From: Mimi Zohar Subject: [PATCH v1.4 0/5] keys: trusted and encrypted keys Date: Thu, 18 Nov 2010 17:42:41 -0500 Message-ID: <1290120166-3132-1-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Mimi Zohar , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@linux-nfs.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, David Howells , Jason Gunthorpe , James Morris , David Safford , Rajiv Andrade To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Return-path: Received: from e37.co.us.ibm.com ([32.97.110.158]:37780 "EHLO e37.co.us.ibm.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1758099Ab0KRWm7 (ORCPT ); Thu, 18 Nov 2010 17:42:59 -0500 Sender: linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: Changes were made in this patchset based on David Howell's comments. The major technical change was converting from the crypto hash to shash API. The remaining changes are listed in the individual patch changelogs. Trusted and Encrypted Keys are two new key types added to the existing kernel key ring service. Both of these new types are variable length symmetic keys, and in both cases all keys are created in the kernel, and user space sees, stores, and loads only encrypted blobs. Trusted Keys require the availability of a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) chip for greater security, while Encrypted Keys can be used on any system. All user level blobs, are displayed and loaded in hex ascii for convenience, and are integrity verified. Trusted Keys use a TPM both to generate and to seal the keys. Keys are sealed under a 2048 bit RSA key in the TPM, and optionally sealed to specified PCR (integrity measurement) values, and only unsealed by the TPM, if PCRs and blob integrity verifications match. A loaded Trusted Key can be updated with new (future) PCR values, so keys are easily migrated to new pcr values, such as when the kernel and initramfs are updated. The same key can have many saved blobs under different PCR values, so multiple boots are easily supported. By default, trusted keys are sealed under the SRK, which has the default authorization value (20 zeros). This can be set at takeownership time with the trouser's utility: "tpm_takeownership -u -z". Usage: keyctl add trusted name "new keylen [options]" ring keyctl add trusted name "load hex_blob [pcrlock=pcrnum]" ring keyctl update key "update [options]" keyctl print keyid options: keyhandle= ascii hex value of sealing key default 0x40000000 (SRK) keyauth= ascii hex auth for sealing key default 0x00... (40 ascii zeros) blobauth= ascii hex auth for sealed data default 0x00... (40 ascii zeros) pcrinfo= ascii hex of PCR_INFO or PCR_INFO_LONG (no default) pcrlock= pcr number to be extended to "lock" blob migratable= 0|1 indicating permission to reseal to new PCR values, default 1 (resealing allowed) keyctl print returns an ascii hex copy of the sealed key, which is in standard TPM_STORED_DATA format. The key length for new keys are always in bytes. Trusted Keys can be 32 - 128 bytes (256 - 1024 bits), the upper limit is to fit within the 2048 bit SRK (RSA) keylength, with all necessary structure/padding. Encrypted keys do not depend on a TPM, and are faster, as they use AES for encryption/decryption. New keys are created from kernel generated random numbers, and are encrypted/decrypted using a specified 'master' key. The 'master' key can either be a trusted-key or user-key type. The main disadvantage of encrypted keys is that if they are not rooted in a trusted key, they are only as secure as the user key encrypting them. The master user key should therefore be loaded in as secure a way as possible, preferably early in boot. Usage: keyctl add encrypted name "new master-key-name keylen" ring keyctl add encrypted name "load key-type:master-key-name keylen hex_blob" ring keyctl update keyid "update master-key-name" where 'key-type' is either 'trusted' or 'user'. The initial consumer of trusted keys is EVM, which at boot time needs a high quality symmetric key for HMAC protection of file metadata. The use of a trusted key provides strong guarantees that the EVM key has not been compromised by a user level problem, and when sealed to specific boot PCR values, protects against boot and offline attacks. Other uses for trusted and encrypted keys, such as for disk and file encryption are anticipated. Mimi Zohar David Safford Mimi Zohar (5): lib: hex2bin converts ascii hexadecimal string to binary tpm: add module_put wrapper key: add tpm_send command keys: add new trusted key-type keys: add new key-type encrypted Documentation/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt | 68 ++ drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c | 20 +- drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h | 5 + include/keys/encrypted-type.h | 29 + include/keys/trusted-type.h | 31 + include/linux/kernel.h | 1 + include/linux/tpm.h | 4 + lib/hexdump.c | 16 + security/Kconfig | 31 + security/keys/Makefile | 2 + security/keys/encrypted_defined.c | 876 +++++++++++++++++++++++ security/keys/encrypted_defined.h | 56 ++ security/keys/trusted_defined.c | 1136 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/keys/trusted_defined.h | 147 ++++ 14 files changed, 2420 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) create mode 100644 Documentation/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt create mode 100644 include/keys/encrypted-type.h create mode 100644 include/keys/trusted-type.h create mode 100644 security/keys/encrypted_defined.c create mode 100644 security/keys/encrypted_defined.h create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted_defined.c create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted_defined.h -- 1.7.2.2