From: Oliver Neukum Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/4][RFC v2] Introduce the in-kernel hibernation encryption Date: Tue, 07 Aug 2018 12:04:19 +0200 Message-ID: <1533636259.7912.2.camel@suse.com> References: <20180718202235.GA4132@amd> <20180718235851.GA22170@sandybridge-desktop> <20180719110149.GA4679@amd> <20180719132003.GA30981@sandybridge-desktop> <20180720102532.GA20284@amd> <1532346156.3057.11.camel@suse.com> <20180723162302.GA4503@sandybridge-desktop> <1532590246.7411.3.camel@suse.com> <20180806075754.GA12124@chenyu-desktop> <1533550820.15815.14.camel@suse.com> <20180807073840.GA17894@chenyu-desktop> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Cc: Pavel Machek , "Rafael J . Wysocki" , Eric Biggers , "Lee, Chun-Yi" , Theodore Ts o , Stephan Mueller , Denis Kenzior , linux-pm@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, "Gu, Kookoo" , "Zhang, Rui" To: Yu Chen Return-path: In-Reply-To: <20180807073840.GA17894@chenyu-desktop> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-Id: linux-crypto.vger.kernel.org On Di, 2018-08-07 at 15:38 +0800, Yu Chen wrote: > > As STD affects the whole machine it must require root rights. > > So I cannot see how you can talk about a session belonging > > to a user. Please explain. > > > > The case is for physical access, not the 'user' in OS. Well, yes, but Secure Boot does not guard against anybody booting or halting the machine. It limits what you can boot by a chain of trust. I think you are trying to add a feature to Secure Boot. Regards Oliver