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[2620:137:e000::1:20]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id u31-20020a056a00099f00b006872ac0a222si6767619pfg.100.2023.08.02.10.06.06; Wed, 02 Aug 2023 10:06:22 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-nfs-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) client-ip=2620:137:e000::1:20; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@kernel.org header.s=k20201202 header.b=a8+x7CVF; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-nfs-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-nfs-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S232429AbjHBQuf (ORCPT + 99 others); Wed, 2 Aug 2023 12:50:35 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:49476 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S233179AbjHBQuS (ORCPT ); Wed, 2 Aug 2023 12:50:18 -0400 Received: from dfw.source.kernel.org (dfw.source.kernel.org [IPv6:2604:1380:4641:c500::1]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E2B9A30D1; Wed, 2 Aug 2023 09:49:59 -0700 (PDT) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (2048 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by dfw.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 25BC461924; Wed, 2 Aug 2023 16:49:59 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id ECAF6C433CB; Wed, 2 Aug 2023 16:49:56 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1690994998; bh=8TDdoriMirQkbs+sSC9VzHqIztUiVMg3Kktox9rBgT4=; h=From:Date:Subject:To:Cc:From; b=a8+x7CVF3sWu9j5R5rqbCqUieawg4Qr4tmpg6Q88oHYPwnXWoMuqL65kBBVhq3BEY c8EH5ml8CrtJJF25vdbwiKbaXyXxCaL2F4UsIE3GPnqKYcnjil6Ees2usVVsKwKp08 YOFBAJ7CudvmPWoEpmZ+OZxwagen4+ghQfpcQKnpDIOu9lO3VBsGCXXsgG8RzcHRxN b1yDjbQFpl6AGx8rVf3Gw4dDLjxh/a9Qjvp86NXy+xxaEL0SzX/aepWHS/SxZBO0mo 6mQNoXCsdWBZe2Uuk3WR+KWSTJpb+pmS2NMb7WUORvgXUeb1BIQgmGWoY7qiLARe+V q3eb5zdz97+9Q== From: Jeff Layton Date: Wed, 02 Aug 2023 12:49:33 -0400 Subject: [PATCH v6] vfs, security: Fix automount superblock LSM init problem, preventing NFS sb sharing MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Message-Id: <20230802-master-v6-1-45d48299168b@kernel.org> X-B4-Tracking: v=1; b=H4sIAByJymQC/x3Myw6DIBCF4VcxrAsZphWwq75H0wXREUmjmIHeY nz3Epdf8p+ziUwcKYtrswmmd8wxLRXm1Ih+8ksgGYdqgYBncIBy9rkQywqEDsgNphM1XpnG+D2 O7o/qkdMsy8Tkj7k2xoF1rbGtU9hZNIBKX7RtO40IWhsEixa1yiXEcvt4LlMKauXU/9KiEgf1e op9/wNokNpKsQAAAA== To: Alexander Viro , Christian Brauner , Trond Myklebust , Anna Schumaker , Paul Moore , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Stephen Smalley , Eric Paris , Casey Schaufler , David Howells , Scott Mayhew Cc: Stephen Smalley , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, Jeff Layton X-Mailer: b4 0.12.3 X-Developer-Signature: v=1; a=openpgp-sha256; l=11586; i=jlayton@kernel.org; h=from:subject:message-id; bh=Y0txRBdmjz7yDLEswKP6N7utPuZsTScZ5wjuMSPYqJE=; b=owEBbQKS/ZANAwAIAQAOaEEZVoIVAcsmYgBkyok049T0DHZRmmBtubznEDMlxtFtyYhKnXWM9 SX+Mgwl1fOJAjMEAAEIAB0WIQRLwNeyRHGyoYTq9dMADmhBGVaCFQUCZMqJNAAKCRAADmhBGVaC Fcg2D/sH10RoA8oISlBvguOODhPLSAU16RhE21Czp7Q5jHf20erUf0bw3RdmtRTWLZEnTqVPfK5 E74ZLh4xxWK3MKYZeLMtNKrnfHOe8AgW6W+qEmfOsKqNVxiGOzyNUou/Vffj2Y1wGv3gmiNcpUP LyLfvvc2ui7Ei8boCll5Kkf4KXUQXyAJ7ZWILH31yjwjd/tFeWT75r9qIgLIno+J2qHJ+6PG1gy qZCAplcBjsa5NmIA/b4HarUkhqa/9iI715LMqc65cV8oPBlKL/tCnwCrh9tHslygo51DvIsxOkW kVXiGIsQ4iAAAQfRx5YjK6OSgFiZpzH0THY+vIWKQjqCwmFcB7wtcXDNJT963NHSDom9TyLp09b pF96v7g5d/iNUw9fojnciqj6mJ9O2P1yH+HhmNsh0o16+NwJrzPFEEOG2lm//hjmijo5xnJqLju OhZrSfvcp4uZlKoYfkOMN4QHp11gXy1XhcW1Ff4A4xAegznId7U8FTP3T/PG9byBWOredAKWgK8 0FVxT7IOBvwKscF1d8N433wZ5mTDZJRGkPWrQn0ebPZ2V89ciMT4Ndb1oiaGy8JCMBSq1bq/8yI GpnNmcIGiXoBi2MH6FifkWtVS5cC+XAmCsY5EOur+HTqK0XPLVogwdEGq16e7VBHDX/4dFR8eue W1pItWTmqrkR8JQ== X-Developer-Key: i=jlayton@kernel.org; a=openpgp; fpr=4BC0D7B24471B2A184EAF5D3000E684119568215 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.1 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,DKIM_VALID_EF, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_BLOCKED,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,T_SCC_BODY_TEXT_LINE autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.6 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.6 (2021-04-09) on lindbergh.monkeyblade.net Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org From: David Howells When NFS superblocks are created by automounting, their LSM parameters aren't set in the fs_context struct prior to sget_fc() being called, leading to failure to match existing superblocks. Fix this by adding a new LSM hook to load fc->security for submount creation when alloc_fs_context() is creating the fs_context for it. However, this uncovers a further bug: nfs_get_root() initialises the superblock security manually by calling security_sb_set_mnt_opts() or security_sb_clone_mnt_opts() - but then vfs_get_tree() calls security_sb_set_mnt_opts(), which can lead to SELinux, at least, complaining. Fix that by adding a flag to the fs_context that suppresses the security_sb_set_mnt_opts() call in vfs_get_tree(). This can be set by NFS when it sets the LSM context on the new superblock. The first bug leads to messages like the following appearing in dmesg: NFS: Cache volume key already in use (nfs,4.2,2,108,106a8c0,1,,,,100000,100000,2ee,3a98,1d4c,3a98,1) Signed-off-by: David Howells Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton Fixes: 9bc61ab18b1d ("vfs: Introduce fs_context, switch vfs_kern_mount() to it.") Fixes: 779df6a5480f ("NFS: Ensure security label is set for root inode) Tested-by: Jeff Layton Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton Acked-by: Casey Schaufler Acked-by: "Christian Brauner (Microsoft)" Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/165962680944.3334508.6610023900349142034.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v1 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/165962729225.3357250.14350728846471527137.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v2 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/165970659095.2812394.6868894171102318796.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v3 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/166133579016.3678898.6283195019480567275.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v4 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/217595.1662033775@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v5 --- This patch was originally sent by David several months ago, but it never got merged. I'm resending to resurrect the discussion. Can we get this fixed? ver #6) - Rebase onto v6.5.0-rc4 ver #5) - Removed unused variable. - Only allocate smack_mnt_opts if we're dealing with a submount. ver #4) - When doing a FOR_SUBMOUNT mount, don't set the root label in SELinux or Smack. ver #3) - Made LSM parameter extraction dependent on fc->purpose == FS_CONTEXT_FOR_SUBMOUNT. Shouldn't happen on FOR_RECONFIGURE. ver #2) - Added Smack support - Made LSM parameter extraction dependent on reference != NULL. --- fs/fs_context.c | 4 ++++ fs/nfs/getroot.c | 1 + fs/super.c | 10 ++++---- include/linux/fs_context.h | 1 + include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 1 + include/linux/security.h | 6 +++++ security/security.c | 14 +++++++++++ security/selinux/hooks.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++ security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 54 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 9 files changed, 112 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/fs_context.c b/fs/fs_context.c index 851214d1d013..a523aea956c4 100644 --- a/fs/fs_context.c +++ b/fs/fs_context.c @@ -282,6 +282,10 @@ static struct fs_context *alloc_fs_context(struct file_system_type *fs_type, break; } + ret = security_fs_context_init(fc, reference); + if (ret < 0) + goto err_fc; + /* TODO: Make all filesystems support this unconditionally */ init_fs_context = fc->fs_type->init_fs_context; if (!init_fs_context) diff --git a/fs/nfs/getroot.c b/fs/nfs/getroot.c index 11ff2b2e060f..651bffb0067e 100644 --- a/fs/nfs/getroot.c +++ b/fs/nfs/getroot.c @@ -144,6 +144,7 @@ int nfs_get_root(struct super_block *s, struct fs_context *fc) } if (error) goto error_splat_root; + fc->lsm_set = true; if (server->caps & NFS_CAP_SECURITY_LABEL && !(kflags_out & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS)) server->caps &= ~NFS_CAP_SECURITY_LABEL; diff --git a/fs/super.c b/fs/super.c index e781226e2880..13adf43e2e5d 100644 --- a/fs/super.c +++ b/fs/super.c @@ -1541,10 +1541,12 @@ int vfs_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc) smp_wmb(); sb->s_flags |= SB_BORN; - error = security_sb_set_mnt_opts(sb, fc->security, 0, NULL); - if (unlikely(error)) { - fc_drop_locked(fc); - return error; + if (!(fc->lsm_set)) { + error = security_sb_set_mnt_opts(sb, fc->security, 0, NULL); + if (unlikely(error)) { + fc_drop_locked(fc); + return error; + } } /* diff --git a/include/linux/fs_context.h b/include/linux/fs_context.h index ff6341e09925..26a9fcdb10cc 100644 --- a/include/linux/fs_context.h +++ b/include/linux/fs_context.h @@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ struct fs_context { bool need_free:1; /* Need to call ops->free() */ bool global:1; /* Goes into &init_user_ns */ bool oldapi:1; /* Coming from mount(2) */ + bool lsm_set:1; /* security_sb_set/clone_mnt_opts() already done */ }; struct fs_context_operations { diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h index 7308a1a7599b..7ce3550154b1 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h @@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, bprm_creds_from_file, struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *f LSM_HOOK(int, 0, bprm_check_security, struct linux_binprm *bprm) LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, bprm_committing_creds, struct linux_binprm *bprm) LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, bprm_committed_creds, struct linux_binprm *bprm) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, fs_context_init, struct fs_context *fc, struct dentry *reference) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, fs_context_dup, struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_context *src_sc) LSM_HOOK(int, -ENOPARAM, fs_context_parse_param, struct fs_context *fc, diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index 32828502f09e..61fda06fac9d 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -293,6 +293,7 @@ int security_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file); int security_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm); void security_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm); void security_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm); +int security_fs_context_init(struct fs_context *fc, struct dentry *reference); int security_fs_context_dup(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_context *src_fc); int security_fs_context_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *param); int security_sb_alloc(struct super_block *sb); @@ -629,6 +630,11 @@ static inline void security_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { } +static inline int security_fs_context_init(struct fs_context *fc, + struct dentry *reference) +{ + return 0; +} static inline int security_fs_context_dup(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_context *src_fc) { diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index b720424ca37d..8a6dc6f7cda0 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -1138,6 +1138,20 @@ void security_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) call_void_hook(bprm_committed_creds, bprm); } +/** + * security_fs_context_init() - Initialise fc->security + * @fc: new filesystem context + * @dentry: dentry reference for submount/remount + * + * Fill out the ->security field for a new fs_context. + * + * Return: Returns 0 on success or negative error code on failure. + */ +int security_fs_context_init(struct fs_context *fc, struct dentry *reference) +{ + return call_int_hook(fs_context_init, 0, fc, reference); +} + /** * security_fs_context_dup() - Duplicate a fs_context LSM blob * @fc: destination filesystem context diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index d06e350fedee..29cce0fadbeb 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -2745,6 +2745,30 @@ static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags) FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL); } +static int selinux_fs_context_init(struct fs_context *fc, + struct dentry *reference) +{ + const struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; + struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts; + + if (fc->purpose == FS_CONTEXT_FOR_SUBMOUNT) { + opts = kzalloc(sizeof(*opts), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!opts) + return -ENOMEM; + + sbsec = selinux_superblock(reference->d_sb); + if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) + opts->fscontext_sid = sbsec->sid; + if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) + opts->context_sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid; + if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) + opts->defcontext_sid = sbsec->def_sid; + fc->security = opts; + } + + return 0; +} + static int selinux_fs_context_dup(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_context *src_fc) { @@ -7182,6 +7206,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { /* * PUT "CLONING" (ACCESSING + ALLOCATING) HOOKS HERE */ + LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_init, selinux_fs_context_init), LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_dup, selinux_fs_context_dup), LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_parse_param, selinux_fs_context_parse_param), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_eat_lsm_opts, selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts), diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index 6e270cf3fd30..938c8259c5e7 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -614,6 +614,59 @@ static int smack_add_opt(int token, const char *s, void **mnt_opts) return -EINVAL; } +/** + * smack_fs_context_init - Initialise security data for a filesystem context + * @fc: The filesystem context. + * @reference: Reference dentry (automount/reconfigure) or NULL + * + * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error. + */ +static int smack_fs_context_init(struct fs_context *fc, + struct dentry *reference) +{ + struct superblock_smack *sbsp; + struct smack_mnt_opts *ctx; + struct inode_smack *isp; + + if (fc->purpose == FS_CONTEXT_FOR_SUBMOUNT) { + ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!ctx) + return -ENOMEM; + fc->security = ctx; + + sbsp = smack_superblock(reference->d_sb); + isp = smack_inode(reference->d_sb->s_root->d_inode); + + if (sbsp->smk_default) { + ctx->fsdefault = kstrdup(sbsp->smk_default->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!ctx->fsdefault) + return -ENOMEM; + } + + if (sbsp->smk_floor) { + ctx->fsfloor = kstrdup(sbsp->smk_floor->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!ctx->fsfloor) + return -ENOMEM; + } + + if (sbsp->smk_hat) { + ctx->fshat = kstrdup(sbsp->smk_hat->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!ctx->fshat) + return -ENOMEM; + } + + if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE) { + if (sbsp->smk_root) { + ctx->fstransmute = kstrdup(sbsp->smk_root->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!ctx->fstransmute) + return -ENOMEM; + } + } + } + + return 0; +} + /** * smack_fs_context_dup - Duplicate the security data on fs_context duplication * @fc: The new filesystem context. @@ -4876,6 +4929,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, smack_ptrace_traceme), LSM_HOOK_INIT(syslog, smack_syslog), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_init, smack_fs_context_init), LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_dup, smack_fs_context_dup), LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_parse_param, smack_fs_context_parse_param), --- base-commit: 5d0c230f1de8c7515b6567d9afba1f196fb4e2f4 change-id: 20230802-master-3082090e8d69 Best regards, -- Jeff Layton