Return-Path: Received: from fieldses.org ([173.255.197.46]:56776 "EHLO fieldses.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751953AbdK0UKD (ORCPT ); Mon, 27 Nov 2017 15:10:03 -0500 Date: Mon, 27 Nov 2017 15:10:03 -0500 From: "J. Bruce Fields" To: Thiago Rafael Becker Cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH] sunrpc: sort groups on unix_gid_parse Message-ID: <20171127201003.GA25662@fieldses.org> References: <20171127192508.12751-1-thiago.becker@gmail.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii In-Reply-To: <20171127192508.12751-1-thiago.becker@gmail.com> Sender: linux-nfs-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: Thanks for the patch: On Mon, Nov 27, 2017 at 05:25:08PM -0200, Thiago Rafael Becker wrote: > In cases were mountd is managing the group membership for nfsd, > if a user has several groups, multiple nfsd threads may call > sort_groups for the same freshly created unix_gid_cache entry > simultaneously, causing entries to be overwritten and the cache > entry to get corrupted. The groups_sort call is in set_groups, called from fs/nfsd/auth.c:nfsd_setuser(): set_groups(new, gi); where "gi" is usually (in the absence of id squashing) a pointer to rqstp->rq_cred.cr_group_info, which can be in use by other threads. To me it's pretty unintuitive that set_groups() would modify the group info passed in the second argument. While we're here, I wonder if we should make that the caller's responsibility? There are basically only three callers outside this one. But I'm OK with this patch. I probably need an OK from a vfs person to take it through the nfsd tree? --b. > This eventually leads to the server > replying to the client with a bogus EPERM error if the group > overwritten is the group that would allow access. > > This is a very hard bug to analyze, as a very slight change in > timing leads to proper sorting behavior. It was first noticed > and reproduced in kernel 3.10.0, which uses shell sort to sort > groups. Nothing indicates that heapsort, which is used > upstream, is thread safe. > > This patch solves this issue by sorting the cache entry before > inserting it into the cache, and thus next entries will not > have to sort it again, avoiding the issue altogether. > > Signed-off-by: Thiago Rafael Becker > --- > kernel/groups.c | 4 +++- > net/sunrpc/svcauth_unix.c | 7 +++++++ > 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/kernel/groups.c b/kernel/groups.c > index e357bc8..4c9c9ed 100644 > --- a/kernel/groups.c > +++ b/kernel/groups.c > @@ -86,11 +86,13 @@ static int gid_cmp(const void *_a, const void *_b) > return gid_gt(a, b) - gid_lt(a, b); > } > > -static void groups_sort(struct group_info *group_info) > +void groups_sort(struct group_info *group_info) > { > sort(group_info->gid, group_info->ngroups, sizeof(*group_info->gid), > gid_cmp, NULL); > } > +EXPORT_SYMBOL(groups_sort); > + > > /* a simple bsearch */ > int groups_search(const struct group_info *group_info, kgid_t grp) > diff --git a/net/sunrpc/svcauth_unix.c b/net/sunrpc/svcauth_unix.c > index f81eaa8..91e3d34 100644 > --- a/net/sunrpc/svcauth_unix.c > +++ b/net/sunrpc/svcauth_unix.c > @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ > > > #include "netns.h" > +void groups_sort(struct group_info *group_info); > > /* > * AUTHUNIX and AUTHNULL credentials are both handled here. > @@ -520,6 +521,12 @@ static int unix_gid_parse(struct cache_detail *cd, > ug.gi->gid[i] = kgid; > } > > + /* Sort the groups before inserting this entry > + * into the cache to avoid future corrutpions > + * by multiple simultaneous attempts to sort this > + * entry. > + */ > + groups_sort(ug.gi); > ugp = unix_gid_lookup(cd, uid); > if (ugp) { > struct cache_head *ch; > -- > 2.9.5