From: Stefan Berger Subject: Re: [tpmdd-devel] [PATCH] tpm: remove chip_num parameter from in-kernel API Date: Mon, 23 Oct 2017 10:07:31 -0400 Message-ID: References: <20171023123817.18559-1-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Cc: David Howells , Herbert Xu , "open list:INTEGRITY MEASUREMENT ARCHITECTURE IMA" , Dmitry Kasatkin , open list , Jason Gunthorpe , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, "moderated list:TPM DEVICE DRIVER" , "open list:KEYS-TRUSTED" , "open list:HARDWARE RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR CORE" , James Morris , Matt Mackall , "open list:INTEGRITY MEASUREMENT ARCHITECTURE IMA" , David Safford , To: Jarkko Sakkinen , linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Return-path: In-Reply-To: <20171023123817.18559-1-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org List-Id: linux-crypto.vger.kernel.org On 10/23/2017 08:38 AM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > The reasoning is simple and obvious. Since every call site passes the > value TPM_ANY_NUM (0xFFFF) the parameter does not have right to exist. > Refined the documentation of the corresponding functions. > > Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen > --- > drivers/char/hw_random/tpm-rng.c | 2 +- > drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c | 38 ++++++++-------- > drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c | 87 ++++++++++++++++++------------------- > drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h | 2 +- > include/linux/tpm.h | 43 ++++++++---------- > security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c | 2 +- > security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c | 2 +- > security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c | 2 +- > security/keys/trusted.c | 35 ++++++++------- > 9 files changed, 101 insertions(+), 112 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/tpm-rng.c b/drivers/char/hw_random/tpm-rng.c > index d6d448266f07..8823efcddab8 100644 > --- a/drivers/char/hw_random/tpm-rng.c > +++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/tpm-rng.c > @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ > > static int tpm_rng_read(struct hwrng *rng, void *data, size_t max, bool wait) > { > - return tpm_get_random(TPM_ANY_NUM, data, max); > + return tpm_get_random(data, max); > } > > static struct hwrng tpm_rng = { > diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c > index a114e8f7fb90..ec351111643b 100644 > --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c > +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c > @@ -81,34 +81,32 @@ void tpm_put_ops(struct tpm_chip *chip) > EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_put_ops); > > /** > - * tpm_chip_find_get() - return tpm_chip for a given chip number > - * @chip_num: id to find > + * tpm_chip_find_get() - reserved the first available TPM chip > * > - * The return'd chip has been tpm_try_get_ops'd and must be released via > - * tpm_put_ops > + * Finds the first available TPM chip and reserves its class device and > + * operations. > + * > + * Return: a reserved &struct tpm_chip instance > */ > -struct tpm_chip *tpm_chip_find_get(int chip_num) > +struct tpm_chip *tpm_chip_find_get(void) > { > - struct tpm_chip *chip, *res = NULL; > + struct tpm_chip *chip; > + struct tpm_chip *res = NULL; > int chip_prev; > + int chip_num; > > mutex_lock(&idr_lock); > > - if (chip_num == TPM_ANY_NUM) { > - chip_num = 0; > - do { > - chip_prev = chip_num; > - chip = idr_get_next(&dev_nums_idr, &chip_num); > - if (chip && !tpm_try_get_ops(chip)) { > - res = chip; > - break; > - } > - } while (chip_prev != chip_num); > - } else { > - chip = idr_find(&dev_nums_idr, chip_num); > - if (chip && !tpm_try_get_ops(chip)) > + chip_num = 0; > + > + do { > + chip_prev = chip_num; > + chip = idr_get_next(&dev_nums_idr, &chip_num); > + if (chip && !tpm_try_get_ops(chip)) { > res = chip; > - } > + break; > + } > + } while (chip_prev != chip_num); > > mutex_unlock(&idr_lock); Here you are keeping the loop, which I think is good and I would like you to keep it... > diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c > index d8e2e5bca903..b3907d3556ce 100644 > --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c > +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c > @@ -802,18 +802,19 @@ int tpm_pcr_read_dev(struct tpm_chip *chip, int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf) > } > > /** > - * tpm_is_tpm2 - is the chip a TPM2 chip? > - * @chip_num: tpm idx # or ANY > + * tpm_is_tpm2 - do we a have a TPM2 chip? > * > - * Returns < 0 on error, and 1 or 0 on success depending whether the chip > - * is a TPM2 chip. > + * Return: > + * 1 if we have a TPM2 chip. > + * 0 if we don't have a TPM2 chip. > + * A negative number for system errors (errno). > */ > -int tpm_is_tpm2(u32 chip_num) > +int tpm_is_tpm2(void) > { > struct tpm_chip *chip; > int rc; > > - chip = tpm_chip_find_get(chip_num); > + chip = tpm_chip_find_get(); > if (chip == NULL) > return -ENODEV; > > @@ -826,22 +827,18 @@ int tpm_is_tpm2(u32 chip_num) > EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_is_tpm2); > > /** > - * tpm_pcr_read - read a pcr value > - * @chip_num: tpm idx # or ANY > - * @pcr_idx: pcr idx to retrieve > - * @res_buf: TPM_PCR value > - * size of res_buf is 20 bytes (or NULL if you don't care) > + * tpm_pcr_read - read a PCR value from SHA1 bank > + * @pcr_idx: the PCR to be retrieved > + * @res_buf: the value of the PCR > * > - * The TPM driver should be built-in, but for whatever reason it > - * isn't, protect against the chip disappearing, by incrementing > - * the module usage count. > + * Return: same as with tpm_transmit_cmd() > */ > -int tpm_pcr_read(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf) > +int tpm_pcr_read(int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf) > { > struct tpm_chip *chip; > int rc; > > - chip = tpm_chip_find_get(chip_num); > + chip = tpm_chip_find_get(); > if (chip == NULL) > return -ENODEV; > if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2) > @@ -882,16 +879,17 @@ static int tpm1_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash, > } > > /** > - * tpm_pcr_extend - extend pcr value with hash > - * @chip_num: tpm idx # or AN& > - * @pcr_idx: pcr idx to extend > - * @hash: hash value used to extend pcr value > + * tpm_pcr_extend - extend a PCR value in SHA1 bank. > + * @pcr_idx: the PCR to be retrieved > + * @hash: the hash value used to extend the PCR value > + * > + * Note: with TPM 2.0 extends also those banks with a known digest size to the > + * cryto subsystem in order to prevent malicious use of those PCR banks. In the > + * future we should dynamically determine digest sizes. > * > - * The TPM driver should be built-in, but for whatever reason it > - * isn't, protect against the chip disappearing, by incrementing > - * the module usage count. > + * Return: same as with tpm_transmit_cmd() > */ > -int tpm_pcr_extend(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash) > +int tpm_pcr_extend(int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash) > { I think every kernel internal TPM driver API should be called with the tpm_chip as a parameter. This is in foresight of namespacing of IMA where we want to provide the flexibility of passing a dedicated vTPM to each namespace and IMA would use the chip as a parameter to all of these functions to talk to the right tpm_vtpm_proxy instance. From that perspective this patch goes into the wrong direction. Stefan > int rc; > struct tpm_chip *chip; > @@ -899,7 +897,7 @@ int tpm_pcr_extend(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash) > u32 count = 0; > int i; > > - chip = tpm_chip_find_get(chip_num); > + chip = tpm_chip_find_get(); > if (chip == NULL) > return -ENODEV; > > @@ -1012,12 +1010,12 @@ int tpm1_auto_startup(struct tpm_chip *chip) > return rc; > } > > -int tpm_send(u32 chip_num, void *cmd, size_t buflen) > +int tpm_send(void *cmd, size_t buflen) > { > struct tpm_chip *chip; > int rc; > > - chip = tpm_chip_find_get(chip_num); > + chip = tpm_chip_find_get(); > if (chip == NULL) > return -ENODEV; > > @@ -1120,14 +1118,13 @@ static const struct tpm_input_header tpm_getrandom_header = { > }; > > /** > - * tpm_get_random() - Get random bytes from the tpm's RNG > - * @chip_num: A specific chip number for the request or TPM_ANY_NUM > + * tpm_get_random() - acquire random bytes > * @out: destination buffer for the random bytes > * @max: the max number of bytes to write to @out > * > - * Returns < 0 on error and the number of bytes read on success > + * Return: same as with tpm_transmit_cmd() > */ > -int tpm_get_random(u32 chip_num, u8 *out, size_t max) > +int tpm_get_random(u8 *out, size_t max) > { > struct tpm_chip *chip; > struct tpm_cmd_t tpm_cmd; > @@ -1138,7 +1135,7 @@ int tpm_get_random(u32 chip_num, u8 *out, size_t max) > if (!out || !num_bytes || max > TPM_MAX_RNG_DATA) > return -EINVAL; > > - chip = tpm_chip_find_get(chip_num); > + chip = tpm_chip_find_get(); > if (chip == NULL) > return -ENODEV; > > @@ -1181,21 +1178,22 @@ int tpm_get_random(u32 chip_num, u8 *out, size_t max) > EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_get_random); > > /** > - * tpm_seal_trusted() - seal a trusted key > - * @chip_num: A specific chip number for the request or TPM_ANY_NUM > + * tpm_seal_trusted() - seal a trusted key payload > * @options: authentication values and other options > * @payload: the key data in clear and encrypted form > * > - * Returns < 0 on error and 0 on success. At the moment, only TPM 2.0 chips > - * are supported. > + * Note: at the moment, only TPM 2.0 chip are supported. TPM 1.x implementation > + * is still located in the keyring subsystem. > + * > + * Return: same as with tpm_transmit_cmd() > */ > -int tpm_seal_trusted(u32 chip_num, struct trusted_key_payload *payload, > +int tpm_seal_trusted(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, > struct trusted_key_options *options) > { > struct tpm_chip *chip; > int rc; > > - chip = tpm_chip_find_get(chip_num); > + chip = tpm_chip_find_get(); > if (chip == NULL || !(chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2)) > return -ENODEV; > > @@ -1207,21 +1205,22 @@ int tpm_seal_trusted(u32 chip_num, struct trusted_key_payload *payload, > EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_seal_trusted); > > /** > - * tpm_unseal_trusted() - unseal a trusted key > - * @chip_num: A specific chip number for the request or TPM_ANY_NUM > + * tpm_unseal_trusted() - unseal a trusted key payload > * @options: authentication values and other options > * @payload: the key data in clear and encrypted form > * > - * Returns < 0 on error and 0 on success. At the moment, only TPM 2.0 chips > - * are supported. > + * Note: at the moment, only TPM 2.0 chip are supported. TPM 1.x implementation > + * is still located in the keyring subsystem. > + * > + * Return: same as with tpm_transmit_cmd() > */ > -int tpm_unseal_trusted(u32 chip_num, struct trusted_key_payload *payload, > +int tpm_unseal_trusted(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, > struct trusted_key_options *options) > { > struct tpm_chip *chip; > int rc; > > - chip = tpm_chip_find_get(chip_num); > + chip = tpm_chip_find_get(); > if (chip == NULL || !(chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2)) > return -ENODEV; > > diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h > index c1866cc02e30..269c32bb3af0 100644 > --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h > +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h > @@ -516,7 +516,7 @@ static inline void tpm_msleep(unsigned int delay_msec) > delay_msec * 1000); > }; > > -struct tpm_chip *tpm_chip_find_get(int chip_num); > +struct tpm_chip *tpm_chip_find_get(void); > __must_check int tpm_try_get_ops(struct tpm_chip *chip); > void tpm_put_ops(struct tpm_chip *chip); > > diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h > index 5a090f5ab335..54cd6d903d31 100644 > --- a/include/linux/tpm.h > +++ b/include/linux/tpm.h > @@ -24,11 +24,6 @@ > > #define TPM_DIGEST_SIZE 20 /* Max TPM v1.2 PCR size */ > > -/* > - * Chip num is this value or a valid tpm idx > - */ > -#define TPM_ANY_NUM 0xFFFF > - > struct tpm_chip; > struct trusted_key_payload; > struct trusted_key_options; > @@ -53,44 +48,42 @@ struct tpm_class_ops { > }; > > #if defined(CONFIG_TCG_TPM) || defined(CONFIG_TCG_TPM_MODULE) > - > -extern int tpm_is_tpm2(u32 chip_num); > -extern int tpm_pcr_read(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf); > -extern int tpm_pcr_extend(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash); > -extern int tpm_send(u32 chip_num, void *cmd, size_t buflen); > -extern int tpm_get_random(u32 chip_num, u8 *data, size_t max); > -extern int tpm_seal_trusted(u32 chip_num, > - struct trusted_key_payload *payload, > +extern int tpm_is_tpm2(void); > +extern int tpm_pcr_read(int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf); > +extern int tpm_pcr_extend(int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash); > +extern int tpm_send(void *cmd, size_t buflen); > +extern int tpm_get_random(u8 *data, size_t max); > +extern int tpm_seal_trusted(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, > struct trusted_key_options *options); > -extern int tpm_unseal_trusted(u32 chip_num, > - struct trusted_key_payload *payload, > +extern int tpm_unseal_trusted(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, > struct trusted_key_options *options); > #else > -static inline int tpm_is_tpm2(u32 chip_num) > +static inline int tpm_is_tpm2(void) > { > return -ENODEV; > } > -static inline int tpm_pcr_read(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf) { > +static inline int tpm_pcr_read(int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf) > +{ > return -ENODEV; > } > -static inline int tpm_pcr_extend(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash) { > +static inline int tpm_pcr_extend(int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash) > +{ > return -ENODEV; > } > -static inline int tpm_send(u32 chip_num, void *cmd, size_t buflen) { > +static inline int tpm_send(void *cmd, size_t buflen) > +{ > return -ENODEV; > } > -static inline int tpm_get_random(u32 chip_num, u8 *data, size_t max) { > +static inline int tpm_get_random(u8 *data, size_t max) > +{ > return -ENODEV; > } > - > -static inline int tpm_seal_trusted(u32 chip_num, > - struct trusted_key_payload *payload, > +static inline int tpm_seal_trusted(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, > struct trusted_key_options *options) > { > return -ENODEV; > } > -static inline int tpm_unseal_trusted(u32 chip_num, > - struct trusted_key_payload *payload, > +static inline int tpm_unseal_trusted(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, > struct trusted_key_options *options) > { > return -ENODEV; > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c > index 802d5d20f36f..b5828bafab26 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c > @@ -644,7 +644,7 @@ static void __init ima_pcrread(int idx, u8 *pcr) > if (!ima_used_chip) > return; > > - if (tpm_pcr_read(TPM_ANY_NUM, idx, pcr) != 0) > + if (tpm_pcr_read(idx, pcr) != 0) > pr_err("Error Communicating to TPM chip\n"); > } > > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c > index 2967d497a665..21be72f604cd 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c > @@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ int __init ima_init(void) > int rc; > > ima_used_chip = 0; > - rc = tpm_pcr_read(TPM_ANY_NUM, 0, pcr_i); > + rc = tpm_pcr_read(0, pcr_i); > if (rc == 0) > ima_used_chip = 1; > > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c > index a02a86d51102..d33966ff210d 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c > @@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ static int ima_pcr_extend(const u8 *hash, int pcr) > if (!ima_used_chip) > return result; > > - result = tpm_pcr_extend(TPM_ANY_NUM, pcr, hash); > + result = tpm_pcr_extend(pcr, hash); > if (result != 0) > pr_err("Error Communicating to TPM chip, result: %d\n", result); > return result; > diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted.c > index ddfaebf60fc8..f912b5bffdad 100644 > --- a/security/keys/trusted.c > +++ b/security/keys/trusted.c > @@ -355,13 +355,12 @@ static int TSS_checkhmac2(unsigned char *buffer, > * For key specific tpm requests, we will generate and send our > * own TPM command packets using the drivers send function. > */ > -static int trusted_tpm_send(const u32 chip_num, unsigned char *cmd, > - size_t buflen) > +static int trusted_tpm_send(unsigned char *cmd, size_t buflen) > { > int rc; > > dump_tpm_buf(cmd); > - rc = tpm_send(chip_num, cmd, buflen); > + rc = tpm_send(cmd, buflen); > dump_tpm_buf(cmd); > if (rc > 0) > /* Can't return positive return codes values to keyctl */ > @@ -382,10 +381,10 @@ static int pcrlock(const int pcrnum) > > if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) > return -EPERM; > - ret = tpm_get_random(TPM_ANY_NUM, hash, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); > + ret = tpm_get_random(hash, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); > if (ret != SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE) > return ret; > - return tpm_pcr_extend(TPM_ANY_NUM, pcrnum, hash) ? -EINVAL : 0; > + return tpm_pcr_extend(pcrnum, hash) ? -EINVAL : 0; > } > > /* > @@ -398,7 +397,7 @@ static int osap(struct tpm_buf *tb, struct osapsess *s, > unsigned char ononce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE]; > int ret; > > - ret = tpm_get_random(TPM_ANY_NUM, ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); > + ret = tpm_get_random(ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); > if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE) > return ret; > > @@ -410,7 +409,7 @@ static int osap(struct tpm_buf *tb, struct osapsess *s, > store32(tb, handle); > storebytes(tb, ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); > > - ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE); > + ret = trusted_tpm_send(tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE); > if (ret < 0) > return ret; > > @@ -434,7 +433,7 @@ static int oiap(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint32_t *handle, unsigned char *nonce) > store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND); > store32(tb, TPM_OIAP_SIZE); > store32(tb, TPM_ORD_OIAP); > - ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE); > + ret = trusted_tpm_send(tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE); > if (ret < 0) > return ret; > > @@ -493,7 +492,7 @@ static int tpm_seal(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint16_t keytype, > if (ret < 0) > goto out; > > - ret = tpm_get_random(TPM_ANY_NUM, td->nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); > + ret = tpm_get_random(td->nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); > if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE) > goto out; > ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_SEAL); > @@ -542,7 +541,7 @@ static int tpm_seal(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint16_t keytype, > store8(tb, cont); > storebytes(tb, td->pubauth, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); > > - ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE); > + ret = trusted_tpm_send(tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE); > if (ret < 0) > goto out; > > @@ -603,7 +602,7 @@ static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb, > > ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_UNSEAL); > keyhndl = htonl(SRKHANDLE); > - ret = tpm_get_random(TPM_ANY_NUM, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); > + ret = tpm_get_random(nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); > if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE) { > pr_info("trusted_key: tpm_get_random failed (%d)\n", ret); > return ret; > @@ -635,7 +634,7 @@ static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb, > store8(tb, cont); > storebytes(tb, authdata2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); > > - ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE); > + ret = trusted_tpm_send(tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE); > if (ret < 0) { > pr_info("trusted_key: authhmac failed (%d)\n", ret); > return ret; > @@ -748,7 +747,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, > int i; > int tpm2; > > - tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(TPM_ANY_NUM); > + tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(); > if (tpm2 < 0) > return tpm2; > > @@ -917,7 +916,7 @@ static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(void) > struct trusted_key_options *options; > int tpm2; > > - tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(TPM_ANY_NUM); > + tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(); > if (tpm2 < 0) > return NULL; > > @@ -967,7 +966,7 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key, > size_t key_len; > int tpm2; > > - tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(TPM_ANY_NUM); > + tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(); > if (tpm2 < 0) > return tpm2; > > @@ -1008,7 +1007,7 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key, > switch (key_cmd) { > case Opt_load: > if (tpm2) > - ret = tpm_unseal_trusted(TPM_ANY_NUM, payload, options); > + ret = tpm_unseal_trusted(payload, options); > else > ret = key_unseal(payload, options); > dump_payload(payload); > @@ -1018,13 +1017,13 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key, > break; > case Opt_new: > key_len = payload->key_len; > - ret = tpm_get_random(TPM_ANY_NUM, payload->key, key_len); > + ret = tpm_get_random(payload->key, key_len); > if (ret != key_len) { > pr_info("trusted_key: key_create failed (%d)\n", ret); > goto out; > } > if (tpm2) > - ret = tpm_seal_trusted(TPM_ANY_NUM, payload, options); > + ret = tpm_seal_trusted(payload, options); > else > ret = key_seal(payload, options); > if (ret < 0)