Received: by 2002:a5b:505:0:0:0:0:0 with SMTP id o5csp180143ybp; Thu, 3 Oct 2019 11:57:27 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqzR13nZy0tHGmcvtR2yQ9ryc2H4gbIYp2cMT8LtYqmmazax6UFOUUJOCbiyxZK3rjTm6iyZ X-Received: by 2002:a17:906:4d93:: with SMTP id s19mr8825252eju.281.1570129047652; Thu, 03 Oct 2019 11:57:27 -0700 (PDT) ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1570129047; cv=none; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; b=Ubuh5j2TnLoZ8HlJsIvU90dc5Mz8vOlgQLw7jIzONln43YgV0XPPHyEU8P7LaQoSJC yAXcnJU5Q9koIBZMJ2YEwT6HqtrZCjpeo/RU6SPioNtLSRGHfFcGrfWFU9VAX14ngZyE RIfcmPsYb24la41FZgnAdrHILKh9oKNdkvlWLxjLLSF+a63Dp7OIVExgoVHYbqlyD9vO doYBiqAY1bQklR1iTfF+Q13vqi0jBUTVMjZnviqZFnukQpPOdd2Ts2EKJ6e/M8JJoac8 8C3FTaoeCRGMVZM9ML0Ducg7v+S9ixu1AAPd9FSaHCVAuwrBWShENvNU3MY1BYgDni4k alTA== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; h=list-id:precedence:sender:user-agent:organization:in-reply-to :content-transfer-encoding:content-disposition:mime-version :references:message-id:subject:cc:to:from:date; bh=B6wYmcQDhpnn3vODRbnMx7J7TpUcwZrzknaA3SPW24M=; b=a9OnypjkuvGwqgiUgWDasvSWQ8RaW81J8ePJV/eovOeud5HLOEzuqGKScvwZoE7Mgd 9UG2aUH0Zp0zW3Hd5mo7Z4C4iB01BxzecK6V9XG7SHKXHI4V2pFaJ4VxRBqf38hZbdjc i0twA01gFB8y27WFLnY9/roB6wawund3+qQqsS+W6fd7fRwMKS5btcIPzHlE/CIzN+KS KwaT5xWynCjeY7mLZvqfAlakB9tkNtBvjN4gQBXGCM/Q+XV3AUB15AKfc1ccsDW2loN0 f53GdQJBdRmweghIj8GGJXN4NVYPDXY3N/1LvcM7XlH2tKAfnfeQuuHhe3Le/mphT5jn B65A== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=intel.com Return-Path: Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org. [209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id e46si2121131eda.401.2019.10.03.11.56.53; Thu, 03 Oct 2019 11:57:27 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=intel.com Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1730637AbfJCSCI (ORCPT + 99 others); Thu, 3 Oct 2019 14:02:08 -0400 Received: from mga09.intel.com ([134.134.136.24]:26933 "EHLO mga09.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1730386AbfJCSCI (ORCPT ); Thu, 3 Oct 2019 14:02:08 -0400 X-Amp-Result: UNKNOWN X-Amp-Original-Verdict: FILE UNKNOWN X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from fmsmga008.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.58]) by orsmga102.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 03 Oct 2019 11:02:06 -0700 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.67,253,1566889200"; d="scan'208";a="191340299" Received: from jvalevi1-mobl1.ger.corp.intel.com (HELO localhost) ([10.251.93.117]) by fmsmga008.fm.intel.com with ESMTP; 03 Oct 2019 11:02:02 -0700 Date: Thu, 3 Oct 2019 21:02:01 +0300 From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: Mimi Zohar Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org, David Howells , Herbert Xu , "David S. Miller" , "open list:ASYMMETRIC KEYS" , "open list:CRYPTO API" , open list Subject: Re: [PATCH] KEYS: asym_tpm: Switch to get_random_bytes() Message-ID: <20191003180201.GC19679@linux.intel.com> References: <20190926171601.30404-1-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> <1570024819.4999.119.camel@linux.ibm.com> <20191003114119.GF8933@linux.intel.com> <1570107752.4421.183.camel@linux.ibm.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit In-Reply-To: <1570107752.4421.183.camel@linux.ibm.com> Organization: Intel Finland Oy - BIC 0357606-4 - Westendinkatu 7, 02160 Espoo User-Agent: Mutt/1.10.1 (2018-07-13) Sender: linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org On Thu, Oct 03, 2019 at 09:02:32AM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote: > That isn't a valid justification for changing the original definition > of trusted keys. ?Just as the kernel supports different methods of > implementing the same function on different architectures, trusted > keys will need to support different methods of generating a random > number. ?? This is completely incorrect deduction. The random number generator inside the kernel is there to gather entropy from different sources. You would exploit trusted keys to potential weaknesses of a single entropy source by doing that. Of course in TEE platform, TEE can be one of the entropy sources but there is no reason to weaken the security by using it as the only sources. /Jarkko