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From:   Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Date:   Thu, 25 Jul 2019 09:22:24 +0300
Message-ID: <CAKv+Gu-8n_DoauycDQS_9zzRew1rTuPaLxHyg6xhXMmqEvMaCA@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [dm-devel] xts fuzz testing and lack of ciphertext stealing support
To:     Pascal Van Leeuwen <pvanleeuwen@verimatrix.com>
Cc:     Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>,
        Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
        "dm-devel@redhat.com" <dm-devel@redhat.com>,
        "linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org" <linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>,
        Horia Geanta <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
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On Wed, 24 Jul 2019 at 19:10, Pascal Van Leeuwen
<pvanleeuwen@verimatrix.com> wrote:
>
> Ard,
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
> > Sent: Monday, July 22, 2019 6:43 PM
> > To: Pascal Van Leeuwen <pvanleeuwen@verimatrix.com>
> > Cc: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>; Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>; dm-devel@redhat.com; linux-
> > crypto@vger.kernel.org; Horia Geanta <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
> > Subject: Re: [dm-devel] xts fuzz testing and lack of ciphertext stealing support
> >
> > On Mon, 22 Jul 2019 at 12:44, Pascal Van Leeuwen
> > <pvanleeuwen@verimatrix.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > > -----Original Message-----
> > > > From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
> > > > Sent: Sunday, July 21, 2019 11:50 AM
> > > > To: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>
> > > > Cc: Pascal Van Leeuwen <pvanleeuwen@verimatrix.com>; Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>; dm-devel@redhat.com; linux-
> > > > crypto@vger.kernel.org; Horia Geanta <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
> > > > Subject: Re: [dm-devel] xts fuzz testing and lack of ciphertext stealing support
> > > >
> > > > On Sat, 20 Jul 2019 at 10:35, Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com> wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > On 20/07/2019 08:58, Eric Biggers wrote:
> > > > > > On Thu, Jul 18, 2019 at 01:19:41PM +0200, Milan Broz wrote:
> > > > > >> Also, I would like to avoid another "just because it is nicer" module dependence (XTS->XEX->ECB).
> > > > > >> Last time (when XTS was reimplemented using ECB) we have many reports with initramfs
> > > > > >> missing ECB module preventing boot from AES-XTS encrypted root after kernel upgrade...
> > > > > >> Just saying. (Despite the last time it was keyring what broke encrypted boot ;-)
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Can't the "missing modules in initramfs" issue be solved by using a
> > > > > > MODULE_SOFTDEP()?  Actually, why isn't that being used for xts -> ecb already?
> > > > > >
> > > > > > (There was also a bug where CONFIG_CRYPTO_XTS didn't select CONFIG_CRYPTO_ECB,
> > > > > > but that was simply a bug, which was fixed.)
> > > > >
> > > > > Sure, and it is solved now. (Some systems with a hardcoded list of modules
> > > > > have to be manually updated etc., but that is just bad design).
> > > > > It can be done properly from the beginning.
> > > > >
> > > > > I just want to say that that switching to XEX looks like wasting time to me
> > > > > for no additional benefit.
> > > > >
> > > > > Fully implementing XTS does make much more sense for me, even though it is long-term
> > > > > the effort and the only user, for now, would be testmgr.
> > > > >
> > > > > So, there are no users because it does not work. It makes no sense
> > > > > to implement it, because there are no users... (sorry, sounds like catch 22 :)
> > > > >
> > > > > (Maybe someone can use it for keyslot encryption for keys not aligned to
> > > > > block size, dunno. Actually, some filesystem encryption could have use for it.)
> > > > >
> > > > > > Or "xts" and "xex" could go in the same kernel module xts.ko, which would make
> > > > > > this a non-issue.
> > > > >
> > > > > If it is not available for users, I really see no reason to introduce XEX when
> > > > > it is just XTS with full blocks.
> > > > >
> > > > > If it is visible to users, it needs some work in userspace - XEX (as XTS) need two keys,
> > > > > people are already confused enough that 256bit key in AES-XTS means AES-128...
> > > > > So the examples, hints, man pages need to be updated, at least.
> > > > >
> > > >
> > > > OK, consider me persuaded. We are already exposing xts(...) to
> > > > userland, and since we already implement a proper subset of true XTS,
> > > > it will be simply a matter of making sure that the existing XTS
> > > > implementations don't regress in performance on the non-CTS code
> > > > paths.
> > > >
> > > > It would be useful, though, to have some generic helper functions,
> > > > e.g., like the one we have for CBC, or the one I recently proposed for
> > > > CTS, so that existing implementations (such as the bit sliced AES) can
> > > > easily be augmented with a CTS code path (but performance may not be
> > > > optimal in those cases). For the ARM implementations based on AES
> > > > instructions, it should be reasonably straight forward to implement it
> > > > close to optimally by reusing some of the code I added for CBC-CTS
> > > > (but I won't get around to doing that for a while). If there are any
> > > > volunteers for looking into the generic or x86/AES-NI implementations,
> > > > please come forward :-) Also, if any of the publications that were
> > > > quoted in this thread have suitable test vectors, that would be good
> > > > to know.
> > >
> > > Unfortunately, these algorithm & protocol specifications tend to be very frugal when it
> > > comes to providing test vectors, barely scratching the surface of any corner cases, but
> > > at least there is one non-multiple-of-16 vector in the original IEEE P1619 / D16
> > > specification in Annex B Test Vectors (last vector, "XTS-AES-128 applied for a data unit
> > > that is not a multiple of 16 bytes")
> > >
> >
> > Actually, that spec has a couple of test vectors. Unfortunately, they
> > are all rather short (except the last one in the 'no multiple of 16
> > bytes' paragraph, but unfortunately, that one is in fact a multiple of
> > 16 bytes)
> >
> > I added them here [0] along with an arm64 implementation for the AES
> > instruction based driver. Could you please double check that these
> > work against your driver?
> >
> I got XTS working with the inside-secure driver and these (and all other) vectors pass :-)
>

Excellent, thanks for the report. May I add your Tested-by when I post
the patch? (just the one that adds the test vectors)

> > That would establish a ground truth against
> > which we can implement the generic version as well.
> >
> > [0] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ardb/linux.git/log/?h=xts-cts
> >
> > > Besides that, I'd be happy to generate some testvectors from our defacto-standard
> > > implementation ;-)
> > >
> >
> > One or two larger ones would be useful, yes.
> >
> I'll see if I can extract some suitable vectors from our verification suite ...
>

Great. Once available, I'll run them against my implementations and report back.