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 <20190618093207.13436-2-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> <CANn89iJuTq36KMf1madQH08g6K0a-Uj-PDH80ao9zuEw+WNcZg@mail.gmail.com>
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From:   Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Date:   Tue, 18 Jun 2019 11:41:35 +0200
Message-ID: <CAKv+Gu894bEEzpKNDTaNiiNJTFoUTYQuFjBBm-ezdkrzW5fyNQ@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] net: fastopen: make key handling more robust against
 future changes
To:     Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc:     netdev <netdev@vger.kernel.org>,
        Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>,
        "open list:HARDWARE RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR CORE" 
        <linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>,
        Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
        David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>,
        Alexey Kuznetsov <kuznet@ms2.inr.ac.ru>,
        Hideaki YOSHIFUJI <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>,
        Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com>,
        Christoph Paasch <cpaasch@apple.com>,
        David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>,
        Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
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On Tue, 18 Jun 2019 at 11:39, Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> wrote:
>
> On Tue, Jun 18, 2019 at 2:32 AM Ard Biesheuvel
> <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> wrote:
> >
> > Some changes to the TCP fastopen code to make it more robust
> > against future changes in the choice of key/cookie size, etc.
> >
> > - Instead of keeping the SipHash key in an untyped u8[] buffer
> >   and casting it to the right type upon use, use the correct
> >   siphash_key_t type directly. This ensures that the key will
> >   appear at the correct alignment if we ever change the way
> >   these data structures are allocated. (Currently, they are
> >   only allocated via kmalloc so they always appear at the
> >   correct alignment)
> >
> > - Use DIV_ROUND_UP when sizing the u64[] array to hold the
> >   cookie, so it is always of sufficient size, even when
> >   TCP_FASTOPEN_COOKIE_MAX is no longer a multiple of 8.
> >
> > - Add a key length check to tcp_fastopen_reset_cipher(). No
> >   callers exist currently that fail this check (they all pass
> >   compile constant values that equal TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY_LENGTH),
> >   but future changes might create problems, e.g., by leaving part
> >   of the key uninitialized, or overflowing the key buffers.
> >
> > Note that none of these are functional changes wrt the current
> > state of the code.
> >
> ...
>
> > -       memcpy(ctx->key[0], primary_key, len);
> > +       if (unlikely(len != TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY_LENGTH)) {
> > +               pr_err("TCP: TFO key length %u invalid\n", len);
> > +               err = -EINVAL;
> > +               goto out;
> > +       }
>
>
> Why a pr_err() is there ?
>
> Can unpriv users flood the syslog ?

They can if they could do so before: there was a call to
crypto_cipher_setkey() in the original pre-SipHash code which would
also result in a pr_err() on an invalid key length. That call got
removed along with the AES cipher handling, and this basically
reinstates it, as suggested by EricB.