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Date: Tue, 26 Dec 2023 12:14:05 -0800
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Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 19/24] ima: Move to LSM infrastructure
To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
 Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com>, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk,
 brauner@kernel.org, chuck.lever@oracle.com, jlayton@kernel.org,
 neilb@suse.de, kolga@netapp.com, Dai.Ngo@oracle.com, tom@talpey.com,
 paul@paul-moore.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com,
 dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com, dhowells@redhat.com, jarkko@kernel.org,
 stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, eparis@parisplace.org, shuah@kernel.org,
 mic@digikod.net
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
 linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
 linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
 selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
 Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>,
 Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
References: <20231214170834.3324559-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com>
 <20231214170834.3324559-20-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com>
 <c6c2d413f340d858e43aa3837abdf80cb8be9d84.camel@linux.ibm.com>
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From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
In-Reply-To: <c6c2d413f340d858e43aa3837abdf80cb8be9d84.camel@linux.ibm.com>
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On 12/26/2023 10:14 AM, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> On Thu, 2023-12-14 at 18:08 +0100, Roberto Sassu wrote:
>> From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
>>
>> Move hardcoded IMA function calls (not appraisal-specific functions) from
>> various places in the kernel to the LSM infrastructure, by introducing a
>> new LSM named 'ima' (at the end of the LSM list and always enabled like
>> 'integrity').
>>
>> Having IMA before EVM in the Makefile is sufficient to preserve the
>> relative order of the new 'ima' LSM in respect to the upcoming 'evm' LSM,
>> and thus the order of IMA and EVM function calls as when they were
>> hardcoded.
>>
>> Make moved functions as static (except ima_post_key_create_or_update(),
>> which is not in ima_main.c), and register them as implementation of the
>> respective hooks in the new function init_ima_lsm().
>>
>> A slight difference is that IMA and EVM functions registered for the
>> inode_post_setattr, inode_post_removexattr, path_post_mknod,
>> inode_post_create_tmpfile, inode_post_set_acl and inode_post_remove_acl
>> won't be executed for private inodes. Since those inodes are supposed to be
>> fs-internal, they should not be of interest of IMA or EVM. The S_PRIVATE
>> flag is used for anonymous inodes, hugetlbfs, reiserfs xattrs, XFS scrub
>> and kernel-internal tmpfs files.
>>
>> Conditionally register ima_post_path_mknod() if CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH is
>> enabled, otherwise the path_post_mknod hook won't be available.
> Up to this point, enabling CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH was not required.  By
> making it conditional on CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH, anyone enabling IMA will
> also need to enable CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH.  Without it, new files will
> not be tagged as a "new" file.
>
> Casey, Paul, how common is it today not to enable CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH?
> Will enabling it just for IMA be a problem?

Landlock, AppArmor and TOMOYO require it. Fedora enables Landlock and Ubuntu
enables AppArmor. I expect that, except for "minimal" distributions, you
won't get any push back. If a distribution is striving for minimal, it's not
going to use IMA.

It makes me wonder if eliminating CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH might not be a
rational alternative.