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From:   Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Date:   Tue, 1 Feb 2022 11:19:37 -0500
Message-ID: <CAHC9VhRAPb8PV08fYd-GOY+ZeKX6r+rmGw_Okrwwj6ESTVDYmA@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC v2 1/2] selinux: Fix selinux_sb_mnt_opts_compat()
To:     Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Cc:     Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>,
        SElinux list <selinux@vger.kernel.org>,
        linux-nfs <linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org>,
        Linux kernel mailing list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
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On Tue, Feb 1, 2022 at 9:38 AM Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> wrote:
> On Mon, Jan 31, 2022 at 5:16 PM Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> wrote:
> > On Mon, Jan 31, 2022 at 7:46 AM Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> wrote:
> > > On Fri, Jan 28, 2022 at 3:28 AM Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> wrote:
> > > > On Thu, Jan 27, 2022 at 4:54 AM Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> wrote:
> > > > > I wonder if we could make this all much simpler by *always* doing the
> > > > > label parsing in selinux_add_opt() and just returning an error when
> > > > > !selinux_initialized(&selinux_state). Before the new mount API, mount
> > > > > options were always passed directly to the mount(2) syscall, so it
> > > > > wasn't possible to pass any SELinux mount options before the SELinux
> > > > > policy was loaded. I don't see why we need to jump through hoops here
> > > > > just to support this pseudo-feature of stashing an unparsed label into
> > > > > an fs_context before policy is loaded... Userspace should never need
> > > > > to do that.
> > > >
> > > > I could agree with that, although part of my mind is a little nervous
> > > > about the "userspace should *never* ..." because that always seems to
> > > > bite us.  Although I'm struggling to think of a case where userspace
> > > > would need to set explicit SELinux mount options without having a
> > > > policy loaded.
> > >
> > > I get that, but IMO this is enough of an odd "use case" that I
> > > wouldn't worry too much ...
> >
> > I understand, but seeing as I'm the only one that defends these things
> > with Linus and others lets do this:
>
> It's not all black and white:
> https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/Pine.LNX.4.64.0512291322560.3298@g5.osdl.org/

I made my statement above not to ask your opinion, but rather to make a point.

-- 
paul-moore.com