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[209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id a13si18447395pfn.70.2019.05.07.06.10.45; Tue, 07 May 2019 06:11:10 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726371AbfEGNKn (ORCPT + 99 others); Tue, 7 May 2019 09:10:43 -0400 Received: from ou.quest-ce.net ([195.154.187.82]:36127 "EHLO ou.quest-ce.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726328AbfEGNKn (ORCPT ); Tue, 7 May 2019 09:10:43 -0400 Received: from [2a01:e35:39f2:1220:2452:dd6c:fe2f:be2c] (helo=opteyam2) by ou.quest-ce.net with esmtpsa (TLS1.1:RSA_AES_256_CBC_SHA1:256) (Exim 4.80) (envelope-from ) id 1hNzri-000CKX-QO; Tue, 07 May 2019 15:10:39 +0200 Message-ID: <74c517ac2c654a7372af731a67e24743c843e157.camel@opteya.com> From: Yann Droneaud To: Stephan =?ISO-8859-1?Q?M=FCller?= Cc: Herbert Xu , linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Date: Tue, 07 May 2019 15:10:38 +0200 In-Reply-To: <1654549.mqJkfNR9fV@positron.chronox.de> References: <1852500.fyBc0DU23F@positron.chronox.de> <1978979.Zxv6YQyJUk@positron.chronox.de> <1654549.mqJkfNR9fV@positron.chronox.de> Organization: OPTEYA Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" User-Agent: Evolution 3.32.1 (3.32.1-1.fc30) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 2a01:e35:39f2:1220:2452:dd6c:fe2f:be2c X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: ydroneaud@opteya.com X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.2 (2011-06-06) on ou.quest-ce.net X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.9 required=5.0 tests=ALL_TRUSTED,BAYES_00, URIBL_BLOCKED autolearn=ham version=3.3.2 Subject: Re: [PATCH v5] crypto: DRBG - add FIPS 140-2 CTRNG for noise source X-SA-Exim-Version: 4.2.1 (built Mon, 26 Dec 2011 16:24:06 +0000) X-SA-Exim-Scanned: Yes (on ou.quest-ce.net) Sender: linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Hi, Le mardi 07 mai 2019 à 11:29 +0200, Stephan Müller a écrit : > FIPS 140-2 section 4.9.2 requires a continuous self test of the noise > source. Up to kernel 4.8 drivers/char/random.c provided this continuous > self test. Afterwards it was moved to a location that is inconsistent > with the FIPS 140-2 requirements. The relevant patch was > e192be9d9a30555aae2ca1dc3aad37cba484cd4a . > Please elaborate: in commit e192be9d9a30 ("random: replace non-blocking pool with a Chacha20-based CRNG") the "self test" code was moved from extract_entropy() to _extract_entropy(), which is used by extract_entropy(). Only crng_initialize() call _extract_entropy() with fips = 0, regarless of fips_enabled. Is this the issue ? Could crng_initialize() pass fips_enabled to _extract_entropy() instead of 0 ? > Thus, the FIPS 140-2 CTRNG is added to the DRBG when it obtains the > seed. This patch resurrects the function drbg_fips_continous_test that > existed some time ago and applies it to the noise sources. The patch > that removed the drbg_fips_continous_test was > b3614763059b82c26bdd02ffcb1c016c1132aad0 . > Thanks for the commit. > The Jitter RNG implements its own FIPS 140-2 self test and thus does not > need to be subjected to the test in the DRBG. > > The patch contains a tiny fix to ensure proper zeroization in case of an > error during the Jitter RNG data gathering. > > Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller > --- > crypto/drbg.c | 84 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- > include/crypto/drbg.h | 2 ++ > 2 files changed, 83 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/crypto/drbg.c b/crypto/drbg.c > index 2a5b16bb000c..8328d7d9b42e 100644 > --- a/crypto/drbg.c > +++ b/crypto/drbg.c > @@ -219,6 +219,57 @@ static inline unsigned short drbg_sec_strength(drbg_flag_t flags) > } > } > > +/* > + * FIPS 140-2 continuous self test for the noise source > + * The test is performed on the noise source input data. Thus, the function > + * implicitly knows the size of the buffer to be equal to the security > + * strength. > + * > + * Note, this function disregards the nonce trailing the entropy data during > + * initial seeding. > + * > + * drbg->drbg_mutex must have been taken. > + * > + * @drbg DRBG handle > + * @entropy buffer of seed data to be checked > + * > + * return: > + * 0 on success > + * -EAGAIN on when the CTRNG is not yet primed > + * < 0 on error > + */ > +static int drbg_fips_continuous_test(struct drbg_state *drbg, > + const unsigned char *entropy) > +{ > + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS)) { if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS)) return 0; > + unsigned short entropylen = drbg_sec_strength(drbg->core->flags); > + int ret = 0; > + > + /* skip test if we test the overall system */ > + if (list_empty(&drbg->test_data.list)) > + return 0; > + /* only perform test in FIPS mode */ > + if (!fips_enabled) > + return 0; > + > + if (!drbg->fips_primed) { > + /* Priming of FIPS test */ > + memcpy(drbg->prev, entropy, entropylen); > + drbg->fips_primed = true; > + /* priming: another round is needed */ > + return -EAGAIN; > + } > + ret = memcmp(drbg->prev, entropy, entropylen); > + if (!ret) > + panic("DRBG continuous self test failed\n"); Previous version from commit b3614763059b ("crypto: drbg - remove FIPS 140-2 continuous test") already has it, and so does the "self test" in drivers/char/random.c, but do we really want to panic() in the unlikely, but still possible, event of a duplicated output from the PRNG ? The longer the system is up, the likelier this can happen ... if one can wait for the end of the universe :) > + memcpy(drbg->prev, entropy, entropylen); > + /* the test shall pass when the two values are not equal */ > + return (ret != 0) ? 0 : -EFAULT; Here, it's not possible to have ret == 0, since that would panic(), so -EFAULT cannot be returned. > + } else { > + return 0; > + } > +} > + > /* > * Convert an integer into a byte representation of this integer. > * The byte representation is big-endian > @@ -1006,16 +1057,23 @@ static void drbg_async_seed(struct work_struct *work) > seed_work); > unsigned int entropylen = drbg_sec_strength(drbg->core->flags); > unsigned char entropy[32]; > + int ret; > > BUG_ON(!entropylen); > BUG_ON(entropylen > sizeof(entropy)); > - get_random_bytes(entropy, entropylen); > > drbg_string_fill(&data, entropy, entropylen); > list_add_tail(&data.list, &seedlist); > > mutex_lock(&drbg->drbg_mutex); > > + do { > + get_random_bytes(entropy, entropylen); > + ret = drbg_fips_continuous_test(drbg, entropy); > + if (ret && ret != -EAGAIN) > + goto unlock; > + } while (ret); > + A function doing get_random_bytes() and continous_test() would be useful to both sync and async seed function. > /* If nonblocking pool is initialized, deactivate Jitter RNG */ > crypto_free_rng(drbg->jent); > drbg->jent = NULL; > @@ -1030,6 +1088,7 @@ static void drbg_async_seed(struct work_struct *work) > if (drbg->seeded) > drbg->reseed_threshold = drbg_max_requests(drbg); > > +unlock: > mutex_unlock(&drbg->drbg_mutex); > > memzero_explicit(entropy, entropylen); > @@ -1081,7 +1140,12 @@ static int drbg_seed(struct drbg_state *drbg, struct drbg_string *pers, > BUG_ON((entropylen * 2) > sizeof(entropy)); > > /* Get seed from in-kernel /dev/urandom */ > - get_random_bytes(entropy, entropylen); > + do { > + get_random_bytes(entropy, entropylen); > + ret = drbg_fips_continuous_test(drbg, entropy); > + if (ret && ret != -EAGAIN) > + goto out; > + } while (ret); > > if (!drbg->jent) { > drbg_string_fill(&data1, entropy, entropylen); > @@ -1094,7 +1158,7 @@ static int drbg_seed(struct drbg_state *drbg, struct drbg_string *pers, > entropylen); > if (ret) { > pr_devel("DRBG: jent failed with %d\n", ret); > - return ret; > + goto out; > } > > drbg_string_fill(&data1, entropy, entropylen * 2); > @@ -1121,6 +1185,7 @@ static int drbg_seed(struct drbg_state *drbg, struct drbg_string *pers, > > ret = __drbg_seed(drbg, &seedlist, reseed); > > +out: > memzero_explicit(entropy, entropylen * 2); > > return ret; > @@ -1142,6 +1207,11 @@ static inline void drbg_dealloc_state(struct drbg_state *drbg) > drbg->reseed_ctr = 0; > drbg->d_ops = NULL; > drbg->core = NULL; > + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS)) { > + kzfree(drbg->prev); > + drbg->prev = NULL; > + drbg->fips_primed = false; > + } > } > > /* > @@ -1211,6 +1281,14 @@ static inline int drbg_alloc_state(struct drbg_state *drbg) > drbg->scratchpad = PTR_ALIGN(drbg->scratchpadbuf, ret + 1); > } > > + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS)) { > + drbg->prev = kzalloc(drbg_sec_strength(drbg->core->flags), > + GFP_KERNEL); > + if (!drbg->prev) > + goto fini; > + drbg->fips_primed = false; > + } > + > return 0; > > fini: > diff --git a/include/crypto/drbg.h b/include/crypto/drbg.h > index 3fb581bf3b87..8c9af21efce1 100644 > --- a/include/crypto/drbg.h > +++ b/include/crypto/drbg.h > @@ -129,6 +129,8 @@ struct drbg_state { > > bool seeded; /* DRBG fully seeded? */ > bool pr; /* Prediction resistance enabled? */ > + bool fips_primed; /* Continuous test primed? */ > + unsigned char *prev; /* FIPS 140-2 continuous test value */ > struct work_struct seed_work; /* asynchronous seeding support */ > struct crypto_rng *jent; > const struct drbg_state_ops *d_ops; Regards. -- Yann Droneaud OPTEYA