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[2620:137:e000::1:20]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id d23-20020a170906641700b0098df03ffa69si3371167ejm.421.2023.08.11.07.41.52; Fri, 11 Aug 2023 07:42:21 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-nfs-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) client-ip=2620:137:e000::1:20; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@umich.edu header.s=google-2016-06-03 header.b=na0RmcUU; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-nfs-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-nfs-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=umich.edu Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S235981AbjHKO2g (ORCPT + 99 others); Fri, 11 Aug 2023 10:28:36 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:33546 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S235761AbjHKO2f (ORCPT ); Fri, 11 Aug 2023 10:28:35 -0400 Received: from mail-lj1-x230.google.com (mail-lj1-x230.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::230]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 87711121 for ; Fri, 11 Aug 2023 07:28:33 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-lj1-x230.google.com with SMTP id 38308e7fff4ca-2b9cb0bb04bso6155831fa.0 for ; Fri, 11 Aug 2023 07:28:33 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=umich.edu; s=google-2016-06-03; t=1691764112; x=1692368912; h=content-transfer-encoding:cc:to:subject:message-id:date:from :in-reply-to:references:mime-version:from:to:cc:subject:date :message-id:reply-to; bh=kT6bnvwHgK491Y3HNlVAV+L1FaIjGCjYkAL78BMrI8k=; b=na0RmcUU6mUcD2+KIm4r9oeyV7Ry0GV8PKVgSkX7XM0uw0Cd5e4CyEkkKkX0epp4rP l6T8NZN9p4Tivn4z51VgrVbcNUo/YjakuYJsRQBbPM0SXJG5q5rJKZiQTJl3W1nokfQr 1chKL4KptnHKDJVDF3axPFWxumctasDVby49J5R2cKeUxQrdO4KLsEcvN9Q/TuBCsx9z MToacICK2vWK/3r8zGE7N88k1M7WoxheIiY14DSZAzRDVnz0hhb+Z3UgHNnNlCkl9ZSx 7Ectn3IrUYhSOIl5fDfNSJUomeBvN5QDX3431ZnCtESGRtNN18KnS6oTNNn7wcqNqSGv 47ag== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20221208; t=1691764112; x=1692368912; h=content-transfer-encoding:cc:to:subject:message-id:date:from :in-reply-to:references:mime-version:x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc :subject:date:message-id:reply-to; bh=kT6bnvwHgK491Y3HNlVAV+L1FaIjGCjYkAL78BMrI8k=; b=Xl+DfgW4Z74pY/vnUxOF77UBFx7CnBkktsV3bI0cJu8Nr7B+BwGTGNMyKpTHMjCRsi tEp4AMEs/A6zEJnF0iFw1R6+6hq7OPgSHloeW72PYaaReI+GD2faYOGSJUhudInIBxrN BSebOgveN4BExrxPrjpBae1u+hYYmtT1DTcsoaBM7bLkbQiCnAuF4P93ocJ97CZ3E9hx TKBunzR262IM3rtY00AxrRfMds98bheqjnS+Kns0DjONCx9XDbGwbmtTAChG7Mvf74j1 7d9FvEE9GVbjOLruOqXuNjnnkby+3uwfnh/CPtIifFDLLrbGUrjaleTa3a10ujo819X2 fjTA== X-Gm-Message-State: AOJu0YwY7yodl8cmJODrwpCh5Puc8xGZT/Iu45eyLtMI+Pg4Jfd9J5kB EBYhaOn/IFGPdcXFr5//BNrGMJczKKwF40Ms2EZdy6Gn X-Received: by 2002:a2e:b808:0:b0:2b9:e10b:a511 with SMTP id u8-20020a2eb808000000b002b9e10ba511mr1499627ljo.0.1691764111358; Fri, 11 Aug 2023 07:28:31 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: In-Reply-To: From: Olga Kornievskaia Date: Fri, 11 Aug 2023 10:28:19 -0400 Message-ID: Subject: Re: turning on s2s copy by default in knfsd To: Jeff Layton Cc: Chuck Lever , Dai Ngo , Dave Wysochanski , Steve Dickson , Olga Kornieskaia , linux-nfs Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.5 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FORGED_FROMDOMAIN,FREEMAIL_FROM, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE,SPF_HELO_NONE, SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.6 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.6 (2021-04-09) on lindbergh.monkeyblade.net Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org On Fri, Aug 11, 2023 at 10:23=E2=80=AFAM Jeff Layton w= rote: > > Chuck and I were chatting yesterday about what it will take to make the > inter_copy_offload_enable module option on by default, and I'd like to > start working toward that end. > > I think what we want to aim for is to eventually deprecate the module > option and have this "just work" when the conditions are right. > > It looks like main obstacle is this (from RFC7862 section 4.9): > > NFSv4 clients and servers supporting the inter-server COPY operations > described in this section are REQUIRED to implement the mechanism > described in Section 4.9.1.1 and to support rejecting COPY_NOTIFY > requests that do not use the RPC security protocol (RPCSEC_GSS) > [RFC7861] with privacy. If the server-to-server copy protocol is > based on ONC RPC, the servers are also REQUIRED to implement > [RFC7861], including the RPCSEC_GSSv3 "copy_to_auth", > "copy_from_auth", and "copy_confirm_auth" structured privileges. > This requirement to implement is not a requirement to use; for > example, a server may, depending on configuration, also allow > COPY_NOTIFY requests that use only AUTH_SYS. > > If a server requires the use of an RPCSEC_GSSv3 copy_to_auth, > copy_from_auth, or copy_confirm_auth privilege and it is not used, > the server will reject the request with NFS4ERR_PARTNER_NO_AUTH. > > We don't (yet) have GSSv3 support, so we'd need to implement that in > order to make this work right with krb5. Has anyone started looking at > GSSv3? Andy Adamson way back when implemented a draft gssv3 implementation and I believe we still have those patches. Anna periodically have been rebasing them but no more than that. I believe there might have been even some patches for the copy piece but I believe those might be lost. I'd have to dig around in my oldest laptop. I'd like to address some other questions later as I'm out of the office tod= ay. > Incidentally, has anyone tried doing this with sec=3Dkrb5 in the current > code? Does it actually work? I don't see any place where we return > nfserr_partner_no_auth, so I wonder if we need to fix up the s2s COPY > authentication and error handling? > > Another question: The v4.2 spec was written before the RPC over TLS > spec. Should we aim to allow this to work by default if the client and > both servers are using xprtsec=3Dmtls and are secured by the same CA? > > 1/ the client and servers are all using GSSv3 with krb5p (or some other > encryption) > > ...or... > > 2/ the client and servers are all using mtls with certificates signed by > the same CA > > > ...I expect we'll probably be able to accomodate #2 before #1. > > Beyond that, we could allow for module or export option that still > allows s2s copy to work and relaxes the above restrictions (to allow > people to use it over plaintext with AUTH_SYS on "secure" networks). > > Anything I've overlooked here, or other thoughts? > > Cheers, > -- > Jeff Layton