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[209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id n1si1215368otf.102.2020.02.25.07.16.01; Tue, 25 Feb 2020 07:16:20 -0800 (PST) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1730876AbgBYPOc (ORCPT + 99 others); Tue, 25 Feb 2020 10:14:32 -0500 Received: from lhrrgout.huawei.com ([185.176.76.210]:2462 "EHLO huawei.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-FAIL) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1730753AbgBYPOc (ORCPT ); Tue, 25 Feb 2020 10:14:32 -0500 Received: from lhreml705-cah.china.huawei.com (unknown [172.18.7.108]) by Forcepoint Email with ESMTP id 266F95FB310989DA608E; Tue, 25 Feb 2020 15:14:30 +0000 (GMT) Received: from lhreml710-chm.china.huawei.com (10.201.108.61) by lhreml705-cah.china.huawei.com (10.201.108.46) with Microsoft SMTP Server (TLS) id 14.3.408.0; Tue, 25 Feb 2020 15:14:29 +0000 Received: from localhost (10.202.226.57) by lhreml710-chm.china.huawei.com (10.201.108.61) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) id 15.1.1713.5; Tue, 25 Feb 2020 15:14:28 +0000 Date: Tue, 25 Feb 2020 15:14:26 +0000 From: Jonathan Cameron To: Xu Zaibo CC: , , , , , , , , , Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/4] crypto: hisilicon/sec2 - Add pbuffer mode for SEC driver Message-ID: <20200225151426.000009f5@Huawei.com> In-Reply-To: <80ab5da7-eceb-920e-dc36-1d411ad57a09@huawei.com> References: <1582189495-38051-1-git-send-email-xuzaibo@huawei.com> <1582189495-38051-5-git-send-email-xuzaibo@huawei.com> <20200224140154.00005967@Huawei.com> <80ab5da7-eceb-920e-dc36-1d411ad57a09@huawei.com> Organization: Huawei Technologies Research and Development (UK) Ltd. X-Mailer: Claws Mail 3.17.4 (GTK+ 2.24.32; i686-w64-mingw32) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Originating-IP: [10.202.226.57] X-ClientProxiedBy: lhreml729-chm.china.huawei.com (10.201.108.80) To lhreml710-chm.china.huawei.com (10.201.108.61) X-CFilter-Loop: Reflected Sender: linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org On Tue, 25 Feb 2020 11:16:52 +0800 Xu Zaibo wrote: > Hi, > > > On 2020/2/24 22:01, Jonathan Cameron wrote: > > On Thu, 20 Feb 2020 17:04:55 +0800 > > Zaibo Xu wrote: > > > >> From: liulongfang > >> > >> In the scenario of SMMU translation, the SEC performance of short messages > >> (<512Bytes) cannot meet our expectations. To avoid this, we reserve the > >> plat buffer (PBUF) memory for small packets when creating TFM. > >> > >> Signed-off-by: liulongfang > >> Signed-off-by: Zaibo Xu > > Hi liulongfang, > > > > This patch might have been easier to review done in two parts. > > First part would do the refactor to place c_ivin etc in the sec_alg_res. > > That should be really simple to review. Second part then adds the > > pbuf alternative to existing code. > Okay, we will split it. > > I'm not sure putting the boolean saying if we are using pbuf or not in > > the context makes sense. Seems liable to introduce race conditions. > > Should that not be tied to the request? > I think it makes no sense, we will update here. > > > > Thanks, > > > > Jonathan > > > >> --- > >> drivers/crypto/hisilicon/sec2/sec.h | 6 + > >> drivers/crypto/hisilicon/sec2/sec_crypto.c | 244 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----- > >> 2 files changed, 213 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-) > >> > >> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/hisilicon/sec2/sec.h b/drivers/crypto/hisilicon/sec2/sec.h > >> index eab0d22..8e2e34b 100644 > >> --- a/drivers/crypto/hisilicon/sec2/sec.h > >> +++ b/drivers/crypto/hisilicon/sec2/sec.h > >> @@ -11,6 +11,8 @@ > >> > >> /* Algorithm resource per hardware SEC queue */ > >> struct sec_alg_res { > >> + u8 *pbuf; > >> + dma_addr_t pbuf_dma; > >> u8 *c_ivin; > >> dma_addr_t c_ivin_dma; > >> u8 *out_mac; > >> @@ -23,6 +25,8 @@ struct sec_cipher_req { > >> dma_addr_t c_in_dma; > >> struct hisi_acc_hw_sgl *c_out; > >> dma_addr_t c_out_dma; > >> + u8 *c_ivin; > >> + dma_addr_t c_ivin_dma; > >> struct skcipher_request *sk_req; > >> u32 c_len; > >> bool encrypt; > >> @@ -128,6 +132,8 @@ struct sec_ctx { > >> atomic_t dec_qcyclic; > >> > >> enum sec_alg_type alg_type; > >> + bool pbuf_supported; > >> + bool use_pbuf; > >> struct sec_cipher_ctx c_ctx; > >> struct sec_auth_ctx a_ctx; > >> }; > >> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/hisilicon/sec2/sec_crypto.c b/drivers/crypto/hisilicon/sec2/sec_crypto.c > >> index a2cfcc9..022d4bf6 100644 > >> --- a/drivers/crypto/hisilicon/sec2/sec_crypto.c > >> +++ b/drivers/crypto/hisilicon/sec2/sec_crypto.c > >> @@ -46,7 +46,21 @@ > >> #define SEC_CIPHER_AUTH 0xfe > >> #define SEC_AUTH_CIPHER 0x1 > >> #define SEC_MAX_MAC_LEN 64 > >> +#define SEC_MAX_AAD_LEN 65535 > >> #define SEC_TOTAL_MAC_SZ (SEC_MAX_MAC_LEN * QM_Q_DEPTH) > >> + > >> +#define SEC_PBUF_SZ 512 > >> +#define SEC_PBUF_IV_OFFSET SEC_PBUF_SZ > >> +#define SEC_PBUF_MAC_OFFSET (SEC_PBUF_SZ + SEC_IV_SIZE) > >> +#define SEC_PBUF_PKG (SEC_PBUF_SZ + SEC_IV_SIZE + \ > >> + SEC_MAX_MAC_LEN * 2) > > 512 + 24 + 128 > > > > So we get 6 per 4kiB page? > Yes, we tried to hold 6 per 4 KB page. > > > >> +#define SEC_PBUF_NUM (PAGE_SIZE / SEC_PBUF_PKG) > >> +#define SEC_PBUF_PAGE_NUM (QM_Q_DEPTH / SEC_PBUF_NUM) > >> +#define SEC_PBUF_LEFT_SZ (SEC_PBUF_PKG * (QM_Q_DEPTH - \ > >> + SEC_PBUF_PAGE_NUM * SEC_PBUF_NUM)) > >> +#define SEC_TOTAL_PBUF_SZ (PAGE_SIZE * SEC_PBUF_PAGE_NUM + \ > >> + SEC_PBUF_LEFT_SZ) > >> + > >> #define SEC_SQE_LEN_RATE 4 > >> #define SEC_SQE_CFLAG 2 > >> #define SEC_SQE_AEAD_FLAG 3 > >> @@ -110,12 +124,12 @@ static void sec_free_req_id(struct sec_req *req) > >> mutex_unlock(&qp_ctx->req_lock); > >> } > >> > >> -static int sec_aead_verify(struct sec_req *req, struct sec_qp_ctx *qp_ctx) > >> +static int sec_aead_verify(struct sec_req *req) > >> { > >> struct aead_request *aead_req = req->aead_req.aead_req; > >> struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(aead_req); > >> - u8 *mac_out = qp_ctx->res[req->req_id].out_mac; > >> size_t authsize = crypto_aead_authsize(tfm); > >> + u8 *mac_out = req->aead_req.out_mac; > > This change looks unrelated to the rest of the patch. > > Good cleanup but not part of adding pbuffer as far as I can tell. > With Pbuf, 'aead_req' will hold the operational 'out_mac' address from > 'res'. > With only SGL buffer, the 'out_mac' of 'aead_req' is only from 'out_mac' > of 'res'. > So, should update here. > > > >> u8 *mac = mac_out + SEC_MAX_MAC_LEN; > >> struct scatterlist *sgl = aead_req->src; > >> size_t sz; > >> @@ -163,7 +177,7 @@ static void sec_req_cb(struct hisi_qp *qp, void *resp) > >> } > >> > >> if (ctx->alg_type == SEC_AEAD && !req->c_req.encrypt) > >> - err = sec_aead_verify(req, qp_ctx); > >> + err = sec_aead_verify(req); > >> > >> atomic64_inc(&ctx->sec->debug.dfx.recv_cnt); > >> > >> @@ -245,6 +259,50 @@ static void sec_free_mac_resource(struct device *dev, struct sec_alg_res *res) > >> res->out_mac, res->out_mac_dma); > >> } > >> > >> +static void sec_free_pbuf_resource(struct device *dev, struct sec_alg_res *res) > >> +{ > >> + if (res->pbuf) > >> + dma_free_coherent(dev, SEC_TOTAL_PBUF_SZ, > >> + res->pbuf, res->pbuf_dma); > >> +} > >> + > >> +/* > >> + * To improve performance, pbuffer is used for > >> + * small packets (< 576Bytes) as IOMMU translation using. > >> + */ > >> +static int sec_alloc_pbuf_resource(struct device *dev, struct sec_alg_res *res) > >> +{ > >> + int pbuf_page_offset; > >> + int i, j, k; > >> + > >> + res->pbuf = dma_alloc_coherent(dev, SEC_TOTAL_PBUF_SZ, > >> + &res->pbuf_dma, GFP_KERNEL); > > Would it make more sense perhaps to do this as a DMA pool and have > > it expand on demand? > Since there exist all kinds of buffer length, I think dma_alloc_coherent > may be better? As it currently stands we allocate a large buffer in one go but ensure we only have a single dma map that occurs at startup. If we allocate every time (don't use pbuf) performance is hit by the need to set up the page table entries and flush for every request. A dma pool with a fixed size element would at worst (for small messages) mean you had to do a dma map / unmap every time 6 ish buffers. This would only happen if you filled the whole queue. Under normal operation you will have a fairly steady number of buffers in use at a time, so mostly it would be reusing buffers that were already mapped from a previous request. You could implement your own allocator on top of dma_alloc_coherent but it'll probably be a messy and cost you more than using fixed size small elements. So a dmapool here would give you a mid point between using lots of memory and never needing to map/unmap vs map/unmap every time. > > > >> + if (!res->pbuf) > >> + return -ENOMEM; > >> + > >> + /* > >> + * SEC_PBUF_PKG contains data pbuf, iv and > >> + * out_mac : > >> + * Every PAGE contains six SEC_PBUF_PKG > >> + * The sec_qp_ctx contains QM_Q_DEPTH numbers of SEC_PBUF_PKG > >> + * So we need SEC_PBUF_PAGE_NUM numbers of PAGE > >> + * for the SEC_TOTAL_PBUF_SZ > >> + */ > >> + for (i = 0; i <= SEC_PBUF_PAGE_NUM; i++) { > >> + pbuf_page_offset = PAGE_SIZE * i; > >> + for (j = 0; j < SEC_PBUF_NUM; j++) { > >> + k = i * SEC_PBUF_NUM + j; > >> + if (k == QM_Q_DEPTH) > >> + break; > >> + res[k].pbuf = res->pbuf + > >> + j * SEC_PBUF_PKG + pbuf_page_offset; > >> + res[k].pbuf_dma = res->pbuf_dma + > >> + j * SEC_PBUF_PKG + pbuf_page_offset; > >> + } > >> + } > >> + return 0; > >> +} > >> + > >> static int sec_alg_resource_alloc(struct sec_ctx *ctx, > >> struct sec_qp_ctx *qp_ctx) > >> { > >> @@ -259,11 +317,17 @@ static int sec_alg_resource_alloc(struct sec_ctx *ctx, > >> if (ctx->alg_type == SEC_AEAD) { > >> ret = sec_alloc_mac_resource(dev, res); > >> if (ret) > >> - goto get_fail; > >> + goto alloc_fail; > >> + } > >> + if (ctx->pbuf_supported) { > >> + ret = sec_alloc_pbuf_resource(dev, res); > >> + if (ret) { > >> + dev_err(dev, "fail to alloc pbuf dma resource!\n"); > >> + goto alloc_fail; > >> + } > >> } > >> - > >> return 0; > >> -get_fail: > >> +alloc_fail: > >> sec_free_civ_resource(dev, res); > >> > >> return ret; > >> @@ -278,6 +342,8 @@ static void sec_alg_resource_free(struct sec_ctx *ctx, > >> > >> if (ctx->alg_type == SEC_AEAD) > >> sec_free_mac_resource(dev, qp_ctx->res); > >> + if (ctx->pbuf_supported) > >> + sec_free_pbuf_resource(dev, qp_ctx->res); > >> } > >> > >> static int sec_create_qp_ctx(struct hisi_qm *qm, struct sec_ctx *ctx, > >> @@ -368,6 +434,12 @@ static int sec_ctx_base_init(struct sec_ctx *ctx) > >> ctx->sec = sec; > >> ctx->hlf_q_num = sec->ctx_q_num >> 1; > >> > >> + if (ctx->sec->iommu_used) > >> + ctx->pbuf_supported = true; > >> + else > >> + ctx->pbuf_supported = false; > > ctx->pbuf_supported = ctx->sec->iommu_used; > yes, nice idea. > > > >> + ctx->use_pbuf = false; > >> + > >> /* Half of queue depth is taken as fake requests limit in the queue. */ > >> ctx->fake_req_limit = QM_Q_DEPTH >> 1; > >> ctx->qp_ctx = kcalloc(sec->ctx_q_num, sizeof(struct sec_qp_ctx), > >> @@ -447,7 +519,6 @@ static int sec_skcipher_init(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm) > >> struct sec_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); > >> int ret; > >> > >> - ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); > >> ctx->alg_type = SEC_SKCIPHER; > >> crypto_skcipher_set_reqsize(tfm, sizeof(struct sec_req)); > >> ctx->c_ctx.ivsize = crypto_skcipher_ivsize(tfm); > >> @@ -591,11 +662,94 @@ GEN_SEC_SETKEY_FUNC(3des_cbc, SEC_CALG_3DES, SEC_CMODE_CBC) > >> GEN_SEC_SETKEY_FUNC(sm4_xts, SEC_CALG_SM4, SEC_CMODE_XTS) > >> GEN_SEC_SETKEY_FUNC(sm4_cbc, SEC_CALG_SM4, SEC_CMODE_CBC) > >> > >> -static int sec_cipher_map(struct device *dev, struct sec_req *req, > >> +static int sec_cipher_pbuf_map(struct sec_ctx *ctx, struct sec_req *req, > >> + struct scatterlist *src) > >> +{ > >> + struct aead_request *aead_req = req->aead_req.aead_req; > >> + struct sec_cipher_req *c_req = &req->c_req; > >> + struct sec_qp_ctx *qp_ctx = req->qp_ctx; > >> + struct device *dev = SEC_CTX_DEV(ctx); > >> + int copy_size, pbuf_length; > >> + int req_id = req->req_id; > >> + > >> + if (ctx->alg_type == SEC_AEAD) > >> + copy_size = aead_req->cryptlen + aead_req->assoclen; > >> + else > >> + copy_size = c_req->c_len; > >> + > >> + pbuf_length = sg_copy_to_buffer(src, sg_nents(src), > >> + qp_ctx->res[req_id].pbuf, > >> + copy_size); > >> + > >> + if (unlikely(pbuf_length != copy_size)) { > >> + dev_err(dev, "copy src data to pbuf error!\n"); > >> + return -EINVAL; > >> + } > >> + > >> + c_req->c_in_dma = qp_ctx->res[req_id].pbuf_dma; > >> + > >> + if (!c_req->c_in_dma) { > >> + dev_err(dev, "fail to set pbuffer address!\n"); > >> + return -ENOMEM; > >> + } > >> + > >> + c_req->c_out_dma = c_req->c_in_dma; > >> + > >> + return 0; > >> +} > >> + > >> +static void sec_cipher_pbuf_unmap(struct sec_ctx *ctx, struct sec_req *req, > >> + struct scatterlist *dst) > >> +{ > >> + struct aead_request *aead_req = req->aead_req.aead_req; > >> + struct sec_cipher_req *c_req = &req->c_req; > >> + struct sec_qp_ctx *qp_ctx = req->qp_ctx; > >> + struct device *dev = SEC_CTX_DEV(ctx); > >> + int copy_size, pbuf_length; > >> + int req_id = req->req_id; > >> + > >> + if (ctx->alg_type == SEC_AEAD) > >> + copy_size = c_req->c_len + aead_req->assoclen; > >> + else > >> + copy_size = c_req->c_len; > >> + > >> + pbuf_length = sg_copy_from_buffer(dst, sg_nents(dst), > >> + qp_ctx->res[req_id].pbuf, > >> + copy_size); > >> + > >> + if (unlikely(pbuf_length != copy_size)) > >> + dev_err(dev, "copy pbuf data to dst error!\n"); > >> + > >> +} > >> + > >> +static int sec_cipher_map(struct sec_ctx *ctx, struct sec_req *req, > >> struct scatterlist *src, struct scatterlist *dst) > >> { > >> struct sec_cipher_req *c_req = &req->c_req; > >> + struct sec_aead_req *a_req = &req->aead_req; > >> struct sec_qp_ctx *qp_ctx = req->qp_ctx; > >> + struct sec_alg_res *res = &qp_ctx->res[req->req_id]; > >> + struct device *dev = SEC_CTX_DEV(ctx); > >> + int ret; > >> + > >> + if (ctx->use_pbuf) { > >> + ret = sec_cipher_pbuf_map(ctx, req, src); > >> + c_req->c_ivin = res->pbuf + SEC_PBUF_IV_OFFSET; > >> + c_req->c_ivin_dma = res->pbuf_dma + SEC_PBUF_IV_OFFSET; > >> + if (ctx->alg_type == SEC_AEAD) { > >> + a_req->out_mac = res->pbuf + SEC_PBUF_MAC_OFFSET; > >> + a_req->out_mac_dma = res->pbuf_dma + > >> + SEC_PBUF_MAC_OFFSET; > >> + } > >> + > >> + return ret; > >> + } > >> + c_req->c_ivin = res->c_ivin; > >> + c_req->c_ivin_dma = res->c_ivin_dma; > >> + if (ctx->alg_type == SEC_AEAD) { > >> + a_req->out_mac = res->out_mac; > >> + a_req->out_mac_dma = res->out_mac_dma; > >> + } > >> > >> c_req->c_in = hisi_acc_sg_buf_map_to_hw_sgl(dev, src, > >> qp_ctx->c_in_pool, > >> @@ -626,29 +780,34 @@ static int sec_cipher_map(struct device *dev, struct sec_req *req, > >> return 0; > >> } > >> > >> -static void sec_cipher_unmap(struct device *dev, struct sec_cipher_req *req, > >> +static void sec_cipher_unmap(struct sec_ctx *ctx, struct sec_req *req, > >> struct scatterlist *src, struct scatterlist *dst) > >> { > >> - if (dst != src) > >> - hisi_acc_sg_buf_unmap(dev, src, req->c_in); > >> + struct sec_cipher_req *c_req = &req->c_req; > >> + struct device *dev = SEC_CTX_DEV(ctx); > >> > >> - hisi_acc_sg_buf_unmap(dev, dst, req->c_out); > >> + if (ctx->use_pbuf) { > > Are we sure this flag can't have changed? > I thinks this is a bug, we will update it. > >> + sec_cipher_pbuf_unmap(ctx, req, dst); > >> + } else { > >> + if (dst != src) > >> + hisi_acc_sg_buf_unmap(dev, src, c_req->c_in); > >> + > >> + hisi_acc_sg_buf_unmap(dev, dst, c_req->c_out); > >> + } > >> } > >> > >> static int sec_skcipher_sgl_map(struct sec_ctx *ctx, struct sec_req *req) > >> { > >> struct skcipher_request *sq = req->c_req.sk_req; > >> > >> - return sec_cipher_map(SEC_CTX_DEV(ctx), req, sq->src, sq->dst); > >> + return sec_cipher_map(ctx, req, sq->src, sq->dst); > >> } > >> > >> static void sec_skcipher_sgl_unmap(struct sec_ctx *ctx, struct sec_req *req) > >> { > >> - struct device *dev = SEC_CTX_DEV(ctx); > >> - struct sec_cipher_req *c_req = &req->c_req; > >> - struct skcipher_request *sk_req = c_req->sk_req; > >> + struct skcipher_request *sq = req->c_req.sk_req; > >> > >> - sec_cipher_unmap(dev, c_req, sk_req->src, sk_req->dst); > >> + sec_cipher_unmap(ctx, req, sq->src, sq->dst); > >> } > >> > >> static int sec_aead_aes_set_key(struct sec_cipher_ctx *c_ctx, > >> @@ -759,16 +918,14 @@ static int sec_aead_sgl_map(struct sec_ctx *ctx, struct sec_req *req) > >> { > >> struct aead_request *aq = req->aead_req.aead_req; > >> > >> - return sec_cipher_map(SEC_CTX_DEV(ctx), req, aq->src, aq->dst); > >> + return sec_cipher_map(ctx, req, aq->src, aq->dst); > >> } > >> > >> static void sec_aead_sgl_unmap(struct sec_ctx *ctx, struct sec_req *req) > >> { > >> - struct device *dev = SEC_CTX_DEV(ctx); > >> - struct sec_cipher_req *cq = &req->c_req; > >> struct aead_request *aq = req->aead_req.aead_req; > >> > >> - sec_cipher_unmap(dev, cq, aq->src, aq->dst); > >> + sec_cipher_unmap(ctx, req, aq->src, aq->dst); > >> } > >> > >> static int sec_request_transfer(struct sec_ctx *ctx, struct sec_req *req) > >> @@ -801,9 +958,9 @@ static void sec_request_untransfer(struct sec_ctx *ctx, struct sec_req *req) > >> static void sec_skcipher_copy_iv(struct sec_ctx *ctx, struct sec_req *req) > >> { > >> struct skcipher_request *sk_req = req->c_req.sk_req; > >> - u8 *c_ivin = req->qp_ctx->res[req->req_id].c_ivin; > >> + struct sec_cipher_req *c_req = &req->c_req; > >> > >> - memcpy(c_ivin, sk_req->iv, ctx->c_ctx.ivsize); > >> + memcpy(c_req->c_ivin, sk_req->iv, ctx->c_ctx.ivsize); > >> } > >> > >> static int sec_skcipher_bd_fill(struct sec_ctx *ctx, struct sec_req *req) > >> @@ -818,8 +975,7 @@ static int sec_skcipher_bd_fill(struct sec_ctx *ctx, struct sec_req *req) > >> memset(sec_sqe, 0, sizeof(struct sec_sqe)); > >> > >> sec_sqe->type2.c_key_addr = cpu_to_le64(c_ctx->c_key_dma); > >> - sec_sqe->type2.c_ivin_addr = > >> - cpu_to_le64(req->qp_ctx->res[req->req_id].c_ivin_dma); > >> + sec_sqe->type2.c_ivin_addr = cpu_to_le64(c_req->c_ivin_dma); > >> sec_sqe->type2.data_src_addr = cpu_to_le64(c_req->c_in_dma); > >> sec_sqe->type2.data_dst_addr = cpu_to_le64(c_req->c_out_dma); > >> > >> @@ -836,7 +992,10 @@ static int sec_skcipher_bd_fill(struct sec_ctx *ctx, struct sec_req *req) > >> cipher = SEC_CIPHER_DEC << SEC_CIPHER_OFFSET; > >> sec_sqe->type_cipher_auth = bd_type | cipher; > >> > >> - sa_type = SEC_SGL << SEC_SRC_SGL_OFFSET; > >> + if (ctx->use_pbuf) > >> + sa_type = SEC_PBUF << SEC_SRC_SGL_OFFSET; > >> + else > >> + sa_type = SEC_SGL << SEC_SRC_SGL_OFFSET; > >> scene = SEC_COMM_SCENE << SEC_SCENE_OFFSET; > >> if (c_req->c_in_dma != c_req->c_out_dma) > >> de = 0x1 << SEC_DE_OFFSET; > >> @@ -844,7 +1003,10 @@ static int sec_skcipher_bd_fill(struct sec_ctx *ctx, struct sec_req *req) > >> sec_sqe->sds_sa_type = (de | scene | sa_type); > >> > >> /* Just set DST address type */ > >> - da_type = SEC_SGL << SEC_DST_SGL_OFFSET; > >> + if (ctx->use_pbuf) > >> + da_type = SEC_PBUF << SEC_DST_SGL_OFFSET; > >> + else > >> + da_type = SEC_SGL << SEC_DST_SGL_OFFSET; > >> sec_sqe->sdm_addr_type |= da_type; > >> > >> sec_sqe->type2.clen_ivhlen |= cpu_to_le32(c_req->c_len); > >> @@ -904,9 +1066,9 @@ static void sec_skcipher_callback(struct sec_ctx *ctx, struct sec_req *req, > >> static void sec_aead_copy_iv(struct sec_ctx *ctx, struct sec_req *req) > >> { > >> struct aead_request *aead_req = req->aead_req.aead_req; > >> - u8 *c_ivin = req->qp_ctx->res[req->req_id].c_ivin; > >> + struct sec_cipher_req *c_req = &req->c_req; > >> > >> - memcpy(c_ivin, aead_req->iv, ctx->c_ctx.ivsize); > >> + memcpy(c_req->c_ivin, aead_req->iv, ctx->c_ctx.ivsize); > >> } > >> > >> static void sec_auth_bd_fill_ex(struct sec_auth_ctx *ctx, int dir, > >> @@ -939,8 +1101,7 @@ static void sec_auth_bd_fill_ex(struct sec_auth_ctx *ctx, int dir, > >> > >> sec_sqe->type2.cipher_src_offset = cpu_to_le16((u16)aq->assoclen); > >> > >> - sec_sqe->type2.mac_addr = > >> - cpu_to_le64(req->qp_ctx->res[req->req_id].out_mac_dma); > >> + sec_sqe->type2.mac_addr = cpu_to_le64(a_req->out_mac_dma); > >> } > >> > >> static int sec_aead_bd_fill(struct sec_ctx *ctx, struct sec_req *req) > >> @@ -964,6 +1125,7 @@ static void sec_aead_callback(struct sec_ctx *c, struct sec_req *req, int err) > >> { > >> struct aead_request *a_req = req->aead_req.aead_req; > >> struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(a_req); > >> + struct sec_aead_req *aead_req = &req->aead_req; > >> struct sec_cipher_req *c_req = &req->c_req; > >> size_t authsize = crypto_aead_authsize(tfm); > >> struct sec_qp_ctx *qp_ctx = req->qp_ctx; > >> @@ -979,7 +1141,7 @@ static void sec_aead_callback(struct sec_ctx *c, struct sec_req *req, int err) > >> struct scatterlist *sgl = a_req->dst; > >> > >> sz = sg_pcopy_from_buffer(sgl, sg_nents(sgl), > >> - qp_ctx->res[req->req_id].out_mac, > >> + aead_req->out_mac, > >> authsize, a_req->cryptlen + > >> a_req->assoclen); > >> > >> @@ -1031,6 +1193,7 @@ static int sec_request_init(struct sec_ctx *ctx, struct sec_req *req) > >> > >> static int sec_process(struct sec_ctx *ctx, struct sec_req *req) > >> { > >> + struct sec_cipher_req *c_req = &req->c_req; > >> int ret; > >> > >> ret = sec_request_init(ctx, req); > >> @@ -1057,12 +1220,10 @@ static int sec_process(struct sec_ctx *ctx, struct sec_req *req) > >> /* As failing, restore the IV from user */ > >> if (ctx->c_ctx.c_mode == SEC_CMODE_CBC && !req->c_req.encrypt) { > >> if (ctx->alg_type == SEC_SKCIPHER) > >> - memcpy(req->c_req.sk_req->iv, > >> - req->qp_ctx->res[req->req_id].c_ivin, > >> + memcpy(req->c_req.sk_req->iv, c_req->c_ivin, > >> ctx->c_ctx.ivsize); > >> else > >> - memcpy(req->aead_req.aead_req->iv, > >> - req->qp_ctx->res[req->req_id].c_ivin, > >> + memcpy(req->aead_req.aead_req->iv, c_req->c_ivin, > >> ctx->c_ctx.ivsize); > >> } > >> > >> @@ -1208,6 +1369,10 @@ static int sec_skcipher_param_check(struct sec_ctx *ctx, struct sec_req *sreq) > >> return -EINVAL; > >> } > >> sreq->c_req.c_len = sk_req->cryptlen; > >> + > >> + if (ctx->pbuf_supported && sk_req->cryptlen <= SEC_PBUF_SZ) > >> + ctx->use_pbuf = true; > > This is request specific so a bit nasty to put it in the context. If nothing > > else it means reviewing this properly requires careful checking that there > > isn't a race on that variable. Can we put the flag in the request somewhere? > Will fix here in V2. > > Cheers, > Zaibo > > . > > > >> + > >> if (c_alg == SEC_CALG_3DES) { > >> if (unlikely(sk_req->cryptlen & (DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE - 1))) { > >> dev_err(dev, "skcipher 3des input length error!\n"); > >> @@ -1321,11 +1486,16 @@ static int sec_aead_param_check(struct sec_ctx *ctx, struct sec_req *sreq) > >> struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req); > >> size_t authsize = crypto_aead_authsize(tfm); > >> > >> - if (unlikely(!req->src || !req->dst || !req->cryptlen)) { > >> + if (unlikely(!req->src || !req->dst || !req->cryptlen || > >> + req->assoclen > SEC_MAX_AAD_LEN)) { > >> dev_err(SEC_CTX_DEV(ctx), "aead input param error!\n"); > >> return -EINVAL; > >> } > >> > >> + if (ctx->pbuf_supported && (req->cryptlen + req->assoclen) <= > >> + SEC_PBUF_SZ) > >> + ctx->use_pbuf = true; > >> + > >> /* Support AES only */ > >> if (unlikely(c_alg != SEC_CALG_AES)) { > >> dev_err(SEC_CTX_DEV(ctx), "aead crypto alg error!\n"); > > > > . > > > >