From: Roberto Sassu <[email protected]>
Introduce LSM_ORDER_LAST, to satisfy the requirement of LSMs willing to be
the last, e.g. the 'integrity' LSM, without changing the kernel command
line or configuration.
As for LSM_ORDER_FIRST, LSMs with LSM_ORDER_LAST are always enabled and put
at the end of the LSM list in no particular order.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <[email protected]>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 1 +
security/security.c | 12 +++++++++---
2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 21a8ce23108..05c4b831d99 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -93,6 +93,7 @@ extern void security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
enum lsm_order {
LSM_ORDER_FIRST = -1, /* This is only for capabilities. */
LSM_ORDER_MUTABLE = 0,
+ LSM_ORDER_LAST = 1,
};
struct lsm_info {
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 322090a50cd..24f52ba3218 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -284,9 +284,9 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_parse(const char *order, const char *origin)
bool found = false;
for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) {
- if (lsm->order == LSM_ORDER_MUTABLE &&
- strcmp(lsm->name, name) == 0) {
- append_ordered_lsm(lsm, origin);
+ if (strcmp(lsm->name, name) == 0) {
+ if (lsm->order == LSM_ORDER_MUTABLE)
+ append_ordered_lsm(lsm, origin);
found = true;
}
}
@@ -306,6 +306,12 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_parse(const char *order, const char *origin)
}
}
+ /* LSM_ORDER_LAST is always last. */
+ for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) {
+ if (lsm->order == LSM_ORDER_LAST)
+ append_ordered_lsm(lsm, " last");
+ }
+
/* Disable all LSMs not in the ordered list. */
for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) {
if (exists_ordered_lsm(lsm))
--
2.25.1
On 3/3/23 13:25, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> From: Roberto Sassu <[email protected]>
>
> Introduce LSM_ORDER_LAST, to satisfy the requirement of LSMs willing to be
> the last, e.g. the 'integrity' LSM, without changing the kernel command
> line or configuration.
>
> As for LSM_ORDER_FIRST, LSMs with LSM_ORDER_LAST are always enabled and put
> at the end of the LSM list in no particular order.
>
I think you should describe the reason for the change for LSM_ORDER_MUTABLE as well.
> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <[email protected]>
> ---
> include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 1 +
> security/security.c | 12 +++++++++---
> 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> index 21a8ce23108..05c4b831d99 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> @@ -93,6 +93,7 @@ extern void security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
> enum lsm_order {
> LSM_ORDER_FIRST = -1, /* This is only for capabilities. */
> LSM_ORDER_MUTABLE = 0,
> + LSM_ORDER_LAST = 1,
> };
>
> struct lsm_info {
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 322090a50cd..24f52ba3218 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -284,9 +284,9 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_parse(const char *order, const char *origin)
> bool found = false;
>
> for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) {
> - if (lsm->order == LSM_ORDER_MUTABLE &&
> - strcmp(lsm->name, name) == 0) {
> - append_ordered_lsm(lsm, origin);
> + if (strcmp(lsm->name, name) == 0) {
> + if (lsm->order == LSM_ORDER_MUTABLE)
> + append_ordered_lsm(lsm, origin);
> found = true;
> }
> }
> @@ -306,6 +306,12 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_parse(const char *order, const char *origin)
> }
> }
>
> + /* LSM_ORDER_LAST is always last. */
> + for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) {
> + if (lsm->order == LSM_ORDER_LAST)
> + append_ordered_lsm(lsm, " last");
> + }
> +
> /* Disable all LSMs not in the ordered list. */
> for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) {
> if (exists_ordered_lsm(lsm))
On Tue, 2023-03-07 at 13:04 -0500, Stefan Berger wrote:
>
> On 3/3/23 13:25, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> > From: Roberto Sassu <[email protected]>
> >
> > Introduce LSM_ORDER_LAST, to satisfy the requirement of LSMs willing to be
> > the last, e.g. the 'integrity' LSM, without changing the kernel command
> > line or configuration.
> >
> > As for LSM_ORDER_FIRST, LSMs with LSM_ORDER_LAST are always enabled and put
> > at the end of the LSM list in no particular order.
> >
>
> I think you should describe the reason for the change for LSM_ORDER_MUTABLE as well.
Right.
Thanks
Roberto
> > Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <[email protected]>
> > ---
> > include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 1 +
> > security/security.c | 12 +++++++++---
> > 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> > index 21a8ce23108..05c4b831d99 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> > @@ -93,6 +93,7 @@ extern void security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
> > enum lsm_order {
> > LSM_ORDER_FIRST = -1, /* This is only for capabilities. */
> > LSM_ORDER_MUTABLE = 0,
> > + LSM_ORDER_LAST = 1,
> > };
> >
> > struct lsm_info {
> > diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> > index 322090a50cd..24f52ba3218 100644
> > --- a/security/security.c
> > +++ b/security/security.c
> > @@ -284,9 +284,9 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_parse(const char *order, const char *origin)
> > bool found = false;
> >
> > for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) {
> > - if (lsm->order == LSM_ORDER_MUTABLE &&
> > - strcmp(lsm->name, name) == 0) {
> > - append_ordered_lsm(lsm, origin);
> > + if (strcmp(lsm->name, name) == 0) {
> > + if (lsm->order == LSM_ORDER_MUTABLE)
> > + append_ordered_lsm(lsm, origin);
> > found = true;
> > }
> > }
> > @@ -306,6 +306,12 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_parse(const char *order, const char *origin)
> > }
> > }
> >
> > + /* LSM_ORDER_LAST is always last. */
> > + for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) {
> > + if (lsm->order == LSM_ORDER_LAST)
> > + append_ordered_lsm(lsm, " last");
> > + }
> > +
> > /* Disable all LSMs not in the ordered list. */
> > for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) {
> > if (exists_ordered_lsm(lsm))
Hi Roberto,
On Fri, 2023-03-03 at 19:25 +0100, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> From: Roberto Sassu <[email protected]>
>
> Introduce LSM_ORDER_LAST, to satisfy the requirement of LSMs willing to be
> the last, e.g. the 'integrity' LSM, without changing the kernel command
> line or configuration.
Please reframe this as a bug fix for 79f7865d844c ("LSM: Introduce
"lsm=" for boottime LSM selection") and upstream it first, with
'integrity' as the last LSM. The original bug fix commit 92063f3ca73a
("integrity: double check iint_cache was initialized") could then be
removed.
>
> As for LSM_ORDER_FIRST, LSMs with LSM_ORDER_LAST are always enabled and put
> at the end of the LSM list in no particular order.
^Similar to LSM_ORDER_FIRST ...
And remove "in no particular order".
>
> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <[email protected]>
> ---
> include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 1 +
> security/security.c | 12 +++++++++---
> 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> index 21a8ce23108..05c4b831d99 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> @@ -93,6 +93,7 @@ extern void security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
> enum lsm_order {
> LSM_ORDER_FIRST = -1, /* This is only for capabilities. */
> LSM_ORDER_MUTABLE = 0,
> + LSM_ORDER_LAST = 1,
> };
>
> struct lsm_info {
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 322090a50cd..24f52ba3218 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -284,9 +284,9 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_parse(const char *order, const char *origin)
> bool found = false;
>
> for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) {
> - if (lsm->order == LSM_ORDER_MUTABLE &&
> - strcmp(lsm->name, name) == 0) {
> - append_ordered_lsm(lsm, origin);
> + if (strcmp(lsm->name, name) == 0) {
> + if (lsm->order == LSM_ORDER_MUTABLE)
> + append_ordered_lsm(lsm, origin);
> found = true;
> }
> }
> @@ -306,6 +306,12 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_parse(const char *order, const char *origin)
> }
> }
>
> + /* LSM_ORDER_LAST is always last. */
> + for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) {
> + if (lsm->order == LSM_ORDER_LAST)
> + append_ordered_lsm(lsm, " last");
> + }
> +
> /* Disable all LSMs not in the ordered list. */
> for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) {
> if (exists_ordered_lsm(lsm))
--
thanks,
Mimi
On Wed, 2023-03-08 at 08:13 -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> Hi Roberto,
>
> On Fri, 2023-03-03 at 19:25 +0100, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> > From: Roberto Sassu <[email protected]>
> >
> > Introduce LSM_ORDER_LAST, to satisfy the requirement of LSMs willing to be
> > the last, e.g. the 'integrity' LSM, without changing the kernel command
> > line or configuration.
>
> Please reframe this as a bug fix for 79f7865d844c ("LSM: Introduce
> "lsm=" for boottime LSM selection") and upstream it first, with
> 'integrity' as the last LSM. The original bug fix commit 92063f3ca73a
> ("integrity: double check iint_cache was initialized") could then be
> removed.
Ok, I should complete the patch by checking the cache initialization in
iint.c.
> > As for LSM_ORDER_FIRST, LSMs with LSM_ORDER_LAST are always enabled and put
> > at the end of the LSM list in no particular order.
>
> ^Similar to LSM_ORDER_FIRST ...
>
> And remove "in no particular order".
The reason for this is that I originally thought that the relative
order of LSMs specified in the kernel configuration or the command line
was respected (if more than one LSM specifies LSM_ORDER_LAST). In fact
not. To do this, we would have to parse the LSM string again, as it is
done for LSM_ORDER_MUTABLE LSMs.
Thanks
Roberto
> > Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <[email protected]>
> > ---
> > include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 1 +
> > security/security.c | 12 +++++++++---
> > 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> > index 21a8ce23108..05c4b831d99 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> > @@ -93,6 +93,7 @@ extern void security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
> > enum lsm_order {
> > LSM_ORDER_FIRST = -1, /* This is only for capabilities. */
> > LSM_ORDER_MUTABLE = 0,
> > + LSM_ORDER_LAST = 1,
> > };
> >
> > struct lsm_info {
> > diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> > index 322090a50cd..24f52ba3218 100644
> > --- a/security/security.c
> > +++ b/security/security.c
> > @@ -284,9 +284,9 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_parse(const char *order, const char *origin)
> > bool found = false;
> >
> > for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) {
> > - if (lsm->order == LSM_ORDER_MUTABLE &&
> > - strcmp(lsm->name, name) == 0) {
> > - append_ordered_lsm(lsm, origin);
> > + if (strcmp(lsm->name, name) == 0) {
> > + if (lsm->order == LSM_ORDER_MUTABLE)
> > + append_ordered_lsm(lsm, origin);
> > found = true;
> > }
> > }
> > @@ -306,6 +306,12 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_parse(const char *order, const char *origin)
> > }
> > }
> >
> > + /* LSM_ORDER_LAST is always last. */
> > + for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) {
> > + if (lsm->order == LSM_ORDER_LAST)
> > + append_ordered_lsm(lsm, " last");
> > + }
> > +
> > /* Disable all LSMs not in the ordered list. */
> > for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) {
> > if (exists_ordered_lsm(lsm))
On Wed, 2023-03-08 at 14:26 +0100, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> On Wed, 2023-03-08 at 08:13 -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > Hi Roberto,
> >
> > On Fri, 2023-03-03 at 19:25 +0100, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> > > From: Roberto Sassu <[email protected]>
> > >
> > > Introduce LSM_ORDER_LAST, to satisfy the requirement of LSMs willing to be
> > > the last, e.g. the 'integrity' LSM, without changing the kernel command
> > > line or configuration.
> >
> > Please reframe this as a bug fix for 79f7865d844c ("LSM: Introduce
> > "lsm=" for boottime LSM selection") and upstream it first, with
> > 'integrity' as the last LSM. The original bug fix commit 92063f3ca73a
> > ("integrity: double check iint_cache was initialized") could then be
> > removed.
>
> Ok, I should complete the patch by checking the cache initialization in
> iint.c.
>
> > > As for LSM_ORDER_FIRST, LSMs with LSM_ORDER_LAST are always enabled and put
> > > at the end of the LSM list in no particular order.
> >
> > ^Similar to LSM_ORDER_FIRST ...
> >
> > And remove "in no particular order".
>
> The reason for this is that I originally thought that the relative
> order of LSMs specified in the kernel configuration or the command line
> was respected (if more than one LSM specifies LSM_ORDER_LAST). In fact
> not. To do this, we would have to parse the LSM string again, as it is
> done for LSM_ORDER_MUTABLE LSMs.
IMA and EVM are only configurable if 'integrity' is enabled. Similar
to how LSM_ORDER_FIRST is reserved for capabilities, LSM_ORDER_LAST
should be reserved for integrity (LSMs), if it is configured, for the
reason as described in the "[PATCH 24/28] ima: Move to LSM
infrastructure" patch description.
>
> Thanks
>
> Roberto
>
> > > Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <[email protected]>
> > > ---
> > > include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 1 +
> > > security/security.c | 12 +++++++++---
> > > 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> > >
> > > diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> > > index 21a8ce23108..05c4b831d99 100644
> > > --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> > > +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> > > @@ -93,6 +93,7 @@ extern void security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
> > > enum lsm_order {
> > > LSM_ORDER_FIRST = -1, /* This is only for capabilities. */
> > > LSM_ORDER_MUTABLE = 0,
> > > + LSM_ORDER_LAST = 1,
> > > };
> > >
> > > struct lsm_info {
> > > diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> > > index 322090a50cd..24f52ba3218 100644
> > > --- a/security/security.c
> > > +++ b/security/security.c
> > > @@ -284,9 +284,9 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_parse(const char *order, const char *origin)
> > > bool found = false;
> > >
> > > for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) {
> > > - if (lsm->order == LSM_ORDER_MUTABLE &&
> > > - strcmp(lsm->name, name) == 0) {
> > > - append_ordered_lsm(lsm, origin);
> > > + if (strcmp(lsm->name, name) == 0) {
> > > + if (lsm->order == LSM_ORDER_MUTABLE)
> > > + append_ordered_lsm(lsm, origin);
> > > found = true;
> > > }
> > > }
> > > @@ -306,6 +306,12 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_parse(const char *order, const char *origin)
> > > }
> > > }
> > >
> > > + /* LSM_ORDER_LAST is always last. */
> > > + for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) {
> > > + if (lsm->order == LSM_ORDER_LAST)
> > > + append_ordered_lsm(lsm, " last");
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > /* Disable all LSMs not in the ordered list. */
> > > for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) {
> > > if (exists_ordered_lsm(lsm))
>
On Wed, 2023-03-08 at 09:00 -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> On Wed, 2023-03-08 at 14:26 +0100, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> > On Wed, 2023-03-08 at 08:13 -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > > Hi Roberto,
> > >
> > > On Fri, 2023-03-03 at 19:25 +0100, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> > > > From: Roberto Sassu <[email protected]>
> > > >
> > > > Introduce LSM_ORDER_LAST, to satisfy the requirement of LSMs willing to be
> > > > the last, e.g. the 'integrity' LSM, without changing the kernel command
> > > > line or configuration.
> > >
> > > Please reframe this as a bug fix for 79f7865d844c ("LSM: Introduce
> > > "lsm=" for boottime LSM selection") and upstream it first, with
> > > 'integrity' as the last LSM. The original bug fix commit 92063f3ca73a
> > > ("integrity: double check iint_cache was initialized") could then be
> > > removed.
> >
> > Ok, I should complete the patch by checking the cache initialization in
> > iint.c.
> >
> > > > As for LSM_ORDER_FIRST, LSMs with LSM_ORDER_LAST are always enabled and put
> > > > at the end of the LSM list in no particular order.
> > >
> > > ^Similar to LSM_ORDER_FIRST ...
> > >
> > > And remove "in no particular order".
> >
> > The reason for this is that I originally thought that the relative
> > order of LSMs specified in the kernel configuration or the command line
> > was respected (if more than one LSM specifies LSM_ORDER_LAST). In fact
> > not. To do this, we would have to parse the LSM string again, as it is
> > done for LSM_ORDER_MUTABLE LSMs.
>
> IMA and EVM are only configurable if 'integrity' is enabled. Similar
> to how LSM_ORDER_FIRST is reserved for capabilities, LSM_ORDER_LAST
> should be reserved for integrity (LSMs), if it is configured, for the
> reason as described in the "[PATCH 24/28] ima: Move to LSM
> infrastructure" patch description.
Yes, it is just that nothing prevents to have multiple LSMs with order
LSM_ORDER_LAST. I guess we will enforce that it is only one by
reviewing the code.
Thanks
Roberto
> > Thanks
> >
> > Roberto
> >
> > > > Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <[email protected]>
> > > > ---
> > > > include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 1 +
> > > > security/security.c | 12 +++++++++---
> > > > 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> > > >
> > > > diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> > > > index 21a8ce23108..05c4b831d99 100644
> > > > --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> > > > +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> > > > @@ -93,6 +93,7 @@ extern void security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
> > > > enum lsm_order {
> > > > LSM_ORDER_FIRST = -1, /* This is only for capabilities. */
> > > > LSM_ORDER_MUTABLE = 0,
> > > > + LSM_ORDER_LAST = 1,
> > > > };
> > > >
> > > > struct lsm_info {
> > > > diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> > > > index 322090a50cd..24f52ba3218 100644
> > > > --- a/security/security.c
> > > > +++ b/security/security.c
> > > > @@ -284,9 +284,9 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_parse(const char *order, const char *origin)
> > > > bool found = false;
> > > >
> > > > for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) {
> > > > - if (lsm->order == LSM_ORDER_MUTABLE &&
> > > > - strcmp(lsm->name, name) == 0) {
> > > > - append_ordered_lsm(lsm, origin);
> > > > + if (strcmp(lsm->name, name) == 0) {
> > > > + if (lsm->order == LSM_ORDER_MUTABLE)
> > > > + append_ordered_lsm(lsm, origin);
> > > > found = true;
> > > > }
> > > > }
> > > > @@ -306,6 +306,12 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_parse(const char *order, const char *origin)
> > > > }
> > > > }
> > > >
> > > > + /* LSM_ORDER_LAST is always last. */
> > > > + for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) {
> > > > + if (lsm->order == LSM_ORDER_LAST)
> > > > + append_ordered_lsm(lsm, " last");
> > > > + }
> > > > +
> > > > /* Disable all LSMs not in the ordered list. */
> > > > for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) {
> > > > if (exists_ordered_lsm(lsm))
On Wed, 2023-03-08 at 15:35 +0100, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> On Wed, 2023-03-08 at 09:00 -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > On Wed, 2023-03-08 at 14:26 +0100, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> > > On Wed, 2023-03-08 at 08:13 -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > > > Hi Roberto,
> > > >
> > > > On Fri, 2023-03-03 at 19:25 +0100, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> > > > > From: Roberto Sassu <[email protected]>
> > > > >
> > > > > Introduce LSM_ORDER_LAST, to satisfy the requirement of LSMs willing to be
> > > > > the last, e.g. the 'integrity' LSM, without changing the kernel command
> > > > > line or configuration.
> > > >
> > > > Please reframe this as a bug fix for 79f7865d844c ("LSM: Introduce
> > > > "lsm=" for boottime LSM selection") and upstream it first, with
> > > > 'integrity' as the last LSM. The original bug fix commit 92063f3ca73a
> > > > ("integrity: double check iint_cache was initialized") could then be
> > > > removed.
> > >
> > > Ok, I should complete the patch by checking the cache initialization in
> > > iint.c.
> > >
> > > > > As for LSM_ORDER_FIRST, LSMs with LSM_ORDER_LAST are always enabled and put
> > > > > at the end of the LSM list in no particular order.
> > > >
> > > > ^Similar to LSM_ORDER_FIRST ...
> > > >
> > > > And remove "in no particular order".
> > >
> > > The reason for this is that I originally thought that the relative
> > > order of LSMs specified in the kernel configuration or the command line
> > > was respected (if more than one LSM specifies LSM_ORDER_LAST). In fact
> > > not. To do this, we would have to parse the LSM string again, as it is
> > > done for LSM_ORDER_MUTABLE LSMs.
> >
> > IMA and EVM are only configurable if 'integrity' is enabled. Similar
> > to how LSM_ORDER_FIRST is reserved for capabilities, LSM_ORDER_LAST
> > should be reserved for integrity (LSMs), if it is configured, for the
> > reason as described in the "[PATCH 24/28] ima: Move to LSM
> > infrastructure" patch description.
>
> Yes, it is just that nothing prevents to have multiple LSMs with order
> LSM_ORDER_LAST. I guess we will enforce that it is only one by
> reviewing the code.
At least add a comment, like the existing one for LSM_ORDER_FIRST.
> > > > enum lsm_order {
> > > > > LSM_ORDER_FIRST = -1, /* This is only for capabilities. */
> > > > > LSM_ORDER_MUTABLE = 0,
> > > > > + LSM_ORDER_LAST = 1,
> > > > > };
--
thanks,
Mimi