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Violators will be prosecuted for from ; Thu, 29 Nov 2018 20:59:32 -0000 Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 04/14] integrity: Introduce struct evm_xattr From: Mimi Zohar To: Thiago Jung Bauermann , linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Dmitry Kasatkin , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , David Howells , David Woodhouse , Jessica Yu , Herbert Xu , "David S. Miller" , Jonathan Corbet , "AKASHI, Takahiro" Date: Thu, 29 Nov 2018 15:59:12 -0500 In-Reply-To: <20181116200712.14154-5-bauerman@linux.ibm.com> References: <20181116200712.14154-1-bauerman@linux.ibm.com> <20181116200712.14154-5-bauerman@linux.ibm.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Message-Id: <1543525152.3902.411.camel@linux.ibm.com> Sender: linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: On Fri, 2018-11-16 at 18:07 -0200, Thiago Jung Bauermann wrote: > Even though struct evm_ima_xattr_data includes a fixed-size array to hold a > SHA1 digest, most of the code ignores the array and uses the struct to mean > "type indicator followed by data of unspecified size" and tracks the real > size of what the struct represents in a separate length variable. > > The only exception to that is the EVM code, which correctly uses the > definition of struct evm_ima_xattr_data. > > So make this explicit in the code by removing the length specification from > the array in struct evm_ima_xattr_data. Also, change the name of the > element from digest to data since in most places the array doesn't hold a > digest. > > A separate struct evm_xattr is introduced, with the original definition of > evm_ima_xattr_data to be used in the places that actually expect that > definition. , specifically the EVM HMAC code. > > Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann Other than commenting the evm_xattr usage is limited to HMAC before the structure definition, this looks good. Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar > --- > security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 8 ++++---- > security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 7 ++++--- > security/integrity/integrity.h | 5 +++++ > 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c > index 7f3f54d89a6e..a1b42d10efc7 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c > +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c > @@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, > /* check value type */ > switch (xattr_data->type) { > case EVM_XATTR_HMAC: > - if (xattr_len != sizeof(struct evm_ima_xattr_data)) { > + if (xattr_len != sizeof(struct evm_xattr)) { > evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; > goto out; > } > @@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, > xattr_value_len, &digest); > if (rc) > break; > - rc = crypto_memneq(xattr_data->digest, digest.digest, > + rc = crypto_memneq(xattr_data->data, digest.digest, > SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); > if (rc) > rc = -EINVAL; > @@ -523,7 +523,7 @@ int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, > const struct xattr *lsm_xattr, > struct xattr *evm_xattr) > { > - struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data; > + struct evm_xattr *xattr_data; > int rc; > > if (!evm_key_loaded() || !evm_protected_xattr(lsm_xattr->name)) > @@ -533,7 +533,7 @@ int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, > if (!xattr_data) > return -ENOMEM; > > - xattr_data->type = EVM_XATTR_HMAC; > + xattr_data->data.type = EVM_XATTR_HMAC; > rc = evm_init_hmac(inode, lsm_xattr, xattr_data->digest); > if (rc < 0) > goto out; > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c > index deec1804a00a..8bcef90939f8 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c > @@ -167,7 +167,8 @@ enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, > return sig->hash_algo; > break; > case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG: > - ret = xattr_value->digest[0]; > + /* first byte contains algorithm id */ > + ret = xattr_value->data[0]; > if (ret < HASH_ALGO__LAST) > return ret; > break; > @@ -175,7 +176,7 @@ enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, > /* this is for backward compatibility */ > if (xattr_len == 21) { > unsigned int zero = 0; > - if (!memcmp(&xattr_value->digest[16], &zero, 4)) > + if (!memcmp(&xattr_value->data[16], &zero, 4)) > return HASH_ALGO_MD5; > else > return HASH_ALGO_SHA1; > @@ -274,7 +275,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, > /* xattr length may be longer. md5 hash in previous > version occupied 20 bytes in xattr, instead of 16 > */ > - rc = memcmp(&xattr_value->digest[hash_start], > + rc = memcmp(&xattr_value->data[hash_start], > iint->ima_hash->digest, > iint->ima_hash->length); > else > diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h > index e60473b13a8d..20ac02bf1b84 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/integrity.h > +++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h > @@ -79,6 +79,11 @@ enum evm_ima_xattr_type { > > struct evm_ima_xattr_data { > u8 type; > + u8 data[]; > +} __packed; > + Please add a comment here saying that evm_xattr is limited to HMAC. > +struct evm_xattr { > + struct evm_ima_xattr_data data; > u8 digest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; > } __packed; >