From: Theodore Ts'o Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 0/7] /dev/random - a new approach Date: Tue, 21 Jun 2016 01:12:55 -0400 Message-ID: <20160621051255.GG9848@thunk.org> References: <20160620184403.21972.qmail@ns.sciencehorizons.net> <10477997.AvJKPRy4pc@positron.chronox.de> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Cc: George Spelvin , andi@firstfloor.org, cryptography@lakedaemon.net, herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, hpa@linux.intel.com, joe@perches.com, jsd@av8n.com, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux@horizon.com, pavel@ucw.cz, sandyinchina@gmail.com To: Stephan Mueller Return-path: Received: from imap.thunk.org ([74.207.234.97]:52418 "EHLO imap.thunk.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751123AbcFUFNs (ORCPT ); Tue, 21 Jun 2016 01:13:48 -0400 Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <10477997.AvJKPRy4pc@positron.chronox.de> Sender: linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: On Mon, Jun 20, 2016 at 09:00:49PM +0200, Stephan Mueller wrote: > > The time stamp maintenance is the exact cause for the correlation: one HID > event triggers: > > - add_interrupt_randomness which takes high-res time stamp, Jiffies and some > pointers > > - add_input_randomness which takes high-res time stamp, Jiffies and HID event > value > > The same applies to disk events. My suggestion is to get rid of the double > counting of time stamps for one event. > > And I guess I do not need to stress that correlation of data that is supposed > to be entropic is not good :-) What is your concern, specifically? If it is in the entropy accounting, there is more entropy in HID event interrupts, so I don't think adding the extra 1/64th bit of entropy is going to be problematic. If it is that there are two timestamps that are closely correleated being added into the pool, the add_interrupt_randomness() path is going to mix that timestamp with the interrupt timings from 63 other interrupts before it is mixed into the input pool, while the add_input_randomness() mixes it directly into the pool. So if you think there is a way this could be leveraged into attack, please give specifics --- but I think we're on pretty solid ground here. Cheers, - Ted