Return-Path: Received: from orcrist.hmeau.com ([104.223.48.154]:50056 "EHLO deadmen.hmeau.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726416AbeLMIv2 (ORCPT ); Thu, 13 Dec 2018 03:51:28 -0500 Date: Thu, 13 Dec 2018 16:51:02 +0800 From: Herbert Xu To: Louis Collard Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, Matt Mackall , Arnd Bergmann , Greg Kroah-Hartman , Gary R Hook , Michael Buesch , PrasannaKumar Muralidharan , "Michael S . Tsirkin" , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, apronin@chromium.org, jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com, linux@mniewoehner.de, david.bild@xaptum.com, Theodore Ts'o Subject: Re: [RESEND PATCH] Allow hwrng to initialize crng. Message-ID: <20181213085102.aiw64pubxgoohlo3@gondor.apana.org.au> References: <20181213084017.80850-1-louiscollard@chromium.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20181213084017.80850-1-louiscollard@chromium.org> Sender: linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: On Thu, Dec 13, 2018 at 04:40:17PM +0800, Louis Collard wrote: > Some systems, for example embedded systems, do not generate > enough entropy on boot through interrupts, and boot may be blocked for > several minutes waiting for a call to getrandom to complete. > > Currently, random data is read from a hwrng when it is registered, > and is loaded into primary_crng. This data is treated in the same > way as data that is device-specific but otherwise unchanging, and > so primary_crng cannot become initialized with the data from the > hwrng. > > This change causes the data initially read from the hwrng to be > treated the same as subsequent data that is read from the hwrng if > it's quality score is non-zero. > > The implications of this are: > > The data read from hwrng can cause primary_crng to become > initialized, therefore avoiding problems of getrandom blocking > on boot. > > Calls to getrandom (with GRND_RANDOM) may be using entropy > exclusively (or in practise, almost exclusively) from the hwrng. > > Regarding the latter point; this behavior is the same as if a > user specified a quality score of 1 (bit of entropy per 1024 bits) > so hopefully this is not too scary a change to make. > > This change is the result of the discussion here: > https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/10453893/ > > Signed-off-by: Louis Collard > Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen > --- > drivers/char/hw_random/core.c | 9 +++++++-- > 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c b/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c > index 95be7228f327..99c3e4127949 100644 > --- a/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c > +++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c > @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ > #include > #include > #include > +#include > > #define RNG_MODULE_NAME "hw_random" > > @@ -64,13 +65,17 @@ static size_t rng_buffer_size(void) > static void add_early_randomness(struct hwrng *rng) > { > int bytes_read; > - size_t size = min_t(size_t, 16, rng_buffer_size()); > + /* Read enough to initialize crng. */ > + size_t size = 2*CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE; > > mutex_lock(&reading_mutex); > bytes_read = rng_get_data(rng, rng_buffer, size, 1); > mutex_unlock(&reading_mutex); > if (bytes_read > 0) > - add_device_randomness(rng_buffer, bytes_read); > + /* Allow crng to become initialized, but do not add > + * entropy to the pool. > + */ > + add_hwgenerator_randomness(rng_buffer, bytes_read, 0); > } > > static inline void cleanup_rng(struct kref *kref) > -- > 2.13.5 > Adding Ted Ts'o to the cc list. -- Email: Herbert Xu Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/ PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt