From: Herbert Xu Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2 v2] talitos: Freescale integrated security engine (SEC) driver Date: Thu, 5 Jun 2008 15:22:24 +1000 Message-ID: <20080605052224.GA23150@gondor.apana.org.au> References: <20080530185830.60f4e1d4.kim.phillips@freescale.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@ozlabs.org, Evgeniy Polyakov To: Kim Phillips Return-path: Received: from rhun.apana.org.au ([64.62.148.172]:39707 "EHLO arnor.apana.org.au" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-FAIL) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751645AbYFEFWb (ORCPT ); Thu, 5 Jun 2008 01:22:31 -0400 Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20080530185830.60f4e1d4.kim.phillips@freescale.com> Sender: linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: On Fri, May 30, 2008 at 06:58:30PM -0500, Kim Phillips wrote: > > + /* get random IV */ > + get_random_bytes(req->giv, crypto_aead_ivsize(authenc)); Sorry but this is unworkable given our current RNG infrastructure. Draining 16 bytes for every packet is going to make /dev/random unuseable (if it wasn't already :). Perhaps just use eseqiv (it should be pretty cheap sinec it just tacks on an extra block to the encryption) for now until we have a PRNG? We'll need to extend eseqiv to support AEAD first though. Perhaps change it so that it can be called as a library by AEAD algorithms? Thanks, -- Visit Openswan at http://www.openswan.org/ Email: Herbert Xu ~{PmV>HI~} Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/ PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt