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Date:   Fri, 14 Feb 2020 14:50:04 +0800
From:   Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
To:     "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc:     linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, Jason@zx2c4.com, ardb@kernel.org,
        stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH stable] crypto: chacha20poly1305 - prevent integer
 overflow on large input
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Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> wrote:
> This code assigns src_len (size_t) to sl (int), which causes problems
> when src_len is very large. Probably nobody in the kernel should be
> passing this much data to chacha20poly1305 all in one go anyway, so I
> don't think we need to change the algorithm or introduce larger types
> or anything. But we should at least error out early in this case and
> print a warning so that we get reports if this does happen and can look
> into why anybody is possibly passing it that much data or if they're
> accidently passing -1 or similar.
> 
> Fixes: d95312a3ccc0 ("crypto: lib/chacha20poly1305 - reimplement crypt_from_sg() routine")
> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.5+
> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
> ---
> lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c | 3 +++
> 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

Patch applied.  Thanks.
-- 
Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
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