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[193.110.157.125]) by mx.google.com with SMTP id a640c23a62f3a-a5a17be6daasi911681666b.809.2024.05.16.08.33.07 for ; Thu, 16 May 2024 08:33:07 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of oss-security-return-30152-linux.lists.archive=gmail.com@lists.openwall.com designates 193.110.157.125 as permitted sender) client-ip=193.110.157.125; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=fail header.i=@openssl.org header.s=dkim-2020-2 header.b=K151Bh9E; spf=pass (google.com: domain of oss-security-return-30152-linux.lists.archive=gmail.com@lists.openwall.com designates 193.110.157.125 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom="oss-security-return-30152-linux.lists.archive=gmail.com@lists.openwall.com"; dmarc=fail (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=openssl.org Received: (qmail 26471 invoked by uid 550); 16 May 2024 15:32:48 -0000 Mailing-List: contact oss-security-help@lists.openwall.com; run by ezmlm Precedence: bulk List-Post: List-Help: List-Unsubscribe: List-Subscribe: List-ID: Reply-To: oss-security@lists.openwall.com Delivered-To: mailing list oss-security@lists.openwall.com Delivered-To: moderator for oss-security@lists.openwall.com Received: (qmail 16048 invoked from network); 16 May 2024 15:25:49 -0000 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=openssl.org; s=dkim-2020-2; t=1715873141; h=from:from:reply-to:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date: message-id:message-id:to:to:cc:mime-version:mime-version: content-type:content-type; bh=sldYJdI8lfUMnHOkqrESOmiDfgqwWyzyexamnr0J8T8=; b=K151Bh9EEGZN/33GlpjyL6EM518ThwHiZEZ3YqNlFcMiEifBnF1m054Vvm9uBRFXABgDJ2 6YpQL+RYh033STIRlUm/aa4DGDBGTBIuEVA0DYF6hZcSMjBVZN1NHufQido13UtxsRrGX+ Eb1DRmN7M4BOE5VskQO+2IHRW0jjasIyzjIsrJWSog95g7ZXSxRhogBiXUwjFm5IvXZo0W kVBE93c8SUfNjJHkU0+1YtFKt3mbiIGicyUBeargPb1Oq1y4ZtjXbc6R1oGoDpAehvntiE /Wu3G6OvDfxj8IeNdoIWrbayOTIX2FqSgYvn3oKjBLM+VfwLlFfcdX5keFm6nw== Date: Thu, 16 May 2024 15:25:41 +0000 From: Tomas Mraz To: oss-security@lists.openwall.com Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline Subject: [oss-security] OpenSSL Security Advisory -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 OpenSSL Security Advisory [16th May 2024] ========================================= Excessive time spent checking DSA keys and parameters (CVE-2023-3446) ===================================================================== Severity: Low Issue summary: Checking excessively long DSA keys or parameters may be very slow. Impact summary: Applications that use the functions EVP_PKEY_param_check() or EVP_PKEY_public_check() to check a DSA public key or DSA parameters may experience long delays. Where the key or parameters that are being checked have been obtained from an untrusted source this may lead to a Denial of Service. The functions EVP_PKEY_param_check() or EVP_PKEY_public_check() perform various checks on DSA parameters. Some of those computations take a long time if the modulus ("p" parameter) is too large. Trying to use a very large modulus is slow and OpenSSL will not allow using public keys with a modulus which is over 10,000 bits in length for signature verification. However the key and parameter check functions do not limit the modulus size when performing the checks. An application that calls EVP_PKEY_param_check() or EVP_PKEY_public_check() and supplies a key or parameters obtained from an untrusted source could be vulnerable to a Denial of Service attack. These functions are not called by OpenSSL itself on untrusted DSA keys so only applications that directly call these functions may be vulnerable. Also vulnerable are the OpenSSL pkey and pkeyparam command line applications when using the "-check" option. The OpenSSL SSL/TLS implementation is not affected by this issue. The OpenSSL 3.0 and 3.1 FIPS providers are affected by this issue. OpenSSL 3.3, 3.2, 3.1 and 3.0 are vulnerable to this issue. OpenSSL 1.1.1 and 1.0.2 are not affected by this issue. Due to the low severity of this issue we are not issuing new releases of OpenSSL at this time. The fix will be included in the next releases when they become available. The fix is also available in commit 53ea0648 (for 3.3), commit da343d06 (for 3.2), commit 9c39b385 (for 3.1) and commit 3559e868 (for 3.0) in the OpenSSL git repository. OSSfuzz first detected and automatically reported this issue on 13th February 2024 using a fuzzer recently added to OpenSSL written by Kurt Roeckx. The fix was developed by Tomas Mraz. General Advisory Notes ====================== URL for this Security Advisory: https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20240516.txt Note: the online version of the advisory may be updated with additional details over time. For details of OpenSSL severity classifications please see: https://www.openssl.org/policies/secpolicy.html -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAEBCAAdFiEE3HAyZir4heL0fyQ/UnRmohynnm0FAmZGJOMACgkQUnRmohyn nm3/cg/+JJtAXf0cyAEoDbPX3mTygHN1U3dqpCVFPMwYi23Bqce33wqXrXZqBxsF m9IM3KRFHsdoArt1q1WWPGpMGLVColq56JwkjGzpaKjooLrb0cEbt6vKp5oepUCW cv1ieLF5Z5dvYrWfgiO1mu5r88SY6OLCmxJdPIWMgTrgd1+h7AtzGF+olTgLHovp qEQUNhCYax6RLaFtqcPY6eHuxlH6ARuERPJaPxasv6bPi8VQfYQ349G7ks4adgw9 b0I0qt/wZuGa0p/rpZ99Ev1VAFo9iOxcB8Vftm4nQzBfjCsieKcX+cM7aTnLPUjR RFr/KmAGY9RcRFOI6UT2xemLP5xb4A3/wgeLjdPbWDeZ5eBe2nvOE07ndHZYxQIC AxTMVFlWgcVpu2bDEHuhiNvYMW+AZYAfsN2jEOBl13SjN4ty9uLt/KMtM0Dp7p0J KiDTTaGgX3jlEUt6gy/X314rEeCn5rNrupOfeQNPKnzdlInjP0yKvxF/boXDfQa3 KM7Sp+eZb674n2c83CuUPVfdIF2jmzm6VdB8a4zIAYoiPyw0HljayzPhAuUBhgOO Q9nrooNs3+aZm/UXEcs0V0X+LPz7+w22z3aQ220sRYuQuZYNkvEfRi+yRzkqqoPd 0Bs7VAdzs6WryLWabkRmfTFagQ9UT9LtXsR+7h6P0By3ps8MaaU= =DJFm -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----