From: Stephan =?ISO-8859-1?Q?M=FCller?= Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v12 3/4] Linux Random Number Generator Date: Wed, 19 Jul 2017 08:25:55 +0200 Message-ID: <1660806.HVQ9M7P8eN@positron.chronox.de> References: <3910055.ntkqcq1Chb@positron.chronox.de> <20170719015133.aijabk36g7m6daek@thunk.org> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7Bit Cc: Sandy Harris , Greg Kroah-Hartman , "Jason A. Donenfeld" , Arnd Bergmann , Linux Crypto Mailing List , LKML To: Theodore Ts'o Return-path: Received: from mail.eperm.de ([89.247.134.16]:60716 "EHLO mail.eperm.de" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751663AbdGSGZ5 (ORCPT ); Wed, 19 Jul 2017 02:25:57 -0400 In-Reply-To: <20170719015133.aijabk36g7m6daek@thunk.org> Sender: linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: Am Mittwoch, 19. Juli 2017, 03:51:33 CEST schrieb Theodore Ts'o: Hi Theodore, > If the real unpredictability is really coming from the interrupts > changing the state of the CPU microarchitecture, the real question is > how many interrupts do you need before you consider things > "unpredictable" to an adequate level of security? Arguing that we > should turn down the "interrupts per bit of entropy" in > drivers/char/random.c is a much more honest way of having that > discussion. Please answer on the concerns given in [1] which explains that we cannot allow turning that knob in the current implementation. [1] https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-crypto/msg26316.html Ciao Stephan