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[209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id x26si933902otk.325.2020.02.20.21.17.22; Thu, 20 Feb 2020 21:17:44 -0800 (PST) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1725973AbgBUFRO (ORCPT + 99 others); Fri, 21 Feb 2020 00:17:14 -0500 Received: from stargate.chelsio.com ([12.32.117.8]:5324 "EHLO stargate.chelsio.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725800AbgBUFRO (ORCPT ); Fri, 21 Feb 2020 00:17:14 -0500 Received: from [10.193.191.44] (ayushsawal.asicdesigners.com [10.193.191.44]) by stargate.chelsio.com (8.13.8/8.13.8) with ESMTP id 01L5H3OK009192; Thu, 20 Feb 2020 21:17:04 -0800 Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, vinay.yadav@chelsio.com Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH] almost certain bug in drivers/crypto/chelsio/chcr_algo.c:create_authenc_wr() To: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, Herbert Xu References: <20200215061416.GZ23230@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> From: Ayush Sawal Message-ID: Date: Fri, 21 Feb 2020 10:47:01 +0530 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:68.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/68.5.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Content-Language: en-US Sender: linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org On 2/15/2020 11:45 AM, Al Viro wrote: > >         kctx_len = (ntohl(KEY_CONTEXT_CTX_LEN_V(aeadctx->key_ctx_hdr)) > << 4) >                 - sizeof(chcr_req->key_ctx); > can't possibly be endian-safe.  Look: ->key_ctx_hdr is __be32.  And > KEY_CONTEXT_CTX_LEN_V is "shift up by 24 bits".  On little-endian hosts it > sees >         b0 b1 b2 b3 > in memory, inteprets that into b0 + (b1 << 8) + (b2 << 16) + (b3 << 24), > shifts up by 24, resulting in b0 << 24, does ntohl (byteswap on l-e), > gets b0 and shifts that up by 4.  So we get b0 * 16 - sizeof(...). > > Sounds reasonable, but on b-e we get > b3 + (b2 << 8) + (b1 << 16) + (b0 << 24), shift up by 24, > yielding b3 << 24, do ntohl (no-op on b-e) and then shift up by 4. > Resulting in b3 << 28 - sizeof(...), i.e. slightly under b3 * 256M. > > Then we increase it some more and pass to alloc_skb() as size. > Somehow I doubt that we really want a quarter-gigabyte skb allocation > here... > > Note that when you are building those values in > #define  FILL_KEY_CTX_HDR(ck_size, mk_size, d_ck, opad, ctx_len) \ >                 htonl(KEY_CONTEXT_VALID_V(1) | \ >                       KEY_CONTEXT_CK_SIZE_V((ck_size)) | \ >                       KEY_CONTEXT_MK_SIZE_V(mk_size) | \ >                       KEY_CONTEXT_DUAL_CK_V((d_ck)) | \ >                       KEY_CONTEXT_OPAD_PRESENT_V((opad)) | \ >                       KEY_CONTEXT_SALT_PRESENT_V(1) | \ >                       KEY_CONTEXT_CTX_LEN_V((ctx_len))) > ctx_len ends up in the first octet (i.e. b0 in the above), which > matches the current behaviour on l-e.  If that's the intent, this > thing should've been >         kctx_len = (KEY_CONTEXT_CTX_LEN_G(ntohl(aeadctx->key_ctx_hdr)) > << 4) >                 - sizeof(chcr_req->key_ctx); > instead - fetch after ntohl() we get (b0 << 24) + (b1 << 16) + (b2 << > 8) + b3, > shift it down by 24 (b0), resuling in b0 * 16 - sizeof(...) both on > l-e and > on b-e. > > PS: when sparse warns you about endianness problems, it might be worth > checking > if there really is something wrong.  And I don't mean "slap __force > cast on it"... > > Signed-off-by: Al Viro > > --- > diff -urN a/drivers/crypto/chelsio/chcr_algo.c > b/drivers/crypto/chelsio/chcr_algo.c > --- a/drivers/crypto/chelsio/chcr_algo.c > +++ b/drivers/crypto/chelsio/chcr_algo.c > @@ -2351,7 +2351,7 @@ static struct sk_buff *create_authenc_wr(struct > aead_request *req, >         snents = sg_nents_xlen(req->src, req->assoclen + req->cryptlen, >                                CHCR_SRC_SG_SIZE, 0); >         dst_size = get_space_for_phys_dsgl(dnents); > -       kctx_len = (ntohl(KEY_CONTEXT_CTX_LEN_V(aeadctx->key_ctx_hdr)) > << 4) > +       kctx_len = (KEY_CONTEXT_CTX_LEN_G(ntohl(aeadctx->key_ctx_hdr)) > << 4) >                 - sizeof(chcr_req->key_ctx); >         transhdr_len = CIPHER_TRANSHDR_SIZE(kctx_len, dst_size); >         reqctx->imm = (transhdr_len + req->assoclen + req->cryptlen) < This was a genuine bug, thanks a lot for pointing it out and providing the fix.We are checking other sparse warns in our files, and soon we will fix the warnings. Thanks, Ayush