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[23.128.96.18]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id d1si3106929eds.484.2021.01.18.21.35.42; Mon, 18 Jan 2021 21:36:02 -0800 (PST) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-nfs-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) client-ip=23.128.96.18; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@fieldses.org header.s=default header.b=Ct4V6koG; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-nfs-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-nfs-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1730620AbhARW4y (ORCPT + 99 others); Mon, 18 Jan 2021 17:56:54 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:50414 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S2390756AbhARW4k (ORCPT ); Mon, 18 Jan 2021 17:56:40 -0500 Received: from fieldses.org (fieldses.org [IPv6:2600:3c00:e000:2f7::1]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E47BCC061575 for ; Mon, 18 Jan 2021 14:55:59 -0800 (PST) Received: by fieldses.org (Postfix, from userid 2815) id 48EAC6E97; Mon, 18 Jan 2021 17:55:57 -0500 (EST) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 fieldses.org 48EAC6E97 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=fieldses.org; s=default; t=1611010557; bh=+NGZkaPUcb49oWb6AuiGE8dDVIBk2x0AEiwLqhDk9l4=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=Ct4V6koG+0QGv+drHLntHIhxImUzczC7wjpwKiVq6BkncihR6lk9ebTQn2dfN1nRC 2/hFh1q3Uyv+fRAoin+gQVFrFhz9zlC7PIVxFcOJLIQWPzVmWQKGnlG0dKeuBHV9S6 Wi2yJugKl/MIPFk7C48gjm6eoaTSb+DFzJ2FUFZc= Date: Mon, 18 Jan 2021 17:55:57 -0500 From: "bfields@fieldses.org" To: =?utf-8?B?5ZC05byC?= Cc: Trond Myklebust , "security@kernel.org" , "w@1wt.eu" , "greg@kroah.com" , "linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org" , "chuck.lever@oracle.com" Subject: Re: nfsd vurlerability submit Message-ID: <20210118225557.GB23934@fieldses.org> References: <20210108152017.GA4183@fieldses.org> <20210108152607.GA950@1wt.eu> <20210108153237.GB4183@fieldses.org> <20210108154230.GB950@1wt.eu> <20210111193655.GC2600@fieldses.org> <20210112153208.GF9248@fieldses.org> <8296b696a7fa5591ad3fbb05bfcf6bdf6175cc38.camel@hammerspace.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit In-Reply-To: User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.21 (2010-09-15) Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org On Tue, Jan 19, 2021 at 12:29:28AM +0800, 吴异 wrote: > I want to consult you on what is the original intention of designing > subtree_check and whether it is to solve the 'I want to export a > subtree of a filesystem' problem. > > As far as I know, when opening subtree_check, the folder's file > handle does not contain the inode information of its parent directory > and > 'while (tdentry != exp->ex_path.dentry && !IS_ROOT(tdentry))' in > nfsd_acceptable can work well to Intercept handles beyond the export > point. > > This seems to delete code as follows in nfsfh.c could solve the 'I > want to export a subtree of a filesystem' problem and ensure safety: > if (exp->ex_flags & NFSEXP_NOSUBTREECHECK) > return 1; > > Or replace by follow: > if (exp->ex_path.dentry == exp->vfs_mount->mnt_root) > return 1; > > When I was reading the nfsd code, I was confused about whether the > designer used the file system as a security boundary or an export > point.Since exporting a complete file system is the safest, why not > directly prohibit unsafe practices, but add code like subtree_check to > try to verify the file handle. Sorry, I honestly don't understand the question. If you have a specific proposal, perhaps you could send a patch. --b. > > I may not understand your design ideas. > > Yours sincerely, > > Trond Myklebust 于2021年1月13日周三 上午12:53写道: > > > > On Tue, 2021-01-12 at 10:32 -0500, J. Bruce Fields wrote: > > > On Tue, Jan 12, 2021 at 10:48:00PM +0800, 吴异 wrote: > > > > Telling users how to configure the exported file system in the most > > > > secure > > > > way does > > > > mitigate the problem to some extent, but this does not seem to > > > > address the > > > > security risks posed by no_ subtree_ check in the code. In my > > > > opinion,when > > > > the generated filehandle does not contain the inode information of > > > > the > > > > parent directory,the nfsd_acceptable function can also recursively > > > > determine whether the request file exceeds the export path > > > > dentry.Enabling > > > > subtree_check to add parent directory information only brings some > > > > troubles. > > > > > > Filesystems don't necessarily provide us with an efficient way to > > > find > > > parent directories from any given file. (And note a single file may > > > have multiple parent directories.) > > > > > > (I do wonder if we could do better in the directory case, though. We > > > already reconnect directories all the way back up to the root.) > > > > > > > I have a bold idea, why not directly remove the file handle > > > > modification in > > > > subtree_check, and then normalize the judgment of whether dentry > > > > exceeds > > > > the export point directory in nfsd_acceptable (line 38 to 54 in > > > > /fs/nfsd/nfsfh.c) . > > > > > > > > As far as I understand it, the reason why subtree_check is not > > > > turned on by > > > > default is that it will cause problems when reading and writing > > > > files, > > > > rather than it wastes more time when nfsd_acceptable. > > > > > > > > In short,I think it's open to question whether the security of the > > > > system > > > > depends on the user's complete correct configuration(the system > > > > does not > > > > prohibit the export of a subdirectory). > > > > > > > Enabling subtree_check to add parent directoryinformation only > > > > brings > > > > some troubles. > > > > > > > > In short,I think it's open to question whether the security of the > > > > system depends on the user's complete correct configuration(the > > > > system > > > > does not prohibit the export of a subdirectory). > > > > > > I'd love to replace the export interface by one that prohibited > > > subdirectory exports (or at least made it more obvious where they're > > > being used.) > > > > > > But given the interface we already have, that would be a disruptive > > > and > > > time-consuming change. > > > > > > Another approach is to add more entropy to filehandles so they're > > > harder > > > to guess; see e.g.: > > > > > > https://www.fsl.cs.stonybrook.edu/docs/nfscrack-tr/index.html > > > > > > In the end none of these change the fact that a filehandle has an > > > infinite lifetime, so once it's leaked, there's nothing you can do. > > > The > > > authors suggest NFSv4 volatile filehandles as a solution to that > > > problem, but I don't think they've thought through the obstacles to > > > making volatile filehandles work. > > > > > > --b. > > > > The point is that there is no good solution to the 'I want to export a > > subtree of a filesystem' problem, and so it is plainly wrong to try to > > make a default of those solutions, which break the one sane case of > > exporting the whole filesystem. > > > > Just a reminder that we kicked out subtree_check not only because a > > trivial rename of a file breaks the client's ability to perform I/O by > > invalidating the filehandle. In addition, that option causes filehandle > > aliasing (i.e. multiple filehandles pointing to the same file) which is > > a major PITA for clients to try to manage for more or less the same > > reason that it is a major PITA to try to manage these files using > > paths. > > > > The discussion on volatile filehandles in RFC5661 does try to address > > some of the above issues, but ends up concluding that you need to > > introduce POSIX-incompatible restrictions, such as trying to ban > > renames and deletions of open files in order to make it work. > > > > None of these compromises are necessary if you export a whole > > filesystem (or a hierarchy of whole filesystems). That's the sane case. > > That's the one that people should default to using. > > > > -- > > Trond Myklebust > > Linux NFS client maintainer, Hammerspace > > trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com > > > >