Return-Path: Received: from mx144.netapp.com ([216.240.21.25]:6886 "EHLO mx144.netapp.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S935278AbdADVrC (ORCPT ); Wed, 4 Jan 2017 16:47:02 -0500 Subject: Re: [PATCH Version 3 06/16] SUNRPC AUTH_GSS gss3 reply verifier To: References: <1482509068-24516-1-git-send-email-andros@netapp.com> <1482509068-24516-7-git-send-email-andros@netapp.com> CC: , From: Anna Schumaker Message-ID: <12835369-fb6b-d55a-124f-c70e58e529c1@Netapp.com> Date: Wed, 4 Jan 2017 16:46:54 -0500 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <1482509068-24516-7-git-send-email-andros@netapp.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="windows-1252" Sender: linux-nfs-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: Hi Andy, On 12/23/2016 11:04 AM, andros@netapp.com wrote: > From: Andy Adamson > > The new GSS Version 3 reply verifier is taken over the same data as > the call verifier, caveat REPLY direction > > Verifier Data > > xid tk_rqstp->rq_xid > direction REPLY (always a 1) RPC_REPLY > rpcvers RPC_VERSION > prog clnt->cl_prog > vers clnt->cl_vers > proc tk_msg.rpc_proc->p_proc > credential > flavor RPC_AUTH_GSS > length cred_len is in gss_marshal (new gv_crlen) > gss version ctx->gc_v > gss proc ctx->gv_proc > gss seq tk_rqstp->rq_seqno > gss svc gss_cred->gc_service > gss ctx len ctx->gc_wire_ctx > gss ctx data ctx->gc_wire_ctx > > Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson > --- > net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c | 60 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- > 1 file changed, 58 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c > index 9288cc2..d11f421 100644 > --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c > +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c > @@ -1624,6 +1624,53 @@ static int gss_cred_is_negative_entry(struct rpc_cred *cred) > return 0; > } > > +/** > + * gss3_reply_verifier: The new gssv3 verifier uses same data as call > + * caveat REPLY direction - see rpc_encode_header > + */ > +static void * > +gss3_reply_verifier(struct rpc_cred *cred, struct gss_cl_ctx *ctx, > + struct rpc_task *task, __be32 *seq, struct kvec *iov) > +{ > + struct gss_cred *g_cred = container_of(cred, struct gss_cred, gc_base); > + void *gss3_buf = NULL; > + __be32 *crlen, *ptr = NULL; > + int len; > + > + /* freed in gss_validate */ > + len = (13 * 4) + ctx->gc_wire_ctx.len; > + gss3_buf = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS); > + if (!gss3_buf) { > + gss3_buf = ERR_PTR(-EIO); > + goto out; > + } > + ptr = (__be32 *)gss3_buf; > + > + *ptr++ = htonl(task->tk_rqstp->rq_xid); > + *ptr++ = htonl(RPC_REPLY); > + *ptr++ = htonl(RPC_VERSION); > + *ptr++ = htonl(task->tk_client->cl_prog); > + *ptr++ = htonl(task->tk_client->cl_vers); > + *ptr++ = htonl(task->tk_msg.rpc_proc->p_proc); > + *ptr++ = htonl(RPC_AUTH_GSS); > + > + /* credential */ > + crlen = ptr++; > + *ptr++ = htonl(ctx->gc_v); > + *ptr++ = htonl(ctx->gc_proc); > + *ptr++ = *seq; > + *ptr++ = htonl(g_cred->gc_service); > + ptr = xdr_encode_netobj(ptr, &ctx->gc_wire_ctx); > + > + /* backfill cred length */ > + *crlen = htonl((ptr - (crlen + 1)) << 2); > + > + iov->iov_base = gss3_buf; > + iov->iov_len = (ptr - (__be32 *)gss3_buf) << 2; > +out: > + return gss3_buf; > +} > + > static __be32 * > gss_validate(struct rpc_task *task, __be32 *p) > { > @@ -1633,6 +1680,7 @@ static int gss_cred_is_negative_entry(struct rpc_cred *cred) > struct kvec iov; > struct xdr_buf verf_buf; > struct xdr_netobj mic; > + void *g3_buf = NULL; > u32 flav,len; > u32 maj_stat; > __be32 *ret = ERR_PTR(-EIO); > @@ -1648,14 +1696,22 @@ static int gss_cred_is_negative_entry(struct rpc_cred *cred) > if (!seq) > goto out_bad; > *seq = htonl(task->tk_rqstp->rq_seqno); > - iov.iov_base = seq; > - iov.iov_len = 4; > + if (ctx->gc_v == RPC_GSS_VERSION) { > + iov.iov_base = seq; > + iov.iov_len = 4; > + } > + if (ctx->gc_v == RPC_GSS3_VERSION) { Can this be written as an else-if instead? I don't think it's likely for gc_v to have two values at once :) Thanks, Anna > + g3_buf = gss3_reply_verifier(cred, ctx, task, seq, &iov); > + if (IS_ERR(g3_buf)) > + goto out_bad; > + } > xdr_buf_from_iov(&iov, &verf_buf); > mic.data = (u8 *)p; > mic.len = len; > > ret = ERR_PTR(-EACCES); > maj_stat = gss_verify_mic(ctx->gc_gss_ctx, &verf_buf, &mic); > + kfree(g3_buf); > if (maj_stat == GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED) > clear_bit(RPCAUTH_CRED_UPTODATE, &cred->cr_flags); > if (maj_stat) { >