From: Hannes Frederic Sowa Subject: Re: BPF hash algo (Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v7 3/6] random: use SipHash in place of MD5) Date: Fri, 23 Dec 2016 19:19:36 +0100 Message-ID: References: <1482425969.2673.5.camel@stressinduktion.org> <585CF6A3.1050107@iogearbox.net> <1482490762.3353.2.camel@stressinduktion.org> <585D11BF.60903@iogearbox.net> Reply-To: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Cc: Alexei Starovoitov , "Jason A. Donenfeld" , "kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com" , Theodore Ts'o , Netdev , LKML , Linux Crypto Mailing List , David Laight , Eric Dumazet , Linus Torvalds , Eric Biggers , Tom Herbert , Andi Kleen , "David S. Miller" , Jean-Philippe Aumasson To: Andy Lutomirski , Daniel Borkmann Return-path: List-Post: List-Help: List-Unsubscribe: List-Subscribe: In-Reply-To: List-Id: linux-crypto.vger.kernel.org On 23.12.2016 17:42, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > On Fri, Dec 23, 2016 at 8:23 AM, Andy Lutomirski wrote: >> On Fri, Dec 23, 2016 at 3:59 AM, Daniel Borkmann wrote: >>> On 12/23/2016 11:59 AM, Hannes Frederic Sowa wrote: >>>> >>>> On Fri, 2016-12-23 at 11:04 +0100, Daniel Borkmann wrote: >>>>> >>>>> On 12/22/2016 05:59 PM, Hannes Frederic Sowa wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> On Thu, 2016-12-22 at 08:07 -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote: >>> >>> [...] >>> >>>>>> The hashing is not a proper sha1 neither, unfortunately. I think that >>>>>> is why it will have a custom implementation in iproute2? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Still trying to catch up on this admittedly bit confusing thread. I >>>>> did run automated tests over couple of days comparing the data I got >>>>> from fdinfo with the one from af_alg and found no mismatch on the test >>>>> cases varying from min to max possible program sizes. In the process >>>>> of testing, as you might have seen on netdev, I found couple of other >>>>> bugs in bpf code along the way and fixed them up as well. So my question, >>>>> do you or Andy or anyone participating in claiming this have any >>>>> concrete data or test cases that suggests something different? If yes, >>>>> I'm very curious to hear about it and willing fix it up, of course. >>>>> When I'm back from pto I'll prep and cook up my test suite to be >>>>> included into the selftests/bpf/, should have done this initially, >>>>> sorry about that. I'll also post something to expose the alg, that >>>>> sounds fine to me. >>>> >>>> >>>> Looking into your code closer, I noticed that you indeed seem to do the >>>> finalization of sha-1 by hand by aligning and padding the buffer >>>> accordingly and also patching in the necessary payload length. >>>> >>>> Apologies for my side for claiming that this is not correct sha1 >>>> output, I was only looking at sha_transform and its implementation and >>>> couldn't see the padding and finalization round with embedding the data >>>> length in there and hadn't thought of it being done manually. >>>> >>>> Anyway, is it difficult to get the sha finalization into some common >>>> code library? It is not very bpf specific and crypto code reviewers >>>> won't find it there at all. >>> >>> >>> Yes, sure, I'll rework it that way (early next year when I'm back if >>> that's fine with you). >> >> Can we make it SHA-256 before 4.10 comes out, though? This really >> looks like it will be used in situations where collisions matter and >> it will be exposed to malicious programs, and SHA-1 should not be used >> for new designs for this purpose because it simply isn't long enough. >> >> Also, a SHA-1 digest isn't a pile of u32s, so u32 digest[...] is very >> misleading. That should be u8 or, at the very least, __be32. >> >> I realize that there isn't a sha-256 implementation in lib, but would >> it really be so bad to make the bpf digest only work (for now) when >> crypto is enabled? I would *love* to see the crypto core learn how to >> export simple primitives for direct use without needing the whole >> crypto core, and this doesn't seem particularly hard to do, but I >> don't think that's 4.10 material. > > I'm going to try to send out RFC patches for all of this today or > tomorrow. It doesn't look bad at all. Factoring out sha3 to lib/ and use it as standalone and in crypto api doesn't seem hard, yep. I also proposed this to Daniel offlist. Bye, Hannes