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Date:   Tue, 12 Sep 2023 12:19:25 -0400
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Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 25/25] integrity: Switch from rbtree to LSM-managed
 blob for integrity_iint_cache
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To:     Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com>,
        viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, brauner@kernel.org,
        chuck.lever@oracle.com, jlayton@kernel.org, neilb@suse.de,
        kolga@netapp.com, Dai.Ngo@oracle.com, tom@talpey.com,
        zohar@linux.ibm.com, dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com,
        paul@paul-moore.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com,
        dhowells@redhat.com, jarkko@kernel.org,
        stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, eparis@parisplace.org,
        casey@schaufler-ca.com
Cc:     linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
        selinux@vger.kernel.org, Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
References: <20230904133415.1799503-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com>
 <20230904134049.1802006-6-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com>
From:   Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
In-Reply-To: <20230904134049.1802006-6-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com>
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On 9/4/23 09:40, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
>
> Before the security field of kernel objects could be shared among LSMs with
> the LSM stacking feature, IMA and EVM had to rely on an alternative storage
> of inode metadata. The association between inode metadata and inode is
> maintained through an rbtree.
>
> With the reservation mechanism offered by the LSM infrastructure, the
> rbtree is no longer necessary, as each LSM could reserve a space in the
> security blob for each inode. Thus, request from the 'integrity' LSM a
> space in the security blob for the pointer of inode metadata
> (integrity_iint_cache structure).
>
> Prefer this to allocating the integrity_iint_cache structure directly, as
> IMA would require it only for a subset of inodes. Always allocating it
> would cause a waste of memory.
>
> Introduce two primitives for getting and setting the pointer of
> integrity_iint_cache in the security blob, respectively
> integrity_inode_get_iint() and integrity_inode_set_iint(). This would make
> the code more understandable, as they directly replace rbtree operations.
>
> Locking is not needed, as access to inode metadata is not shared, it is per
> inode.
>
> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> ---
>
> @@ -145,10 +91,8 @@ static void integrity_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
>   	if (!IS_IMA(inode))
>   		return;

I think you can remove this check !IS_IMA()  as well since the next 
function called here integrity_iint_find() already has this check:

struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_find(struct inode *inode)
{
         if (!IS_IMA(inode))
                 return NULL;

         return integrity_inode_get_iint(inode);
}


>   
> -	write_lock(&integrity_iint_lock);
> -	iint = __integrity_iint_find(inode);
> -	rb_erase(&iint->rb_node, &integrity_iint_tree);
> -	write_unlock(&integrity_iint_lock);
> +	iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);         <--------------
> +	integrity_inode_set_iint(inode, NULL);
>   
>   	iint_free(iint);
>   }