Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67;
MIME-Version: 1.0
References: <20190805162521.90882-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> <20190805162521.90882-13-ebiggers@kernel.org>
In-Reply-To: <20190805162521.90882-13-ebiggers@kernel.org>
From:   Paul Crowley <paulcrowley@google.com>
Date:   Tue, 6 Aug 2019 13:43:27 -0700
Message-ID: <CA+_SqcBkR_8Z9EUTpK-dEW4PN+9P5OgJnqYDHtOhG+P1LjotPA@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 12/20] fscrypt: add an HKDF-SHA512 implementation
To:     Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc:     linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net,
        linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com>,
        "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>, Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"
Sender: linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org
Precedence: bulk

On Mon, 5 Aug 2019 at 09:28, Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> wrote:
>
> From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
>
> Add an implementation of HKDF (RFC 5869) to fscrypt, for the purpose of
> deriving additional key material from the fscrypt master keys for v2
> encryption policies.  HKDF is a key derivation function built on top of
> HMAC.  We choose SHA-512 for the underlying unkeyed hash, and use an
> "hmac(sha512)" transform allocated from the crypto API.
>
> We'll be using this to replace the AES-ECB based KDF currently used to
> derive the per-file encryption keys.  While the AES-ECB based KDF is
> believed to meet the original security requirements, it is nonstandard
> and has problems that don't exist in modern KDFs such as HKDF:
>
> 1. It's reversible.  Given a derived key and nonce, an attacker can
>    easily compute the master key.  This is okay if the master key and
>    derived keys are equally hard to compromise, but now we'd like to be
>    more robust against threats such as a derived key being compromised
>    through a timing attack, or a derived key for an in-use file being
>    compromised after the master key has already been removed.
>
> 2. It doesn't evenly distribute the entropy from the master key; each 16
>    input bytes only affects the corresponding 16 output bytes.
>
> 3. It isn't easily extensible to deriving other values or keys, such as
>    a public hash for securely identifying the key, or per-mode keys.
>    Per-mode keys will be immediately useful for Adiantum encryption, for
>    which fscrypt currently uses the master key directly, introducing
>    unnecessary usage constraints.  Per-mode keys will also be useful for
>    hardware inline encryption, which is currently being worked on.
>
> HKDF solves all the above problems.
>
> Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>

Looks good, feel free to add:

Reviewed-by: Paul Crowley <paulcrowley@google.com>