Date: Tue, 24 Nov 2015 11:36:50 -0700
From: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@redhat.com>
To: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 5/5] nfsd4: fix gss-proxy 4.1 mounts for some AD
 principals
Message-ID: <20151124183650.GC20456@pad.redhat.com>
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 <1448385497-23737-6-git-send-email-bfields@redhat.com>
 <1448388306.29102.2.camel@redhat.com>
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On Tue, Nov 24, 2015 at 01:05:06PM -0500, Simo Sorce wrote:
> On Tue, 2015-11-24 at 12:18 -0500, J. Bruce Fields wrote:
> > From: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@redhat.com>
> > 
> > The principal name on a gss cred is used to setup the NFSv4.0 callback,
> > which has to have a client principal name to authenticate to.
> > 
> > That code wants the name to be in the form servicetype@hostname.
> > rpc.svcgssd passes down such names (and passes down no principal name at
> > all in the case the principal isn't a service principal).
> > 
> > gss-proxy always passes down the principal name, and passes it down in
> > the form servicetype/hostname@REALM.  So we've been munging the name
> > gss-proxy passes down into the format the NFSv4.0 callback code expects,
> > or throwing away the name if we can't.
> > 
> > Since the introduction of the MACH_CRED enforcement in NFSv4.1, we've
> > also been using the principal name to verify that certain operations are
> > done as the same principal as was used on the original EXCHANGE_ID call.
> > 
> > For that application, the original name passed down by gss-proxy is also
> > useful.
> > 
> > Lack of that name in some cases was causing some kerberized NFSv4.1
> > mount failures in an Active Directory environment.
> > 
> > This fix only works in the gss-proxy case.  The fix for legacy
> > rpc.svcgssd would be more involved, and rpc.svcgssd already has other
> > problems in the AD case.
> > 
> > Reported-and-tested-by: James Ralston <ralston@pobox.com>
> > Cc: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
> 
> LGTM, feel free to add ack by me.

Thanks!--b.

> 
> > Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
> > ---
> >  fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c                  | 10 +++++++++-
> >  include/linux/sunrpc/svcauth.h       |  9 ++++++++-
> >  net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_rpc_upcall.c |  3 +++
> >  3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> > 
> > diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c
> > index 36ad22a15d61..0e685201f0db 100644
> > --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c
> > +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c
> > @@ -1875,6 +1875,10 @@ static int copy_cred(struct svc_cred *target, struct svc_cred *source)
> >  	ret = strdup_if_nonnull(&target->cr_principal, source->cr_principal);
> >  	if (ret)
> >  		return ret;
> > +	ret = strdup_if_nonnull(&target->cr_raw_principal,
> > +					source->cr_raw_principal);
> > +	if (ret)
> > +		return ret;
> >  	target->cr_flavor = source->cr_flavor;
> >  	target->cr_uid = source->cr_uid;
> >  	target->cr_gid = source->cr_gid;
> > @@ -1978,6 +1982,9 @@ static bool mach_creds_match(struct nfs4_client *cl, struct svc_rqst *rqstp)
> >  		return false;
> >  	if (!svc_rqst_integrity_protected(rqstp))
> >  		return false;
> > +	if (cl->cl_cred.cr_raw_principal)
> > +		return 0 == strcmp(cl->cl_cred.cr_raw_principal,
> > +						cr->cr_raw_principal);
> >  	if (!cr->cr_principal)
> >  		return false;
> >  	return 0 == strcmp(cl->cl_cred.cr_principal, cr->cr_principal);
> > @@ -2389,7 +2396,8 @@ nfsd4_exchange_id(struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
> >  		 * Which is a bug, really.  Anyway, we can't enforce
> >  		 * MACH_CRED in that case, better to give up now:
> >  		 */
> > -		if (!new->cl_cred.cr_principal) {
> > +		if (!new->cl_cred.cr_principal &&
> > +					!new->cl_cred.cr_raw_principal) {
> >  			status = nfserr_serverfault;
> >  			goto out_nolock;
> >  		}
> > diff --git a/include/linux/sunrpc/svcauth.h b/include/linux/sunrpc/svcauth.h
> > index 8d71d6577459..c00f53a4ccdd 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/sunrpc/svcauth.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/sunrpc/svcauth.h
> > @@ -23,13 +23,19 @@ struct svc_cred {
> >  	kgid_t			cr_gid;
> >  	struct group_info	*cr_group_info;
> >  	u32			cr_flavor; /* pseudoflavor */
> > -	char			*cr_principal; /* for gss */
> > +	/* name of form servicetype/hostname@REALM, passed down by
> > +	 * gss-proxy: */
> > +	char			*cr_raw_principal;
> > +	/* name of form servicetype@hostname, passed down by
> > +	 * rpc.svcgssd, or computed from the above: */
> > +	char			*cr_principal;
> >  	struct gss_api_mech	*cr_gss_mech;
> >  };
> >  
> >  static inline void init_svc_cred(struct svc_cred *cred)
> >  {
> >  	cred->cr_group_info = NULL;
> > +	cred->cr_raw_principal = NULL;
> >  	cred->cr_principal = NULL;
> >  	cred->cr_gss_mech = NULL;
> >  }
> > @@ -38,6 +44,7 @@ static inline void free_svc_cred(struct svc_cred *cred)
> >  {
> >  	if (cred->cr_group_info)
> >  		put_group_info(cred->cr_group_info);
> > +	kfree(cred->cr_raw_principal);
> >  	kfree(cred->cr_principal);
> >  	gss_mech_put(cred->cr_gss_mech);
> >  	init_svc_cred(cred);
> > diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_rpc_upcall.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_rpc_upcall.c
> > index 59eeed43eda2..f0c6a8c78a56 100644
> > --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_rpc_upcall.c
> > +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_rpc_upcall.c
> > @@ -326,6 +326,9 @@ int gssp_accept_sec_context_upcall(struct net *net,
> >  	if (data->found_creds && client_name.data != NULL) {
> >  		char *c;
> >  
> > +		data->creds.cr_raw_principal = kstrndup(client_name.data,
> > +						client_name.len, GFP_KERNEL);
> > +
> >  		data->creds.cr_principal = kstrndup(client_name.data,
> >  						client_name.len, GFP_KERNEL);
> >  		if (data->creds.cr_principal) {
> 
> 
> -- 
> Simo Sorce * Red Hat, Inc * New York
>