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Message-ID: <42911719-547d-443a-b2f2-07b0cfb11f7a@huaweicloud.com>
Date: Tue, 2 Jan 2024 12:56:26 +0100
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Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 21/24] evm: Move to LSM infrastructure
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To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk,
 brauner@kernel.org, chuck.lever@oracle.com, jlayton@kernel.org,
 neilb@suse.de, kolga@netapp.com, Dai.Ngo@oracle.com, tom@talpey.com,
 paul@paul-moore.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com,
 dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com, dhowells@redhat.com, jarkko@kernel.org,
 stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, eparis@parisplace.org,
 casey@schaufler-ca.com, shuah@kernel.org, mic@digikod.net
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
 linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
 linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
 selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
 Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
References: <20231214170834.3324559-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com>
 <20231214170834.3324559-22-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com>
 <b03e68e9fa1803d6b2cc7a2c0260f78a05a4d88e.camel@linux.ibm.com>
From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com>
In-Reply-To: <b03e68e9fa1803d6b2cc7a2c0260f78a05a4d88e.camel@linux.ibm.com>
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On 12/26/2023 11:13 PM, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> On Thu, 2023-12-14 at 18:08 +0100, Roberto Sassu wrote:
>> From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
>>
>> As for IMA, move hardcoded EVM function calls from various places in the
>> kernel to the LSM infrastructure, by introducing a new LSM named 'evm'
>> (last and always enabled like 'ima'). The order in the Makefile ensures
>> that 'evm' hooks are executed after 'ima' ones.
>>
>> Make EVM functions as static (except for evm_inode_init_security(), which
>> is exported), and register them as hook implementations in init_evm_lsm().
>>
>> Unlike before (see commit to move IMA to the LSM infrastructure),
>> evm_inode_post_setattr(), evm_inode_post_set_acl(),
>> evm_inode_post_remove_acl(), and evm_inode_post_removexattr() are not
>> executed for private inodes.
>>
> 
> Missing is a comment on moving the inline function definitions -
> evm_inode_remove_acl(), evm_inode_post_remove_acl(), and
> evm_inode_post_set_acl() - to evm_main.c.

Ok.

>> Finally, add the LSM_ID_EVM case in lsm_list_modules_test.c
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
>> ---
> 
> [...]
>> @@ -2307,9 +2299,7 @@ int security_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
>>   
>>   	if (ret == 1)
>>   		ret = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
>> -	if (ret)
>> -		return ret;
>> -	return evm_inode_setxattr(idmap, dentry, name, value, size, flags);
>> +	return ret;
>>   }
> 
> Even though capability will be called after EVM, it doesn't make a
> difference in this instance.
> 
> [...]
> 
>>   /**
>> @@ -2493,9 +2472,7 @@ int security_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
>>   	ret = call_int_hook(inode_removexattr, 1, idmap, dentry, name);
>>   	if (ret == 1)
>>   		ret = cap_inode_removexattr(idmap, dentry, name);
>> -	if (ret)
>> -		return ret;
>> -	return evm_inode_removexattr(idmap, dentry, name);
>> +	return ret;
>>   }
> 
> 'security.capability' is one of the EVM protected xattrs.  As
> capability isn't an LSM, it will now be called after EVM, which is a
> problem.

Uhm, according to this comment in security_inode_removexattr() and 
security_inode_setxattr():

	/*
	 * SELinux and Smack integrate the cap call,
	 * so assume that all LSMs supplying this call do so.
	 */

We can add the call to IMA and EVM as well, to be compliant.

However, I'm missing why the two cases are different. It seems 
cap_inode_set/removexattr() are doing just checks.

Thanks

Roberto