Received: by 2002:a25:4158:0:0:0:0:0 with SMTP id o85csp699468yba; Fri, 3 May 2019 09:04:25 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqyJ8QXWEm7hCRo4y6aZmYpVQ91AkoYQszJSppBgecRZJIMB1pJZpNDFAkFl9b50VwCJ/FsN X-Received: by 2002:a63:28c:: with SMTP id 134mr11389175pgc.278.1556899465101; Fri, 03 May 2019 09:04:25 -0700 (PDT) ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1556899465; cv=none; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; b=Dpi8bKTvfHOyLYoCkNEwSnUt4dKpnIehF2qYjSJrjs6G8MD/b6Ev/cprft85GPPhKC IZDqMg5rk0HUnwzSeMano2iKfl77yrraLma03uTLy3ZZOCnitz7axcjO75WZB0rad9eX kZyW+uyViD18hkKZ9PLvE7g9hsDspCGDT5kVw4aFO1OafSBTzrbQm9aV4kPhJ5LwLp9m ddhzUI8gzmLAB/VsvPVcKS+JiDDH6q5oOURmBrdaLO2nACrUD/qc9GDTHSdHY0Slfcv5 JIv8UtR2n68Eey4sdQQT5bTB/ccwZVYf5Z02Mt9xLT9iWcCGKmS6UPCQJ49HtA4CraaJ qu3g== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; h=list-id:precedence:sender:user-agent:in-reply-to :content-transfer-encoding:content-disposition:mime-version :references:message-id:subject:cc:to:from:date; bh=8CK0q0nmX7WxKM5o5A79U0SkMdByesRIf3bxCwsng0U=; b=L/bMkwKtqORpHtxnx0M4ngkL/8n6HQRfHHbIY2bJkZoNI+vMeVaoWx3I2x6EsqbsBq /U/WqmNG50mEgzbeYfgxTeMOS5aW5UZm5o3xVnqykKNrUBBzCfJ4Vg114QofLTGJkUCi n5hxvaFhRdrsy+9U+xE94LQZYBMWTU2L4PeoVgNtyLQjx+XjfyOj66x+dAvfV87WmssH O95C6WZ4rjojiWHRmNjrV6BDyzcybVjp0+vxjqVdnHLGBlYzthmIW4BZfFJBMLmXBJej 2yaJ9JfWy8TI7aqV4TeXrheeMWCfSEIhiFceOxa8wUVT+PsQ/7oxJiQhIuhKfQ5VoVdG N9Lg== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-nfs-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-nfs-owner@vger.kernel.org Return-Path: Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org. [209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id f11si3000203plb.234.2019.05.03.09.04.10; Fri, 03 May 2019 09:04:25 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-nfs-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-nfs-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-nfs-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728278AbfECPfc (ORCPT + 99 others); Fri, 3 May 2019 11:35:32 -0400 Received: from fieldses.org ([173.255.197.46]:54398 "EHLO fieldses.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726724AbfECPfc (ORCPT ); Fri, 3 May 2019 11:35:32 -0400 Received: by fieldses.org (Postfix, from userid 2815) id 82E561C26; Fri, 3 May 2019 11:35:31 -0400 (EDT) Date: Fri, 3 May 2019 11:35:31 -0400 From: "J. Bruce Fields" To: NeilBrown Cc: Andreas Gruenbacher , Miklos Szeredi , Andreas =?utf-8?Q?Gr=C3=BCnbacher?= , Patrick Plagwitz , "linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org" , Linux NFS list , Linux FS-devel Mailing List , Linux Kernel Mailing List Subject: Re: [PATCH] overlayfs: ignore empty NFSv4 ACLs in ext4 upperdir Message-ID: <20190503153531.GJ12608@fieldses.org> References: <20161205162559.GB17517@fieldses.org> <266c571f-e4e2-7c61-5ee2-8ece0c2d06e9@web.de> <20161206185806.GC31197@fieldses.org> <87bm0l4nra.fsf@notabene.neil.brown.name> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit In-Reply-To: <87bm0l4nra.fsf@notabene.neil.brown.name> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.21 (2010-09-15) Sender: linux-nfs-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org On Thu, May 02, 2019 at 12:02:33PM +1000, NeilBrown wrote: > On Tue, Dec 06 2016, J. Bruce Fields wrote: > > > On Tue, Dec 06, 2016 at 02:18:31PM +0100, Andreas Gruenbacher wrote: > >> On Tue, Dec 6, 2016 at 11:08 AM, Miklos Szeredi wrote: > >> > On Tue, Dec 6, 2016 at 12:24 AM, Andreas Grünbacher > >> > wrote: > >> >> 2016-12-06 0:19 GMT+01:00 Andreas Grünbacher : > >> > > >> >>> It's not hard to come up with a heuristic that determines if a > >> >>> system.nfs4_acl value is equivalent to a file mode, and to ignore the > >> >>> attribute in that case. (The file mode is transmitted in its own > >> >>> attribute already, so actually converting .) That way, overlayfs could > >> >>> still fail copying up files that have an actual ACL. It's still an > >> >>> ugly hack ... > >> >> > >> >> Actually, that kind of heuristic would make sense in the NFS client > >> >> which could then hide the "system.nfs4_acl" attribute. > >> > > >> > Even simpler would be if knfsd didn't send the attribute if not > >> > necessary. Looks like there's code actively creating the nfs4_acl on > >> > the wire even if the filesystem had none: > >> > > >> > pacl = get_acl(inode, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS); > >> > if (!pacl) > >> > pacl = posix_acl_from_mode(inode->i_mode, GFP_KERNEL); > >> > > >> > What's the point? > >> > >> That's how the protocol is specified. > > > > Yep, even if we could make that change to nfsd it wouldn't help the > > client with the large number of other servers that are out there > > (including older knfsd's). > > > > --b. > > > >> (I'm not saying that that's very helpful.) > >> > >> Andreas > > Hi everyone..... > I have a customer facing this problem, and so stumbled onto the email > thread. > Unfortunately it didn't resolve anything. Maybe I can help kick things > along??? > > The core problem here is that NFSv4 and ext4 use different and largely > incompatible ACL implementations. There is no way to accurately > translate from one to the other in general (common specific examples > can be converted). > > This means that either: > 1/ overlayfs cannot use ext4 for upper and NFS for lower (or vice > versa) or > 2/ overlayfs need to accept that sometimes it cannot copy ACLs, and > that is OK. > > Silently not copying the ACLs is probably not a good idea as it might > result in inappropriate permissions being given away. So if the > sysadmin wants this (and some clearly do), they need a way to > explicitly say "I accept the risk". So, I feel like silently copying ACLs up *also* carries a risk, if that means switching from server-enforcement to client-enforcement of those permissions. Sorry, I know we had another thread recently about permissions in this situation, and I've forgotten the conclusion. Out of curiosity, what's done with selinux labels? --b. > If only standard Unix permissions > are used, there is no risk, so this seems reasonable. > > So I would like to propose a new option for overlayfs > nocopyupacl: when overlayfs is copying a file (or directory etc) > from the lower filesystem to the upper filesystem, it does not > copy extended attributes with the "system." prefix. These are > used for storing ACL information and this is sometimes not > compatible between different filesystem types (e.g. ext4 and > NFSv4). Standard Unix ownership permission flags (rwx) *are* > copied so this option does not risk giving away inappropriate > permissions unless the lowerfs uses unusual ACLs. > > > Miklos: would you find that acceptable? > > Thanks, > NeilBrown > >