When support for ECDSA keys was added, constraints for data & signature
sizes were never updated. This makes it impossible to use such keys via
keyctl API from userspace.
Update constraint on max_data_size to 64 bytes in order to support
SHA512-based signatures. Also update the signature length constraints
per ECDSA signature encoding described in RFC 5480.
Fixes: 299f561a6693 ("x509: Add support for parsing x509 certs with ECDSA keys")
Signed-off-by: Denis Kenzior <[email protected]>
---
Version History:
v2: Update patch description according to Jarkko's comments. No
functional code changes.
crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
index 2f8352e88860..eca5671ad3f2 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
@@ -186,8 +186,28 @@ static int software_key_query(const struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
len = crypto_akcipher_maxsize(tfm);
info->key_size = len * 8;
- info->max_data_size = len;
- info->max_sig_size = len;
+
+ if (strncmp(pkey->pkey_algo, "ecdsa", 5) == 0) {
+ /*
+ * ECDSA key sizes are much smaller than RSA, and thus could
+ * operate on (hashed) inputs that are larger than key size.
+ * For example SHA384-hashed input used with secp256r1
+ * based keys. Set max_data_size to be at least as large as
+ * the largest supported hash size (SHA512)
+ */
+ info->max_data_size = 64;
+
+ /*
+ * Verify takes ECDSA-Sig (described in RFC 5480) as input,
+ * which is actually 2 'key_size'-bit integers encoded in
+ * ASN.1. Account for the ASN.1 encoding overhead here.
+ */
+ info->max_sig_size = 2 * (len + 3) + 2;
+ } else {
+ info->max_data_size = len;
+ info->max_sig_size = len;
+ }
+
info->max_enc_size = len;
info->max_dec_size = len;
info->supported_ops = (KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_ENCRYPT |
--
2.35.1
On 8/26/22 10:51, Denis Kenzior wrote:
> When support for ECDSA keys was added, constraints for data & signature
> sizes were never updated. This makes it impossible to use such keys via
> keyctl API from userspace.
>
> Update constraint on max_data_size to 64 bytes in order to support
> SHA512-based signatures. Also update the signature length constraints
> per ECDSA signature encoding described in RFC 5480.
>
> Fixes: 299f561a6693 ("x509: Add support for parsing x509 certs with ECDSA keys")
> Signed-off-by: Denis Kenzior <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <[email protected]>
> ---
>
> Version History:
>
> v2: Update patch description according to Jarkko's comments. No
> functional code changes.
>
> crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++--
> 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
> index 2f8352e88860..eca5671ad3f2 100644
> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
> @@ -186,8 +186,28 @@ static int software_key_query(const struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
>
> len = crypto_akcipher_maxsize(tfm);
> info->key_size = len * 8;
> - info->max_data_size = len;
> - info->max_sig_size = len;
> +
> + if (strncmp(pkey->pkey_algo, "ecdsa", 5) == 0) {
> + /*
> + * ECDSA key sizes are much smaller than RSA, and thus could
> + * operate on (hashed) inputs that are larger than key size.
> + * For example SHA384-hashed input used with secp256r1
> + * based keys. Set max_data_size to be at least as large as
> + * the largest supported hash size (SHA512)
> + */
> + info->max_data_size = 64;
> +
> + /*
> + * Verify takes ECDSA-Sig (described in RFC 5480) as input,
> + * which is actually 2 'key_size'-bit integers encoded in
> + * ASN.1. Account for the ASN.1 encoding overhead here.
> + */
> + info->max_sig_size = 2 * (len + 3) + 2;
> + } else {
> + info->max_data_size = len;
> + info->max_sig_size = len;
> + }
> +
> info->max_enc_size = len;
> info->max_dec_size = len;
> info->supported_ops = (KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_ENCRYPT |
Hi
What's the hold-up with this patch? I would really appreciate if someone could take a look at it and move it along to finally enable iwd to connect to networks using ECDSA certificates (my eduroam network for example).
Michael
------- Original Message -------
On Friday, August 26th, 2022 at 16:51, Denis Kenzior <[email protected]> wrote:
>
>
> When support for ECDSA keys was added, constraints for data & signature
> sizes were never updated. This makes it impossible to use such keys via
> keyctl API from userspace.
>
> Update constraint on max_data_size to 64 bytes in order to support
> SHA512-based signatures. Also update the signature length constraints
> per ECDSA signature encoding described in RFC 5480.
>
> Fixes: 299f561a6693 ("x509: Add support for parsing x509 certs with ECDSA keys")
> Signed-off-by: Denis Kenzior [email protected]
>
> ---
>
> Version History:
>
> v2: Update patch description according to Jarkko's comments. No
> functional code changes.
>
> crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++--
> 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
> index 2f8352e88860..eca5671ad3f2 100644
> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
> @@ -186,8 +186,28 @@ static int software_key_query(const struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
>
> len = crypto_akcipher_maxsize(tfm);
> info->key_size = len * 8;
>
> - info->max_data_size = len;
>
> - info->max_sig_size = len;
>
> +
> + if (strncmp(pkey->pkey_algo, "ecdsa", 5) == 0) {
>
> + /*
> + * ECDSA key sizes are much smaller than RSA, and thus could
> + * operate on (hashed) inputs that are larger than key size.
> + * For example SHA384-hashed input used with secp256r1
> + * based keys. Set max_data_size to be at least as large as
> + * the largest supported hash size (SHA512)
> + */
> + info->max_data_size = 64;
>
> +
> + /*
> + * Verify takes ECDSA-Sig (described in RFC 5480) as input,
> + * which is actually 2 'key_size'-bit integers encoded in
> + * ASN.1. Account for the ASN.1 encoding overhead here.
> + */
> + info->max_sig_size = 2 * (len + 3) + 2;
>
> + } else {
> + info->max_data_size = len;
>
> + info->max_sig_size = len;
>
> + }
> +
> info->max_enc_size = len;
>
> info->max_dec_size = len;
>
> info->supported_ops = (KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_ENCRYPT |
>
> --
> 2.35.1