From: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: Re: [PATCH v5 1/4] siphash: add
 cryptographically secure PRF
Date: Fri, 16 Dec 2016 15:44:27 -0500
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On Fri, 2016-12-16 at 11:47 -0800, Tom Herbert wrote:
>=20
> That's about 3x of jhash speed (7 nsecs). So that might closer
> to a more palatable replacement for jhash. Do we lose any security
> advantages with halfsiphash?

Have you tested a lower round SipHash? Probably best to stick with the
usual construction for non-DoS mitigation, but why not try SipHash 1-3,
1-2, etc. for DoS mitigation?

Rust and Swift both went with SipHash 1-3 for hash tables.
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