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Miller" , "open list:ASYMMETRIC KEYS" , "open list:CRYPTO API" , open list Subject: Re: [PATCH] KEYS: asym_tpm: Switch to get_random_bytes() Message-ID: <20191003114119.GF8933@linux.intel.com> References: <20190926171601.30404-1-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> <1570024819.4999.119.camel@linux.ibm.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit In-Reply-To: <1570024819.4999.119.camel@linux.ibm.com> Organization: Intel Finland Oy - BIC 0357606-4 - Westendinkatu 7, 02160 Espoo User-Agent: Mutt/1.10.1 (2018-07-13) Sender: linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org On Wed, Oct 02, 2019 at 10:00:19AM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote: > On Thu, 2019-09-26 at 20:16 +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > > Only the kernel random pool should be used for generating random numbers. > > TPM contributes to that pool among the other sources of entropy. In here it > > is not, agreed, absolutely critical because TPM is what is trusted anyway > > but in order to remove tpm_get_random() we need to first remove all the > > call sites. > > At what point during boot is the kernel random pool available? ?Does > this imply that you're planning on changing trusted keys as well? Well trusted keys *must* be changed to use it. It is not a choice because using a proprietary random number generator instead of defacto one in the kernel can be categorized as a *regression*. Also, TEE trusted keys cannot use the TPM option. If it was not initialized early enough we would need fix that too. I don't think there should be a problem anyway since encrypted keys is already using get_random_bytes(). /Jarkko