
> > static inline void init_svc_cred(struct svc_cred *cred)
> > {
> > cred->cr_group_info = NULL;
> > + cred->cr_raw_principal = NULL;
> > cred->cr_principal = NULL;
> > cred->cr_gss_mech = NULL;
> > }
> > @@ -38,6 +44,7 @@ static inline void free_svc_cred(struct svc_cred *cred)
> > {
> > if (cred->cr_group_info)
> > put_group_info(cred->cr_group_info);
> > + kfree(cred->cr_raw_principal);
> > kfree(cred->cr_principal);
> > gss_mech_put(cred->cr_gss_mech);
> > init_svc_cred(cred);
> > diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_rpc_upcall.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_rpc_upcall.c
> > index 59eeed43eda2..f0c6a8c78a56 100644
> > --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_rpc_upcall.c
> > +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_rpc_upcall.c
> > @@ -326,6 +326,9 @@ int gssp_accept_sec_context_upcall(struct net *net,
> > if (data->found_creds && client_name.data != NULL) {
> > char *c;
> >
> > + data->creds.cr_raw_principal = kstrndup(client_name.data,
> > + client_name.len, GFP_KERNEL);
> > +
> > data->creds.cr_principal = kstrndup(client_name.data,
> > client_name.len, GFP_KERNEL);
> > if (data->creds.cr_principal) {
>
>
> --
> Simo Sorce * Red Hat, Inc * New York
>