From: Oliver Neukum Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/4][RFC v2] Introduce the in-kernel hibernation encryption Date: Thu, 26 Jul 2018 09:30:46 +0200 Message-ID: <1532590246.7411.3.camel@suse.com> References: <20180718202235.GA4132@amd> <20180718235851.GA22170@sandybridge-desktop> <20180719110149.GA4679@amd> <20180719132003.GA30981@sandybridge-desktop> <20180720102532.GA20284@amd> <1532346156.3057.11.camel@suse.com> <20180723162302.GA4503@sandybridge-desktop> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Cc: Pavel Machek , "Rafael J . Wysocki" , Eric Biggers , "Lee, Chun-Yi" , Theodore Ts o , Stephan Mueller , Denis Kenzior , linux-pm@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, "Gu, Kookoo" , "Zhang, Rui" To: Yu Chen Return-path: In-Reply-To: <20180723162302.GA4503@sandybridge-desktop> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-Id: linux-crypto.vger.kernel.org On Di, 2018-07-24 at 00:23 +0800, Yu Chen wrote: > > Good point, we once tried to generate key in kernel, but people > suggest to generate key in userspace and provide it to the > kernel, which is what ecryptfs do currently, so it seems this > should also be safe for encryption in kernel. > https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-crypto/msg33145.html > Thus Chun-Yi's signature can use EFI key and both the key from > user space. Hi, ecryptfs can trust user space. It is supposed to keep data safe while the system is inoperative. The whole point of Secure Boot is a cryptographic system of trust that does not include user space. I seriously doubt we want to use trusted computing here. So the key needs to be generated in kernel space and stored in a safe manner. As we have a saolution doing that, can we come to ausable synthesis? Regards Oliver