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Date:   Wed, 31 May 2023 09:44:58 -0700
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Subject: Re: [PATCH -next 0/2] lsm: Change inode_setattr() to take struct
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To:     Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc:     Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
        =?UTF-8?Q?Micka=c3=abl_Sala=c3=bcn?= <mic@digikod.net>,
        Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>,
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        hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp, linkinjeon@kernel.org,
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        chuck.lever@oracle.com, jlayton@kernel.org, miklos@szeredi.hu,
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        linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org,
        wangweiyang2@huawei.com, Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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From:   Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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On 5/31/2023 1:36 AM, Christian Brauner wrote:
> On Tue, May 30, 2023 at 03:15:01PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> On 5/30/2023 9:01 AM, Christian Brauner wrote:
>>> On Tue, May 30, 2023 at 07:55:17AM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>>>> On 5/30/2023 7:28 AM, Christoph Hellwig wrote:
>>>>> On Tue, May 30, 2023 at 03:58:35PM +0200, Christian Brauner wrote:
>>>>>> The main concern which was expressed on other patchsets before is that
>>>>>> modifying inode operations to take struct path is not the way to go.
>>>>>> Passing struct path into individual filesystems is a clear layering
>>>>>> violation for most inode operations, sometimes downright not feasible,
>>>>>> and in general exposing struct vfsmount to filesystems is a hard no. At
>>>>>> least as far as I'm concerned.
>>>>> Agreed.  Passing struct path into random places is not how the VFS works.
>>>>>
>>>>>> So the best way to achieve the landlock goal might be to add new hooks
>>>>> What is "the landlock goal", and why does it matter?
>>>>>
>>>>>> or not. And we keep adding new LSMs without deprecating older ones (A
>>>>>> problem we also face in the fs layer.) and then they sit around but
>>>>>> still need to be taken into account when doing changes.
>>>>> Yes, I'm really worried about th amount of LSMs we have, and the weird
>>>>> things they do.
>>>> Which LSM(s) do you think ought to be deprecated? I only see one that I
>>> I don't have a good insight into what LSMs are actively used or are
>>> effectively unused but I would be curious to hear what LSMs are
>>> considered actively used/maintained from the LSM maintainer's
>>> perspective.
>> I'm not the LSM maintainer, but I've been working on the infrastructure
>> for quite some time. All the existing LSMs save one can readily be associated
>> with active systems, and the one that isn't is actively maintained. We have
>> not gotten into the habit of accepting LSMs upstream that don't have a real
>> world use.
>>
>>>> might consider a candidate. As for weird behavior, that's what LSMs are
>>>> for, and the really weird ones proposed (e.g. pathname character set limitations)
>>> If this is effectively saying that LSMs are licensed to step outside the
>>> rules of the subsystem they're a guest in then it seems unlikely
>>> subsystems will be very excited to let new LSM changes go in important
>>> codepaths going forward. In fact this seems like a good argument against
>>> it.
>> This is an artifact of Linus' decision that security models should be
>> supported as add-on modules. On the one hand, all that a subsystem maintainer
>> needs to know about a security feature is what it needs in the way of hooks.
>> On the other hand, the subsystem maintainer loses control over what kinds of
>> things the security feature does with the available information. It's a
>> tension that we've had to deal with since the Orange Book days of the late
>> 1980's. The deal has always been:
>>
>> 	You can have your security feature if:
>> 	1. If I turn it off it has no performance impact
>> 	2. I don't have to do anything to maintain it
>> 	3. It doesn't interfere with any other system behavior
>> 	4. You'll leave me alone
>>
>> As a security developer from way back I would be delighted if maintainers of
>> other subsystems took an active interest in some of what we've been trying
>> to accomplish in the security space. If the VFS maintainers would like to
>> see the LSM interfaces for file systems changed I, for one, would like very
>> much to hear about what they'd prefer. 
> What is important for us is that the security layer must understand and
> accept that some things cannot be done the way it envisions them to be
> done because it would involve design compromises in the fs layer that
> the fs maintainers are unwilling to make. The idea to pass struct path
> to almost every security hook is a good example.

Yes, and that's completely acceptable. What would be really great is some
guidance about what to do instead. Fishing for NAKs isn't fun for anybody.

> If the project is feature parity between inode and path based LSMs then
> it must be clear from the start that this won't be achieved at the cost
> of mixing up the layer where only dentries and inodes are relevant and
> the layer where struct paths are most relevant.

Which is a fair point, and helps those of us who don't work in the VFS
layer daily understand the rationale.

>
>> We do a lot of crazy things to avoid interfering with the subsystems we
>> interact with. A closer developer relationship would be most welcome, so
>> long as it helps us achieve or goals. We get a lot of complaints about how
>> LSM feature perform, but no one wants to hear that a good deal of that comes
>> about because of what has to be done in support of 1, 2 and 3 above. Sometimes
>> we do stoopid things, but usually it's to avoid changes "outside our swim lane".
> I personally am not opposed to comment on patches but they will
> naturally have lower priority than other things.

I can't say that I see how security features "naturally have lower priority",
but everyone has to balance things.