From: Jhih-Ming Huang Subject: [PATCH 01/11] Fix coding style of driver/staging/ccree/ssi_aead.c ERROR: space required after that Date: Tue, 20 Jun 2017 13:19:44 +0800 Message-ID: <1497935984-4406-1-git-send-email-fbihjmeric@gmail.com> Cc: Jhih-Ming Hunag To: Gilad Ben-Yossef , Greg Kroah-Hartman , linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, driverdev-devel@linuxdriverproject.org, devel@driverdev.osuosl.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Return-path: Received: from mail-pf0-f193.google.com ([209.85.192.193]:36734 "EHLO mail-pf0-f193.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1750808AbdFTFUA (ORCPT ); Tue, 20 Jun 2017 01:20:00 -0400 Sender: linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: From: Jhih-Ming Hunag In this series patches, I fix all of the coding style error in driver/staging/ccree/ssi_aead.c from 54 errors to 0 error. The first patch fixed 'ERROR: space required after that'. Signed-off-by: Jhih-Ming Hunag --- drivers/staging/ccree/ssi_aead.c | 22 +++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/staging/ccree/ssi_aead.c b/drivers/staging/ccree/ssi_aead.c index e8936a3..5bc3a53 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/ccree/ssi_aead.c +++ b/drivers/staging/ccree/ssi_aead.c @@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ static int ssi_aead_init(struct crypto_aead *tfm) ctx->auth_mode = ssi_alg->auth_mode; ctx->drvdata = ssi_alg->drvdata; dev = &ctx->drvdata->plat_dev->dev; - crypto_aead_set_reqsize(tfm,sizeof(struct aead_req_ctx)); + crypto_aead_set_reqsize(tfm, sizeof(struct aead_req_ctx)); /* Allocate key buffer, cache line aligned */ ctx->enckey = dma_alloc_coherent(dev, AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE, @@ -1566,7 +1566,7 @@ static int config_ccm_adata(struct aead_request *req) { /* taken from crypto/ccm.c */ /* 2 <= L <= 8, so 1 <= L' <= 7. */ if (2 > l || l > 8) { - SSI_LOG_ERR("illegal iv value %X\n",req->iv[0]); + SSI_LOG_ERR("illegal iv value %X\n", req->iv[0]); return -EINVAL; } memcpy(b0, req->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); @@ -1862,27 +1862,27 @@ static inline void ssi_aead_dump_gcm( ctx->cipher_mode, ctx->authsize, ctx->enc_keylen, req->assoclen, req_ctx->cryptlen ); if ( ctx->enckey != NULL ) { - dump_byte_array("mac key",ctx->enckey, 16); + dump_byte_array("mac key", ctx->enckey, 16); } - dump_byte_array("req->iv",req->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + dump_byte_array("req->iv", req->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); - dump_byte_array("gcm_iv_inc1",req_ctx->gcm_iv_inc1, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + dump_byte_array("gcm_iv_inc1", req_ctx->gcm_iv_inc1, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); - dump_byte_array("gcm_iv_inc2",req_ctx->gcm_iv_inc2, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + dump_byte_array("gcm_iv_inc2", req_ctx->gcm_iv_inc2, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); - dump_byte_array("hkey",req_ctx->hkey, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + dump_byte_array("hkey", req_ctx->hkey, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); - dump_byte_array("mac_buf",req_ctx->mac_buf, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + dump_byte_array("mac_buf", req_ctx->mac_buf, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); - dump_byte_array("gcm_len_block",req_ctx->gcm_len_block.lenA, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + dump_byte_array("gcm_len_block", req_ctx->gcm_len_block.lenA, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); if (req->src!=NULL && req->cryptlen) { - dump_byte_array("req->src",sg_virt(req->src), req->cryptlen+req->assoclen); + dump_byte_array("req->src", sg_virt(req->src), req->cryptlen+req->assoclen); } if (req->dst!=NULL) { - dump_byte_array("req->dst",sg_virt(req->dst), req->cryptlen+ctx->authsize+req->assoclen); + dump_byte_array("req->dst", sg_virt(req->dst), req->cryptlen+ctx->authsize+req->assoclen); } } #endif -- 2.7.4