From: joeyli Subject: Re: [RFC V4 PATCH 00/15] Signature verification of hibernate snapshot Date: Thu, 26 Sep 2013 12:40:03 +0800 Message-ID: <1380170403.32302.52.camel__33216.8737579652$1380170434$gmane$org@linux-s257.site> References: <1380147414.18835.36.camel@dabdike.int.hansenpartnership.com> <20130926002730.GA26857@amd.pavel.ucw.cz> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: QUOTED-PRINTABLE Cc: James Bottomley , Alan Stern , David Howells , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-pm@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, opensuse-kernel@opensuse.org, "Rafael J. Wysocki" , Matthew Garrett , Len Brown , Josh Boyer , Vojtech Pavlik , Matt Fleming , Greg KH , JKosina@suse.com, Rusty Russell , Herbert Xu , "David S. Miller" , "H. Peter Anvin" , Michal Marek , Gary Lin , Vivek Goyal To: Pavel Machek Return-path: In-Reply-To: <20130926002730.GA26857@amd.pavel.ucw.cz> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-Id: linux-crypto.vger.kernel.org =E6=96=BC =E5=9B=9B=EF=BC=8C2013-09-26 =E6=96=BC 02:27 +0200=EF=BC=8CPa= vel Machek =E6=8F=90=E5=88=B0=EF=BC=9A > On Wed 2013-09-25 15:16:54, James Bottomley wrote: > > On Wed, 2013-09-25 at 17:25 -0400, Alan Stern wrote: > > > On Wed, 25 Sep 2013, David Howells wrote: > > >=20 > > > > I have pushed some keyrings patches that will likely affect thi= s to: > > > >=20 > > > > http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs.= git/log/?h=3Dkeys-devel > > > >=20 > > > > I intend to ask James to pull these into his next branch. If h= e's happy to do > > > > so, I can look at pulling at least your asymmetric keys patch o= n top of them. > > >=20 > > > This suggests a point that I raised at the Linux Plumbers confere= nce: > > >=20 > > > Why are asymmetric keys used for verifying the hibernation image?= It > > > seems that a symmetric key would work just as well. And it would= be a > > > lot quicker to generate, because it wouldn't need any high-precis= ion > > > integer computations. > >=20 > > The reason is the desire to validate that the previous kernel creat= ed > > something which it passed on to the current kernel (in this case, t= he > > hibernation image) untampered with. To do that, something must be > > passed to the prior kernel that can be validated but *not* recreate= d by > > the current kernel. >=20 > I don't get this. Why is it important that current kernel can't > recreate the signature? >=20 > Current kernel is not considered malicious (if it were, you have wors= e > problems). >=20 Current boot kernel should not malicious especially when UEFI secure boot enabled. > Pavel >=20 > PS: And yes, it would be nice to have > Documentation/power/swsusp-uefi.txt (or something) explaining the > design. >=20 Thanks for your suggestion, I will write the swsusp-uefi.txt to explaining the design in next version. Thanks a lot! Joey Lee