From: "Lee, Chun-Yi" Subject: [PATCH V4 13/15] Hibernate: introduced SNAPSHOT_SIG_HASH config for select hash algorithm Date: Sun, 15 Sep 2013 08:56:59 +0800 Message-ID: <1379206621-18639-14-git-send-email-jlee@suse.com> References: <1379206621-18639-1-git-send-email-jlee@suse.com> Cc: linux-security-module-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org, linux-efi-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org, linux-pm-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org, linux-crypto-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org, opensuse-kernel-stAJ6ESoqRxg9hUCZPvPmw@public.gmane.org, David Howells , "Rafael J. Wysocki" , Matthew Garrett , Len Brown , Pavel Machek , Josh Boyer , Vojtech Pavlik , Matt Fleming , James Bottomley , Greg KH , JKosina-IBi9RG/b67k@public.gmane.org, Rusty Russell , Herbert Xu , "David S. Miller" , "H. Peter Anvin" , Michal Marek , Gary Lin , Vivek Goyal , "Lee, Chun-Yi" To: linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org Return-path: In-Reply-To: <1379206621-18639-1-git-send-email-jlee-IBi9RG/b67k@public.gmane.org> List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: List-Owner: List-Archive: List-Id: linux-crypto.vger.kernel.org This patch introduced SNAPSHOT_SIG_HASH config for user to select which hash algorithm will be used during signature generation of snapshot. v2: Add define check of oCONFIG_SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION in snapshot.c before declare pkey_hash(). Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina Signed-off-by: Lee, Chun-Yi --- kernel/power/Kconfig | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ kernel/power/snapshot.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++----- 2 files changed, 66 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/power/Kconfig b/kernel/power/Kconfig index b592d88..79b34fa 100644 --- a/kernel/power/Kconfig +++ b/kernel/power/Kconfig @@ -78,6 +78,52 @@ config SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION dependent on UEFI environment. EFI bootloader should generate the key-pair. +choice + prompt "Which hash algorithm should snapshot be signed with?" + depends on SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION + help + This determines which sort of hashing algorithm will be used during + signature generation of snapshot. This algorithm _must_ be built into + the kernel directly so that signature verification can take place. + It is not possible to load a signed snapshot containing the algorithm + to check the signature on that module. + +config SNAPSHOT_SIG_SHA1 + bool "Sign modules with SHA-1" + select CRYPTO_SHA1 + select CRYPTO_SHA1_SSSE3 if X86_64 + +config SNAPSHOT_SIG_SHA224 + bool "Sign modules with SHA-224" + select CRYPTO_SHA256 + select CRYPTO_SHA256_SSSE3 if X86_64 + +config SNAPSHOT_SIG_SHA256 + bool "Sign modules with SHA-256" + select CRYPTO_SHA256 + select CRYPTO_SHA256_SSSE3 if X86_64 + +config SNAPSHOT_SIG_SHA384 + bool "Sign modules with SHA-384" + select CRYPTO_SHA512 + select CRYPTO_SHA512_SSSE3 if X86_64 + +config SNAPSHOT_SIG_SHA512 + bool "Sign modules with SHA-512" + select CRYPTO_SHA512 + select CRYPTO_SHA512_SSSE3 if X86_64 + +endchoice + +config SNAPSHOT_SIG_HASH + string + depends on SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION + default "sha1" if SNAPSHOT_SIG_SHA1 + default "sha224" if SNAPSHOT_SIG_SHA224 + default "sha256" if SNAPSHOT_SIG_SHA256 + default "sha384" if SNAPSHOT_SIG_SHA384 + default "sha512" if SNAPSHOT_SIG_SHA512 + config PM_STD_PARTITION string "Default resume partition" depends on HIBERNATION diff --git a/kernel/power/snapshot.c b/kernel/power/snapshot.c index 804feb6..896f11d 100644 --- a/kernel/power/snapshot.c +++ b/kernel/power/snapshot.c @@ -1041,7 +1041,22 @@ static inline void copy_data_page(unsigned long dst_pfn, unsigned long src_pfn) #endif /* CONFIG_HIGHMEM */ #ifdef CONFIG_SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION -#define SNAPSHOT_HASH "sha256" +static const char *snapshot_hash = CONFIG_SNAPSHOT_SIG_HASH; + +static int pkey_hash(void) +{ + int i, ret; + + ret = -1; + for (i = 0; i < PKEY_HASH__LAST; i++) { + if (!strcmp(pkey_hash_algo[i], snapshot_hash)) { + ret = i; + break; + } + } + + return ret; +} #endif /* @@ -1074,7 +1089,7 @@ swsusp_generate_signature(struct memory_bitmap *copy_bm, unsigned int nr_pages) int ret, i; ret = -ENOMEM; - tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(SNAPSHOT_HASH, 0, 0); + tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(snapshot_hash, 0, 0); if (IS_ERR(tfm)) { pr_err("IS_ERR(tfm): %ld", PTR_ERR(tfm)); return PTR_ERR(tfm); @@ -1127,7 +1142,7 @@ swsusp_generate_signature(struct memory_bitmap *copy_bm, unsigned int nr_pages) goto error_key; } - pks = generate_signature(s4_sign_key, digest, PKEY_HASH_SHA256, false); + pks = generate_signature(s4_sign_key, digest, pkey_hash(), false); if (IS_ERR(pks)) { pr_err("Generate signature fail: %lx", PTR_ERR(pks)); ret = PTR_ERR(pks); @@ -2491,7 +2506,7 @@ int snapshot_verify_signature(u8 *digest, size_t digest_size) pr_err("PM: Allocate public key signature fail!"); return -ENOMEM; } - pks->pkey_hash_algo = PKEY_HASH_SHA256; + pks->pkey_hash_algo = pkey_hash(); pks->digest = digest; pks->digest_size = digest_size; @@ -2544,7 +2559,7 @@ int snapshot_image_verify(void) if (ret) goto forward_ret; - tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(SNAPSHOT_HASH, 0, 0); + tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(snapshot_hash, 0, 0); if (IS_ERR(tfm)) { pr_err("IS_ERR(tfm): %ld", PTR_ERR(tfm)); return PTR_ERR(tfm); -- 1.6.0.2