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[209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id l4si603564plb.305.2019.05.02.16.46.54; Thu, 02 May 2019 16:47:27 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-nfs-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-nfs-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-nfs-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726030AbfEBXY5 (ORCPT + 99 others); Thu, 2 May 2019 19:24:57 -0400 Received: from mx2.suse.de ([195.135.220.15]:55420 "EHLO mx1.suse.de" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-FAIL) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726022AbfEBXY5 (ORCPT ); Thu, 2 May 2019 19:24:57 -0400 X-Virus-Scanned: by amavisd-new at test-mx.suse.de Received: from relay2.suse.de (unknown [195.135.220.254]) by mx1.suse.de (Postfix) with ESMTP id 00C10AE1C; Thu, 2 May 2019 23:24:55 +0000 (UTC) From: NeilBrown To: Andreas Gruenbacher Date: Fri, 03 May 2019 09:24:47 +1000 Cc: Amir Goldstein , "J. Bruce Fields" , Miklos Szeredi , Andreas =?utf-8?Q?Gr=C3=BCnbacher?= , Patrick Plagwitz , "linux-unionfs\@vger.kernel.org" , Linux NFS list , Linux FS-devel Mailing List , Linux Kernel Mailing List Subject: Re: [PATCH] overlayfs: ignore empty NFSv4 ACLs in ext4 upperdir In-Reply-To: References: <20161205151933.GA17517@fieldses.org> <20161205162559.GB17517@fieldses.org> <266c571f-e4e2-7c61-5ee2-8ece0c2d06e9@web.de> <20161206185806.GC31197@fieldses.org> <87bm0l4nra.fsf@notabene.neil.brown.name> <875zqt4igg.fsf@notabene.neil.brown.name> Message-ID: <87r29g30e8.fsf@notabene.neil.brown.name> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/signed; boundary="=-=-="; micalg=pgp-sha256; protocol="application/pgp-signature" Sender: linux-nfs-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org --=-=-= Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable On Thu, May 02 2019, Andreas Gruenbacher wrote: > On Thu, 2 May 2019 at 05:57, NeilBrown wrote: >> On Wed, May 01 2019, Amir Goldstein wrote: >> > On Wed, May 1, 2019 at 10:03 PM NeilBrown wrote: >> >> On Tue, Dec 06 2016, J. Bruce Fields wrote: >> >> > On Tue, Dec 06, 2016 at 02:18:31PM +0100, Andreas Gruenbacher wrote: >> >> >> On Tue, Dec 6, 2016 at 11:08 AM, Miklos Szeredi wrote: >> >> >> > On Tue, Dec 6, 2016 at 12:24 AM, Andreas Gr=C3=BCnbacher >> >> >> > wrote: >> >> >> >> 2016-12-06 0:19 GMT+01:00 Andreas Gr=C3=BCnbacher : >> >> >> > >> >> >> >>> It's not hard to come up with a heuristic that determines if a >> >> >> >>> system.nfs4_acl value is equivalent to a file mode, and to ign= ore the >> >> >> >>> attribute in that case. (The file mode is transmitted in its o= wn >> >> >> >>> attribute already, so actually converting .) That way, overlay= fs could >> >> >> >>> still fail copying up files that have an actual ACL. It's stil= l an >> >> >> >>> ugly hack ... >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Actually, that kind of heuristic would make sense in the NFS cl= ient >> >> >> >> which could then hide the "system.nfs4_acl" attribute. > > I still think the nfs client could make this problem mostly go away by > not exposing "system.nfs4_acl" xattrs when the acl is equivalent to > the file mode. Maybe ... but this feels a bit like "sweeping it under the carpet". What happens if some file on the lower layer does have a more complex ACL? Do we just fail any attempt to modify that object? Doesn't that violate the law of least surprise? Maybe if the lower-layer has an i_op->permission method, then overlayfs should *always* call that for permission checking - unless a chmod/chown/etc has happened on the file. That way, we wouldn't need to copy-up the ACL, but would still get correct ACL testing. Thanks, NeilBrown > The richacl patches contain a workable abgorithm for > that. The problem would remain for files that have an actual NFS4 ACL, > which just cannot be mapped to a file mode or to POSIX ACLs in the > general case, as well as for files that have a POSIX ACL. Mapping NFS4 > ACL that used to be a POSIX ACL back to POSIX ACLs could be achieved > in many cases as well, but the code would be quite messy. A better way > seems to be to using a filesystem that doesn't support POSIX ACLs in > the first place. Unfortunately, xfs doesn't allow turning off POSIX > ACLs, for example. > > Andreas > >> >> >> > Even simpler would be if knfsd didn't send the attribute if not >> >> >> > necessary. Looks like there's code actively creating the nfs4_a= cl on >> >> >> > the wire even if the filesystem had none: >> >> >> > >> >> >> > pacl =3D get_acl(inode, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS); >> >> >> > if (!pacl) >> >> >> > pacl =3D posix_acl_from_mode(inode->i_mode, GFP_KERNEL); >> >> >> > >> >> >> > What's the point? >> >> >> >> >> >> That's how the protocol is specified. >> >> > >> >> > Yep, even if we could make that change to nfsd it wouldn't help the >> >> > client with the large number of other servers that are out there >> >> > (including older knfsd's). >> >> > >> >> > --b. >> >> > >> >> >> (I'm not saying that that's very helpful.) >> >> >> >> >> >> Andreas >> >> >> >> Hi everyone..... >> >> I have a customer facing this problem, and so stumbled onto the email >> >> thread. >> >> Unfortunately it didn't resolve anything. Maybe I can help kick thi= ngs >> >> along??? >> >> >> >> The core problem here is that NFSv4 and ext4 use different and large= ly >> >> incompatible ACL implementations. There is no way to accurately >> >> translate from one to the other in general (common specific examples >> >> can be converted). >> >> >> >> This means that either: >> >> 1/ overlayfs cannot use ext4 for upper and NFS for lower (or vice >> >> versa) or >> >> 2/ overlayfs need to accept that sometimes it cannot copy ACLs, and >> >> that is OK. >> >> >> >> Silently not copying the ACLs is probably not a good idea as it might >> >> result in inappropriate permissions being given away. >> > >> > For example? permissions given away to do what? >> > Note that ovl_permission() only check permissions of *mounter* >> > to read the lower NFS file and ovl_open()/ovl_read_iter() access >> > the lower file with *mounter* credentials. >> > >> > I might be wrong, but seems to me that once admin mounted >> > overlayfs with lower NFS, NFS ACLs are not being enforced at all >> > even before copy up. >> >> I guess it is just as well that copy-up fails then - if the lower-level >> permission check is being ignored. >> >> > >> >> So if the >> >> sysadmin wants this (and some clearly do), they need a way to >> >> explicitly say "I accept the risk". If only standard Unix permissio= ns >> >> are used, there is no risk, so this seems reasonable. >> >> >> >> So I would like to propose a new option for overlayfs >> >> nocopyupacl: when overlayfs is copying a file (or directory etc) >> >> from the lower filesystem to the upper filesystem, it does not >> >> copy extended attributes with the "system." prefix. These are >> >> used for storing ACL information and this is sometimes not >> >> compatible between different filesystem types (e.g. ext4 and >> >> NFSv4). Standard Unix ownership permission flags (rwx) *are* >> >> copied so this option does not risk giving away inappropriate >> >> permissions unless the lowerfs uses unusual ACLs. >> >> >> >> >> > >> > I am wondering if it would make more sense for nfs to register a >> > security_inode_copy_up_xattr() hook. >> > That is the mechanism that prevents copying up other security.* >> > xattrs? >> >> No, I don't think that would make sense. >> Support some day support for nfs4 acls were added to ext4 (not a totally >> ridiculous suggestion). We would then want NFS to allow it's ACLs to be >> copied up. >> >> Thanks, >> NeilBrown >> >> >> > >> > Thanks, >> > Amir. --=-=-= Content-Type: application/pgp-signature; name="signature.asc" -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAEBCAAdFiEEG8Yp69OQ2HB7X0l6Oeye3VZigbkFAlzLfD8ACgkQOeye3VZi gblSbhAAg6MuQuMSczkW5alaN6PqD0JiouqJ40yEE0mjB7sGVYBEyuk9kB0tj4aQ Mu58Xm0ZJk3z51m5crM+JTCiJwr2rtZijvaHa808/qeLcw1gZJceSa0zXd/ma3cB GAgQWnmHX3G6IZ0Nzk+m77MxYqD4GSyLMY5fWF8ItJKAlcfmhA8aGp23IsF9EyGN KXmE+gQEDvs7W1uuiqaug87AxAm1zK+49qWv2no5Br9nmOCHHUC7opmaO9uTg/Ez iyrb/2qkbgDO9G1c0cLE+b8ZFd2Ndo9T43PFLS2+2eJ4Lv2T8w8QnN6ZBdSuRd6/ PWJzb+2VQDb9qPWV2XRReWJokflbLkcV6/4hhHiW5SnAMujsG24forDKQRt1Av7X bGupRXEbZJx54AbOJhmIdoEjlOcvl5rEG+ljGcB+6ylPN/BBYxsB4rwQoTb0/vRT eMb89V+ulB/bCEgrL6jQECwnl/unZw2X10h5bh4X8ZOTAz6wB+raGr8EgtzUm2sH w9AjWNgTv9vjt3pmITgY+AiDEyx8SWrVJXF9Svs52iPkOGCnYpebWzNXjQuBXyof fheyBuFA27bng/oIPPEUEiS1vq1JynScygBSb/0odcnEJbFTLn5WJjPa0itanWqq Eymd6C8pWDT4gF8scQQmxOcBqFUU+qaav6Cz5CeFBGnKsrVxMrM= =RTQU -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --=-=-=--