Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.1 required=3.0 tests=DKIMWL_WL_HIGH,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SPF_PASS,UNPARSEABLE_RELAY autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0B574C4360F for ; Fri, 1 Mar 2019 16:01:21 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id CF77B2085A for ; Fri, 1 Mar 2019 16:01:20 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=oracle.com header.i=@oracle.com header.b="ACKzz28V" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S2388326AbfCAQBU (ORCPT ); Fri, 1 Mar 2019 11:01:20 -0500 Received: from aserp2130.oracle.com ([141.146.126.79]:59464 "EHLO aserp2130.oracle.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727952AbfCAQBU (ORCPT ); Fri, 1 Mar 2019 11:01:20 -0500 Received: from pps.filterd (aserp2130.oracle.com [127.0.0.1]) by aserp2130.oracle.com (8.16.0.27/8.16.0.27) with SMTP id x21G0uZ0167864; Fri, 1 Mar 2019 16:01:17 GMT DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=oracle.com; h=content-type : mime-version : subject : from : in-reply-to : date : cc : content-transfer-encoding : message-id : references : to; s=corp-2018-07-02; bh=Vx6wGPXn8qGPXobFimrsuxTCoNi+2uYkcObjoguIsRI=; b=ACKzz28VxR7SrqsrwOh0x/jwwZJERe4cFlYlSBu2KeAnEhZwEZv3A6O7FNQBIqKa2942 Jzgu6hbY1c0edhAm/4C5aJc1aCk8FXHfoMikW1qHeUXGzD+y9Trd+psJCdiR6c6eqwN1 HW1kKESmvxdsuCrlIVeeLmuyRPR4MkqiZKykL7zGkT9K6o993dQQiJ01F2xa2U/njpeg ERenSQQZVMVqBeJlMWzbUwjupbxNdsKML9+o6ocaz46CDqzocWNTKrVBHWHaMQ7TWZ6u uVrmFNTGTQFUC5UPZPPvzE7Qa63SjGHFp1vvwcxMWRf1Zjqw0DC2W8M+JSLToUrmZFrh Mg== Received: from userv0022.oracle.com (userv0022.oracle.com [156.151.31.74]) by aserp2130.oracle.com with ESMTP id 2qtuperbwk-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Fri, 01 Mar 2019 16:01:16 +0000 Received: from userv0121.oracle.com (userv0121.oracle.com [156.151.31.72]) by userv0022.oracle.com (8.14.4/8.14.4) with ESMTP id x21G1F6H025960 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Fri, 1 Mar 2019 16:01:15 GMT Received: from abhmp0019.oracle.com (abhmp0019.oracle.com [141.146.116.25]) by userv0121.oracle.com (8.14.4/8.13.8) with ESMTP id x21G1Fhe026129; Fri, 1 Mar 2019 16:01:15 GMT Received: from anon-dhcp-171.1015granger.net (/68.61.232.219) by default (Oracle Beehive Gateway v4.0) with ESMTP ; Fri, 01 Mar 2019 08:01:14 -0800 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Mime-Version: 1.0 (Mac OS X Mail 12.2 \(3445.102.3\)) Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC 4/4] NFSD: Prototype support for IMA on NFS (server) From: Chuck Lever In-Reply-To: <20190301150401.GA17160@fieldses.org> Date: Fri, 1 Mar 2019 11:01:14 -0500 Cc: Linux NFS Mailing List , linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Message-Id: References: <20190214203336.6469.34750.stgit@manet.1015granger.net> <20190214204326.6469.25843.stgit@manet.1015granger.net> <20190218193218.GA5879@fieldses.org> <20190301150401.GA17160@fieldses.org> To: Bruce Fields X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.3445.102.3) X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=nai engine=5900 definitions=9182 signatures=668685 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=notspam policy=default score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=0 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 mlxscore=0 impostorscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1810050000 definitions=main-1903010112 Sender: linux-nfs-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org > On Mar 1, 2019, at 10:04 AM, Bruce Fields wrote: > > On Mon, Feb 18, 2019 at 02:41:24PM -0500, Chuck Lever wrote: >> >> >>> On Feb 18, 2019, at 2:32 PM, bfields@fieldses.org wrote: >>> >>> On Thu, Feb 14, 2019 at 03:43:26PM -0500, Chuck Lever wrote: >>>> When NFSv4 Security Label support is enabled and kernel Integrity >>>> and IMA support is enabled (via CONFIG), then build in code to >>>> handle the "security.ima" xattr. The NFS server converts incoming >>>> GETATTR and SETATTR calls to acesses and updates of the xattr. >>>> >>>> The FATTR4 bit is made up; meaning we still have to go through a >>>> standards process to allocate a bit that all NFS vendors agree on. >>>> Thus there is no guarantee this prototype will interoperate with >>>> others or with a future standards-based implementation. >>> >>> Why the dependence on CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL? >> >> Hrm, well there is some mechanism on the client side that IMA >> needs that is behind CONFIG_NFS_V4_SECURITY_LABEL. I guess I >> didn't think about not doing the same thing on the server. It >> may just be an artifact of an earlier version of this code. >> >> >>> (Also, I wonder if we actually need CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL or if >>> we could just remove it, or replace it by CONFIG_SECURITY where >>> necessary.) >> >> On the server, there is already a (run-time) export option to >> enable and disable security labels. Is there a reason a >> distribution would want to disable client or server support >> for security labels at build time? > > Distributions tend to want kernels that can do anything, with run time > controls that are adequate to handle any use cases. > > So given that we need adequate run-time configuration, why might someone > also want the ability to disable at build time? Some reasons I can > think of: > > - they need a really small kernel. > - the feature is too hard to support, or they think it > introduces security risks, so they don't want their users > turning it on at all. > > I could see any of those being reasons for someone not to want NFSD_V4 > or SECURITY at all, but is there likely to be a big need to configure in > both of those things but configure out NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL? That > seems unnecessarily fine grained. I'm not clear, then. Are you proposing to control support for IMA labels with the "security_labels" export option? -- Chuck Lever