From: Bryan O'Donoghue Subject: [RESEND PATCH 6/6] crypto: caam: detect RNG init when TrustZone is active Date: Wed, 24 Jan 2018 14:50:35 +0000 Message-ID: <1516805435-15034-7-git-send-email-pure.logic@nexus-software.ie> References: <1516805435-15034-1-git-send-email-pure.logic@nexus-software.ie> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Cc: fabio.estevam@nxp.com, peng.fan@nxp.com, herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, davem@davemloft.net, lukas.auer@aisec.fraunhofer.de, rui.silva@linaro.org, ryan.harkin@linaro.org, Bryan O'Donoghue To: horia.geanta@nxp.com, aymen.sghaier@nxp.com, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Return-path: In-Reply-To: <1516805435-15034-1-git-send-email-pure.logic@nexus-software.ie> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-Id: linux-crypto.vger.kernel.org When TrustZone is enabled on sec4 compatible silicon the first page of the CAAM is reserved for TrustZone only, this means that access to the deco registers is restricted and will return zero when read. The solution to this problem is to initialize the RNG prior to TrustZone being enabled or to initialize the RNG from a TrustZone context and simultaneously to ensure that the job-ring registers have been assigned to the correct non-TrustZone context. Assigning of the job-ring registers is a task for u-boot or OPTEE/TrustZone as is the initialization of the RNG. This patch adds logic to detect RNG initialization if and only if TrustZone has been detected as active on the CAAM block. If TrustZone is initialized and the RNG looks to be setup - we mark the RNG as good to go and continue to load, else we mark the RNG as bad and bail out. More detail on the original problem and the split fix between u-boot and Linux is available in these two threads Link: https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/issues/1408 Link: https://tinyurl.com/yam5gv9a Link: https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/cover/865042 Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue Cc: "Horia Geantă" Cc: Aymen Sghaier Cc: Fabio Estevam Cc: Peng Fan Cc: Herbert Xu Cc: "David S. Miller" Cc: Lukas Auer --- drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c b/drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c index 7fd3bfc..66a7c7e 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c @@ -711,6 +711,24 @@ static int caam_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) int inst_handles = rd_reg32(&ctrl->r4tst[0].rdsta) & RDSTA_IFMASK; + + /* + * If TrustZone is active then u-boot or the TrustZone + * firmware must have initialized the RNG for us else we + * cannot do so from Linux. + * + * We've previously detected TrustZone so now let's + * detect if the RNG has been initialized. + */ + if (ctrlpriv->trust_zone) { + ret = -ENODEV; + if (ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init || inst_handles) + ret = 0; + dev_info(dev, "TrustZone active RNG looks %s\n", + ret ? "uninitialized" : "initialized"); + break; + } + /* * If either SH were instantiated by somebody else * (e.g. u-boot) then it is assumed that the entropy -- 2.7.4