From: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/6] MODSIGN: Kernel module signing
Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2007 22:10:30 +0000
Message-ID: <20070215221030.GA6602@ucw.cz>
References: <20070214190938.6438.15091.stgit@warthog.cambridge.redhat.com> <200702142135.40832.agruen@suse.de> <20070215054559.GD15654@redhat.com> <200702142214.53625.agruen@suse.de>
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Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	torvalds@linux-foundation.org, herbert.xu@redhat.com,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, arjan@infradead.org,
	linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
To: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
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In-Reply-To: <200702142214.53625.agruen@suse.de>
Sender: linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org

Hi!

> > well, the situation for external modules is no worse than usual.
> > They still work, they just aren't signed. Which from a distributor point
> > of view, is actually a nice thing, as they stick out like a sore thumb
> > in oops reports with (U) markers :)
> 
> I agree, that's really what should happen. We solve this by marking modules as 
> supported, partner supported, or unsupported, but in an "insecure" way, so 
> partners and users could try to fake the support status of a module and/or 
> remove status flags from Oopses, and cryptography wouldn't save us. We could 
> try to sign Oopses which I guess you guys are doing. This whole issue hasn't 

I do not think any ammount of crypto can determine that I loaded
unsupported module, then edited oops. (TPM hw module may be able to do that, not
sure).

-- 
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