From: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Subject: Re: [CRYPTO] obfuscating kernel pointers
Date: Fri, 12 Nov 2010 14:03:15 -0500
Message-ID: <1289588595.3090.331.camel@Dan>
References: <1289568721.3090.267.camel@Dan>
	 <20101112172727.GA26217@hmsreliant.think-freely.org>
	 <1289583581.2034.8.camel@dan>
	 <20101112185413.GB26217@hmsreliant.think-freely.org>
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Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
To: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
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Sender: linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org


> > 
> adding a consistent random value to a your void * pointers sounds like a fine
> solution to the problem, then.  As long as you use the same random value for the
> lifetime of the system, that will give you consistent values.  And you have to
> use the same random input consistently to have consistent output on multiple
> concatinations of the same file anyway.  This also has the advantage of not
> having to do a crypto operation for every print/seq_sprintf/etc that contains a
> %p.
> 

The problem with that is the ease with which one could infer that random
value makes the whole thing pretty pointless.

-Dan