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Message-ID: <ab80d0e3-e360-410b-ba24-da6c8e0ac5ff@schaufler-ca.com>
Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2024 10:57:26 -0800
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Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 20/25] ima: Move to LSM infrastructure
Content-Language: en-US
To: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com>, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk,
 brauner@kernel.org, chuck.lever@oracle.com, jlayton@kernel.org,
 neilb@suse.de, kolga@netapp.com, Dai.Ngo@oracle.com, tom@talpey.com,
 paul@paul-moore.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com,
 zohar@linux.ibm.com, dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com, eric.snowberg@oracle.com,
 dhowells@redhat.com, jarkko@kernel.org, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com,
 eparis@parisplace.org, shuah@kernel.org, mic@digikod.net
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
 linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
 linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
 selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
 Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>,
 Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
References: <20240115181809.885385-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com>
 <20240115181809.885385-21-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com>
From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
In-Reply-To: <20240115181809.885385-21-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com>
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On 1/15/2024 10:18 AM, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
>
> Move hardcoded IMA function calls (not appraisal-specific functions) from
> various places in the kernel to the LSM infrastructure, by introducing a
> new LSM named 'ima' (at the end of the LSM list and always enabled like
> 'integrity').
>
> Having IMA before EVM in the Makefile is sufficient to preserve the
> relative order of the new 'ima' LSM in respect to the upcoming 'evm' LSM,
> and thus the order of IMA and EVM function calls as when they were
> hardcoded.
>
> Make moved functions as static (except ima_post_key_create_or_update(),
> which is not in ima_main.c), and register them as implementation of the
> respective hooks in the new function init_ima_lsm().
>
> Select CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH, to ensure that the path-based LSM hook
> path_post_mknod is always available and ima_post_path_mknod() is always
> executed to mark files as new, as before the move.
>
> A slight difference is that IMA and EVM functions registered for the
> inode_post_setattr, inode_post_removexattr, path_post_mknod,
> inode_post_create_tmpfile, inode_post_set_acl and inode_post_remove_acl
> won't be executed for private inodes. Since those inodes are supposed to be
> fs-internal, they should not be of interest of IMA or EVM. The S_PRIVATE
> flag is used for anonymous inodes, hugetlbfs, reiserfs xattrs, XFS scrub
> and kernel-internal tmpfs files.
>
> Conditionally register ima_post_key_create_or_update() if
> CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS is enabled. Also, conditionally register
> ima_kernel_module_request() if CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS is enabled.
>
> Finally, add the LSM_ID_IMA case in lsm_list_modules_test.c.
>
> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
> Acked-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>

Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

> ---
>  fs/file_table.c                               |   2 -
>  fs/namei.c                                    |   6 -
>  fs/nfsd/vfs.c                                 |   7 --
>  fs/open.c                                     |   1 -
>  include/linux/ima.h                           | 104 ------------------
>  include/uapi/linux/lsm.h                      |   1 +
>  security/integrity/Makefile                   |   1 +
>  security/integrity/ima/Kconfig                |   1 +
>  security/integrity/ima/ima.h                  |   6 +
>  security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c             |  78 +++++++++----
>  security/integrity/integrity.h                |   1 +
>  security/keys/key.c                           |   9 +-
>  security/security.c                           |  63 ++---------
>  .../selftests/lsm/lsm_list_modules_test.c     |   3 +
>  14 files changed, 83 insertions(+), 200 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/file_table.c b/fs/file_table.c
> index c72dc75f2bd3..0401ac98281c 100644
> --- a/fs/file_table.c
> +++ b/fs/file_table.c
> @@ -26,7 +26,6 @@
>  #include <linux/percpu_counter.h>
>  #include <linux/percpu.h>
>  #include <linux/task_work.h>
> -#include <linux/ima.h>
>  #include <linux/swap.h>
>  #include <linux/kmemleak.h>
>  
> @@ -386,7 +385,6 @@ static void __fput(struct file *file)
>  	locks_remove_file(file);
>  
>  	security_file_release(file);
> -	ima_file_free(file);
>  	if (unlikely(file->f_flags & FASYNC)) {
>  		if (file->f_op->fasync)
>  			file->f_op->fasync(-1, file, 0);
> diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
> index adb3ab27951a..37cc0988308f 100644
> --- a/fs/namei.c
> +++ b/fs/namei.c
> @@ -27,7 +27,6 @@
>  #include <linux/fsnotify.h>
>  #include <linux/personality.h>
>  #include <linux/security.h>
> -#include <linux/ima.h>
>  #include <linux/syscalls.h>
>  #include <linux/mount.h>
>  #include <linux/audit.h>
> @@ -3622,8 +3621,6 @@ static int do_open(struct nameidata *nd,
>  		error = vfs_open(&nd->path, file);
>  	if (!error)
>  		error = security_file_post_open(file, op->acc_mode);
> -	if (!error)
> -		error = ima_file_check(file, op->acc_mode);
>  	if (!error && do_truncate)
>  		error = handle_truncate(idmap, file);
>  	if (unlikely(error > 0)) {
> @@ -3687,7 +3684,6 @@ static int vfs_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
>  		spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
>  	}
>  	security_inode_post_create_tmpfile(idmap, inode);
> -	ima_post_create_tmpfile(idmap, inode);
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
> @@ -4036,8 +4032,6 @@ static int do_mknodat(int dfd, struct filename *name, umode_t mode,
>  		case 0: case S_IFREG:
>  			error = vfs_create(idmap, path.dentry->d_inode,
>  					   dentry, mode, true);
> -			if (!error)
> -				ima_post_path_mknod(idmap, dentry);
>  			break;
>  		case S_IFCHR: case S_IFBLK:
>  			error = vfs_mknod(idmap, path.dentry->d_inode,
> diff --git a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
> index b0c3f07a8bba..e491392a1243 100644
> --- a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
> +++ b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
> @@ -25,7 +25,6 @@
>  #include <linux/posix_acl_xattr.h>
>  #include <linux/xattr.h>
>  #include <linux/jhash.h>
> -#include <linux/ima.h>
>  #include <linux/pagemap.h>
>  #include <linux/slab.h>
>  #include <linux/uaccess.h>
> @@ -883,12 +882,6 @@ __nfsd_open(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp, umode_t type,
>  		goto out;
>  	}
>  
> -	host_err = ima_file_check(file, may_flags);
> -	if (host_err) {
> -		fput(file);
> -		goto out;
> -	}
> -
>  	if (may_flags & NFSD_MAY_64BIT_COOKIE)
>  		file->f_mode |= FMODE_64BITHASH;
>  	else
> diff --git a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c
> index 02dc608d40d8..c8bb9bd5259f 100644
> --- a/fs/open.c
> +++ b/fs/open.c
> @@ -29,7 +29,6 @@
>  #include <linux/audit.h>
>  #include <linux/falloc.h>
>  #include <linux/fs_struct.h>
> -#include <linux/ima.h>
>  #include <linux/dnotify.h>
>  #include <linux/compat.h>
>  #include <linux/mnt_idmapping.h>
> diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
> index 0f9af283cbc8..23ae24b60ecf 100644
> --- a/include/linux/ima.h
> +++ b/include/linux/ima.h
> @@ -16,24 +16,6 @@ struct linux_binprm;
>  
>  #ifdef CONFIG_IMA
>  extern enum hash_algo ima_get_current_hash_algo(void);
> -extern int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
> -extern int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask);
> -extern void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> -				    struct inode *inode);
> -extern void ima_file_free(struct file *file);
> -extern int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
> -			 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags);
> -extern int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
> -			     unsigned long prot);
> -extern int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents);
> -extern int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
> -			      enum kernel_load_data_id id, char *description);
> -extern int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id,
> -			 bool contents);
> -extern int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
> -			      enum kernel_read_file_id id);
> -extern void ima_post_path_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> -				struct dentry *dentry);
>  extern int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size);
>  extern int ima_inode_hash(struct inode *inode, char *buf, size_t buf_size);
>  extern void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size);
> @@ -58,68 +40,6 @@ static inline enum hash_algo ima_get_current_hash_algo(void)
>  	return HASH_ALGO__LAST;
>  }
>  
> -static inline int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
> -{
> -	return 0;
> -}
> -
> -static inline int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
> -{
> -	return 0;
> -}
> -
> -static inline void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> -					   struct inode *inode)
> -{
> -}
> -
> -static inline void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
> -{
> -	return;
> -}
> -
> -static inline int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
> -				unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
> -{
> -	return 0;
> -}
> -
> -static inline int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
> -				    unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot)
> -{
> -	return 0;
> -}
> -
> -static inline int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
> -{
> -	return 0;
> -}
> -
> -static inline int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
> -				     enum kernel_load_data_id id,
> -				     char *description)
> -{
> -	return 0;
> -}
> -
> -static inline int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id,
> -				bool contents)
> -{
> -	return 0;
> -}
> -
> -static inline int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
> -				     enum kernel_read_file_id id)
> -{
> -	return 0;
> -}
> -
> -static inline void ima_post_path_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> -				       struct dentry *dentry)
> -{
> -	return;
> -}
> -
>  static inline int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size)
>  {
>  	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> @@ -170,20 +90,6 @@ static inline void ima_add_kexec_buffer(struct kimage *image)
>  {}
>  #endif
>  
> -#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
> -extern void ima_post_key_create_or_update(struct key *keyring,
> -					  struct key *key,
> -					  const void *payload, size_t plen,
> -					  unsigned long flags, bool create);
> -#else
> -static inline void ima_post_key_create_or_update(struct key *keyring,
> -						 struct key *key,
> -						 const void *payload,
> -						 size_t plen,
> -						 unsigned long flags,
> -						 bool create) {}
> -#endif  /* CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS */
> -
>  #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE
>  extern bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void);
>  extern void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> @@ -256,14 +162,4 @@ static inline bool ima_appraise_signature(enum kernel_read_file_id func)
>  	return false;
>  }
>  #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE && CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING */
> -
> -#if defined(CONFIG_IMA) && defined(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS)
> -extern int ima_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name);
> -#else
> -static inline int ima_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
> -{
> -	return 0;
> -}
> -
> -#endif
>  #endif /* _LINUX_IMA_H */
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/lsm.h b/include/uapi/linux/lsm.h
> index f8aef9ade549..b3b7fd699b63 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/lsm.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/lsm.h
> @@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ struct lsm_ctx {
>  #define LSM_ID_LOCKDOWN		108
>  #define LSM_ID_BPF		109
>  #define LSM_ID_LANDLOCK		110
> +#define LSM_ID_IMA		111
>  
>  /*
>   * LSM_ATTR_XXX definitions identify different LSM attributes
> diff --git a/security/integrity/Makefile b/security/integrity/Makefile
> index d0ffe37dc1d6..92b63039c654 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/Makefile
> +++ b/security/integrity/Makefile
> @@ -18,5 +18,6 @@ integrity-$(CONFIG_LOAD_IPL_KEYS) += platform_certs/load_ipl_s390.o
>  integrity-$(CONFIG_LOAD_PPC_KEYS) += platform_certs/efi_parser.o \
>                                       platform_certs/load_powerpc.o \
>                                       platform_certs/keyring_handler.o
> +# The relative order of the 'ima' and 'evm' LSMs depends on the order below.
>  obj-$(CONFIG_IMA)			+= ima/
>  obj-$(CONFIG_EVM)			+= evm/
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
> index b98bfe9efd0c..475c32615006 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
> @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ config IMA
>  	select CRYPTO_HMAC
>  	select CRYPTO_SHA1
>  	select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO
> +	select SECURITY_PATH
>  	select TCG_TPM if HAS_IOMEM
>  	select TCG_TIS if TCG_TPM && X86
>  	select TCG_CRB if TCG_TPM && ACPI
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> index c29db699c996..c0412100023e 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> @@ -127,6 +127,12 @@ void ima_load_kexec_buffer(void);
>  static inline void ima_load_kexec_buffer(void) {}
>  #endif /* CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC */
>  
> +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
> +void ima_post_key_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, struct key *key,
> +				   const void *payload, size_t plen,
> +				   unsigned long flags, bool create);
> +#endif
> +
>  /*
>   * The default binary_runtime_measurements list format is defined as the
>   * platform native format.  The canonical format is defined as little-endian.
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> index 908fa026ec58..483ccd24e214 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> @@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ static void ima_check_last_writer(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
>   *
>   * Flag files that changed, based on i_version
>   */
> -void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
> +static void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
>  {
>  	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
>  	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
> @@ -427,8 +427,8 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
>   * On success return 0.  On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
>   * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
>   */
> -int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
> -		  unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
> +static int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
> +			 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
>  {
>  	u32 secid;
>  	int ret;
> @@ -466,8 +466,8 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
>   *
>   * On mprotect change success, return 0.  On failure, return -EACESS.
>   */
> -int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
> -		      unsigned long prot)
> +static int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
> +			     unsigned long prot)
>  {
>  	struct ima_template_desc *template = NULL;
>  	struct file *file;
> @@ -525,7 +525,7 @@ int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
>   * On success return 0.  On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
>   * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
>   */
> -int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
> +static int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
>  {
>  	int ret;
>  	u32 secid;
> @@ -551,7 +551,7 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
>   * On success return 0.  On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
>   * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
>   */
> -int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
> +static int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
>  {
>  	u32 secid;
>  
> @@ -560,7 +560,6 @@ int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
>  				   mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC |
>  					   MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK);
>  }
> -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check);
>  
>  static int __ima_inode_hash(struct inode *inode, struct file *file, char *buf,
>  			    size_t buf_size)
> @@ -685,8 +684,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_inode_hash);
>   * Skip calling process_measurement(), but indicate which newly, created
>   * tmpfiles are in policy.
>   */
> -void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> -			     struct inode *inode)
> +static void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> +				    struct inode *inode)
> +
>  {
>  	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
>  	int must_appraise;
> @@ -717,8 +717,7 @@ void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
>   * Mark files created via the mknodat syscall as new, so that the
>   * file data can be written later.
>   */
> -void ima_post_path_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> -			 struct dentry *dentry)
> +static void ima_post_path_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry)
>  {
>  	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
>  	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
> @@ -753,8 +752,8 @@ void ima_post_path_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
>   *
>   * For permission return 0, otherwise return -EACCES.
>   */
> -int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id,
> -		  bool contents)
> +static int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id,
> +			 bool contents)
>  {
>  	enum ima_hooks func;
>  	u32 secid;
> @@ -803,8 +802,8 @@ const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = {
>   * On success return 0.  On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
>   * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
>   */
> -int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
> -		       enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
> +static int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
> +			      enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
>  {
>  	enum ima_hooks func;
>  	u32 secid;
> @@ -837,7 +836,7 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
>   *
>   * For permission return 0, otherwise return -EACCES.
>   */
> -int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
> +static int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
>  {
>  	bool ima_enforce, sig_enforce;
>  
> @@ -891,9 +890,9 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
>   * On success return 0.  On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
>   * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
>   */
> -int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
> -		       enum kernel_load_data_id load_id,
> -		       char *description)
> +static int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
> +			      enum kernel_load_data_id load_id,
> +			      char *description)
>  {
>  	if (load_id == LOADING_FIRMWARE) {
>  		if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) &&
> @@ -1110,7 +1109,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_measure_critical_data);
>   *
>   * Return: Zero if it is safe to load the kernel module, -EINVAL otherwise.
>   */
> -int ima_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
> +static int ima_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
>  {
>  	if (strncmp(kmod_name, "crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,", 20) == 0)
>  		return -EINVAL;
> @@ -1151,4 +1150,41 @@ static int __init init_ima(void)
>  	return error;
>  }
>  
> +static struct security_hook_list ima_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
> +	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_check_security, ima_bprm_check),
> +	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_post_open, ima_file_check),
> +	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_create_tmpfile, ima_post_create_tmpfile),
> +	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_release, ima_file_free),
> +	LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, ima_file_mmap),
> +	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, ima_file_mprotect),
> +	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, ima_load_data),
> +	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_post_load_data, ima_post_load_data),
> +	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, ima_read_file),
> +	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_post_read_file, ima_post_read_file),
> +	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_post_mknod, ima_post_path_mknod),
> +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
> +	LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_post_create_or_update, ima_post_key_create_or_update),
> +#endif
> +#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
> +	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, ima_kernel_module_request),
> +#endif
> +};
> +
> +static const struct lsm_id ima_lsmid = {
> +	.name = "ima",
> +	.id = LSM_ID_IMA,
> +};
> +
> +static int __init init_ima_lsm(void)
> +{
> +	security_add_hooks(ima_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(ima_hooks), &ima_lsmid);
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
> +DEFINE_LSM(ima) = {
> +	.name = "ima",
> +	.init = init_ima_lsm,
> +	.order = LSM_ORDER_LAST,
> +};
> +
>  late_initcall(init_ima);	/* Start IMA after the TPM is available */
> diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
> index 9561db7cf6b4..59eaddd84434 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
> +++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
> @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
>  #include <crypto/hash.h>
>  #include <linux/key.h>
>  #include <linux/audit.h>
> +#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
>  
>  /* iint action cache flags */
>  #define IMA_MEASURE		0x00000001
> diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
> index f75fe66c2f03..80fc2f203a0c 100644
> --- a/security/keys/key.c
> +++ b/security/keys/key.c
> @@ -13,7 +13,6 @@
>  #include <linux/security.h>
>  #include <linux/workqueue.h>
>  #include <linux/random.h>
> -#include <linux/ima.h>
>  #include <linux/err.h>
>  #include "internal.h"
>  
> @@ -937,8 +936,6 @@ static key_ref_t __key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
>  
>  	security_key_post_create_or_update(keyring, key, payload, plen, flags,
>  					   true);
> -	ima_post_key_create_or_update(keyring, key, payload, plen,
> -				      flags, true);
>  
>  	key_ref = make_key_ref(key, is_key_possessed(keyring_ref));
>  
> @@ -970,13 +967,9 @@ static key_ref_t __key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
>  
>  	key_ref = __key_update(key_ref, &prep);
>  
> -	if (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
> +	if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
>  		security_key_post_create_or_update(keyring, key, payload, plen,
>  						   flags, false);
> -		ima_post_key_create_or_update(keyring, key,
> -					      payload, plen,
> -					      flags, false);
> -	}
>  
>  	goto error_free_prep;
>  }
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 6c6571a141a1..aa17b47d44c1 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -50,7 +50,8 @@
>  	(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID) ? 1 : 0) + \
>  	(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM) ? 1 : 0) + \
>  	(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BPF_LSM) ? 1 : 0) + \
> -	(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) ? 1 : 0))
> +	(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) ? 1 : 0) + \
> +	(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA) ? 1 : 0))
>  
>  /*
>   * These are descriptions of the reasons that can be passed to the
> @@ -1182,12 +1183,7 @@ int security_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm, const struct file *
>   */
>  int security_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
>  {
> -	int ret;
> -
> -	ret = call_int_hook(bprm_check_security, 0, bprm);
> -	if (ret)
> -		return ret;
> -	return ima_bprm_check(bprm);
> +	return call_int_hook(bprm_check_security, 0, bprm);
>  }
>  
>  /**
> @@ -2901,13 +2897,8 @@ static inline unsigned long mmap_prot(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
>  int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
>  		       unsigned long flags)
>  {
> -	unsigned long prot_adj = mmap_prot(file, prot);
> -	int ret;
> -
> -	ret = call_int_hook(mmap_file, 0, file, prot, prot_adj, flags);
> -	if (ret)
> -		return ret;
> -	return ima_file_mmap(file, prot, prot_adj, flags);
> +	return call_int_hook(mmap_file, 0, file, prot, mmap_prot(file, prot),
> +			     flags);
>  }
>  
>  /**
> @@ -2936,12 +2927,7 @@ int security_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
>  int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
>  			   unsigned long prot)
>  {
> -	int ret;
> -
> -	ret = call_int_hook(file_mprotect, 0, vma, reqprot, prot);
> -	if (ret)
> -		return ret;
> -	return ima_file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
> +	return call_int_hook(file_mprotect, 0, vma, reqprot, prot);
>  }
>  
>  /**
> @@ -3250,12 +3236,7 @@ int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
>   */
>  int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
>  {
> -	int ret;
> -
> -	ret = call_int_hook(kernel_module_request, 0, kmod_name);
> -	if (ret)
> -		return ret;
> -	return ima_kernel_module_request(kmod_name);
> +	return call_int_hook(kernel_module_request, 0, kmod_name);
>  }
>  
>  /**
> @@ -3271,12 +3252,7 @@ int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
>  int security_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id,
>  			      bool contents)
>  {
> -	int ret;
> -
> -	ret = call_int_hook(kernel_read_file, 0, file, id, contents);
> -	if (ret)
> -		return ret;
> -	return ima_read_file(file, id, contents);
> +	return call_int_hook(kernel_read_file, 0, file, id, contents);
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_read_file);
>  
> @@ -3296,12 +3272,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_read_file);
>  int security_kernel_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
>  				   enum kernel_read_file_id id)
>  {
> -	int ret;
> -
> -	ret = call_int_hook(kernel_post_read_file, 0, file, buf, size, id);
> -	if (ret)
> -		return ret;
> -	return ima_post_read_file(file, buf, size, id);
> +	return call_int_hook(kernel_post_read_file, 0, file, buf, size, id);
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_read_file);
>  
> @@ -3316,12 +3287,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_read_file);
>   */
>  int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
>  {
> -	int ret;
> -
> -	ret = call_int_hook(kernel_load_data, 0, id, contents);
> -	if (ret)
> -		return ret;
> -	return ima_load_data(id, contents);
> +	return call_int_hook(kernel_load_data, 0, id, contents);
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_load_data);
>  
> @@ -3343,13 +3309,8 @@ int security_kernel_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
>  				   enum kernel_load_data_id id,
>  				   char *description)
>  {
> -	int ret;
> -
> -	ret = call_int_hook(kernel_post_load_data, 0, buf, size, id,
> -			    description);
> -	if (ret)
> -		return ret;
> -	return ima_post_load_data(buf, size, id, description);
> +	return call_int_hook(kernel_post_load_data, 0, buf, size, id,
> +			     description);
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_load_data);
>  
> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/lsm/lsm_list_modules_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/lsm/lsm_list_modules_test.c
> index 9df29b1e3497..17333787cb2f 100644
> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/lsm/lsm_list_modules_test.c
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/lsm/lsm_list_modules_test.c
> @@ -122,6 +122,9 @@ TEST(correct_lsm_list_modules)
>  		case LSM_ID_LANDLOCK:
>  			name = "landlock";
>  			break;
> +		case LSM_ID_IMA:
> +			name = "ima";
> +			break;
>  		default:
>  			name = "INVALID";
>  			break;