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Date:   Mon, 2 Nov 2020 14:44:35 +0100
From:   Torsten Duwe <duwe@lst.de>
To:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
        "Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc:     Stephan =?UTF-8?B?TcO8bGxlcg==?= <smueller@chronox.de>,
        Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
        Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
        "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
        "Alexander E. Patrakov" <patrakov@gmail.com>,
        "Ahmed S. Darwish" <darwish.07@gmail.com>,
        Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>,
        Vito Caputo <vcaputo@pengaru.com>,
        Andreas Dilger <adilger.kernel@dilger.ca>,
        Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>, Ray Strode <rstrode@redhat.com>,
        William Jon McCann <mccann@jhu.edu>,
        zhangjs <zachary@baishancloud.com>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
        Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
        Lennart Poettering <mzxreary@0pointer.de>,
        Peter Matthias <matthias.peter@bsi.bund.de>,
        Marcelo Henrique Cerri <marcelo.cerri@canonical.com>,
        Neil Horman <nhorman@redhat.com>,
        Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
        Julia Lawall <julia.lawall@inria.fr>,
        Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>,
        And y Lavr <andy.lavr@gmail.com>,
        Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>,
        "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>,
        Petr Tesarik <ptesarik@suse.cz>, simo@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v36 00/13] /dev/random - a new approach
Message-ID: <20201102154435.71cab8c0@blackhole>
In-Reply-To: <20201028180728.GA2831268@kroah.com>
References: <20200921075857.4424-1-nstange@suse.de>
        <2961243.vtBmWVcJkq@tauon.chronox.de>
        <20201016172619.GA18410@lst.de>
        <3073852.aeNJFYEL58@positron.chronox.de>
        <20201028185117.74300988@blackhole.lan>
        <20201028180728.GA2831268@kroah.com>
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On Wed, 28 Oct 2020 19:07:28 +0100
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

> On Wed, Oct 28, 2020 at 06:51:17PM +0100, Torsten Duwe wrote:
> > On Mon, 19 Oct 2020 21:28:50 +0200
> > Stephan Müller <smueller@chronox.de> wrote:
> > [...]
> > > * Sole use of crypto for data processing:
> > [...]
> > >  - The LRNG uses only properly defined and implemented
> > > cryptographic algorithms unlike the use of the SHA-1
> > > transformation in the existing /dev/random implementation.
> > > 
> > >  - Hash operations use NUMA-node-local hash instances to benefit
> > > large parallel systems.
> > > 
> > >  - LRNG uses limited number of data post-processing steps
> > [...]
> > > * Performance
> > > 
> > >  - Faster by up to 75% in the critical code path of the interrupt
> > > handler depending on data collection size configurable at kernel
> > > compile time - the default is about equal in performance with
> > > existing /dev/random as outlined in [2] section 4.2.
> > 
> > [...]
> > >  - ChaCha20 DRNG is significantly faster as implemented in the
> > > existing /dev/random as demonstrated with [2] table 2.
> > > 
> > >  - Faster entropy collection during boot time to reach fully
> > > seeded level, including on virtual systems or systems with SSDs as
> > > outlined in [2] section 4.1.
> > > 
> > > * Testing
> > [...]
> > 
> > So we now have 2 proposals for a state-of-the-art RNG, and over a
> > month without a single comment on-topic from any `get_maintainer.pl`
> > 
> > I don't want to emphasise the certification aspects so much. The
> > interrelation is rather that those certifications require certain
> > code features, features which are reasonable per se. But the
> > current code is lagging way behind.
> > 
> > I see the focus namely on performance, scalability, testability and
> > virtualisation. And it certainly is an advantage to use the code
> > already present under crypto, with its optimisations, and not rely
> > on some home brew.
> > 
> > Can we please have a discussion about how to proceed?
> > Ted, Greg, Arnd: which approach would you prefer?
> 
> Greg and Arnd are not the random driver maintainers, as is now
> correctly shown in the 5.10-rc1 MAINTAINERS file, so I doubt we (well
> at least I) have any say here, sorry.

No problem. get_maintainer (for the proposals) works on paths, not on
topics and I didn't want to leave anybody out.

Ted, if you don't have the time any more to take care of /dev/random,
it's not a shame to hand over maintainership, especially given your
long history of Linux contributions.

Please do seriously consider to hand it over to someone new. This would
be a good opportunity.

	Torsten